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SUMMARY
Canada’s federal government has championed the prospect of exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to overseas markets.
The government of British Columbia is aggressively planning to turn itself into a global LNG-export hub, and the prospect
for Canadian LNG exports is positive. However, there are market and political uncertainties that must be overcome in a
relatively short period of time if Canada is to become a natural gas exporter to a country other than the United States. This
report assesses the feasibility of Canadian exports and examines the policy challenges involved in making the opportunity
a reality.
Demand for natural gas in the Asia-Pacific region is forecast to grow over 60 per cent by 2025. LNG trade is expected to
make up nearly two-thirds of global natural gas trade by 2035. Supply in the Asia-Pacific region is limited, requiring
significant LNG imports with corresponding infrastructure investment. This results in substantial price differentials between
North America and the Asia-Pacific countries, creating a potentially lucrative opportunity for Canada. 
The lower North American prices are a reflection of the fact that there is a surplus of gas on this continent. Canada’s
shipments to its sole export market, the United States, are shrinking in the face of vast increases in American production
of shale and tight gas. Canada has a surplus of natural gas and there is growing demand in the Asia-Pacific region.
Proponents argue that all Canada needs to do is build and supply facilities to liquefy gas and ship it across the Pacific; the
reality is not so simple.
Timing is one of the key challenges Canada faces. Producers around the world — including in the newly gas-rich U.S. — are
racing to lock up market-share in the Asia-Pacific region, in many cases much more aggressively than Canada. While this
market is robust and growing, the nature of the contracts for delivery will favour actors that are earliest in the queue;
margins for those arriving late will be slimmer and less certain over time. As supply grows, so too does the likelihood of
falling gas prices in the Asia-Pacific region, making later projects less lucrative. LNG projects are feasible only on the basis
of long-term contracts; once a piece of market share is acquired, it could be decades before it becomes available again.
Currently, there are more proposed LNG-export projects around the world than will be required to meet projected demand
for the foreseeable future. 
Delays beyond 2024 risk complete competitive loss of market entry for Canadian companies. B.C. is behind schedule on
the government’s goal of having a single terminal operational by 2015. Of equal concern is the lack of policy and regulatory
co-ordination, with disagreements between governments over standards, process and compensation for those
stakeholders involved in the potential LNG industry. Issues as basic as taxing and royalty charges for gas shipments
between provinces and locating facilities and marine-safety standards remain unsettled in Canada. The B.C. government
has announced plans to levy special taxes on LNG, a policy that could render many current proposals uncompetitive. 
The LNG market is much more complicated than current discussions suggest; this report delves into every aspect relevant
for Canada as a potential exporter. The prospect for Canada expanding into the Asia-Pacific market is entirely viable.
Canada has almost everything going for it: political stability, free-market principles, immense resources, extensive
infrastructure and industry experience. Everything, that is, except a co-ordinated regulatory and policy regime. Without
that, Canada could be shut out, stuck relying on a single U.S. gas-export market that, increasingly, does not need us. 
† The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the anonymous referees. The authors would also like
to thank Brian Conger and Stephanie Symonds for excellent research assistance.
www.policyschool.ca
Volume 7 • numéro 18 • juillet 2014
UN PARI RISQUÉ : L’ENJEU DE LA CONJONCTURE, DE 
L’ACCÈS ET DU RENDEMENT DANS LE MARCHÉ DU GNL  
DE LA RÉGION ASIE-PACIFIQUE†
M.C. Moore, D. Hackett, L. Noda, J. Winter, R. Karski et M. Pilcher, 
École de politiques publiques
RÉSUMÉ
Le gouvernement fédéral du Canada a encouragé l’exportation de gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL) dans les marchés étrangers. 
Le gouvernement de la Colombie Britannique s’emploie activement à devenir un pôle d’exportation mondial de GNL, et la 
perspective est encourageante pour les exportations de GNL du pays. Cependant, le Canada devra surmonter relativement 
rapidement certaines incertitudes commerciales et politiques s’il veut exporter du gaz naturel ailleurs qu’aux États Unis. Les 
auteurs du présent rapport évaluent la faisabilité des exportations canadiennes et examinent les défis stratégiques à relever en 
vue d’atteindre cet objectif.
On prévoit que la demande en gaz naturel dans la région Asie-Pacifique croîtra de plus de 60 pour cent d’ici 2025. Le commerce 
du GNL devrait constituer près des deux tiers du commerce mondial du gaz naturel d’ici 2035. La région Asie-Pacifique, 
dont l’approvisionnement en gaz naturel est limité, nécessitera d’importantes importations de GNL et des investissements en 
infrastructure pour les acheminer. Il en résultera des écarts de prix substantiels entre l’Amérique du Nord et les pays d’Asie-
Pacifique, créant ainsi un débouché potentiellement lucratif pour le Canada.
La baisse des prix nord-américains correspond aux excédents de gaz naturel pour ce continent. Les livraisons du Canada vers 
son seul marché d’exportation, les États Unis, diminuent en raison des vastes augmentations de la production américaine de 
gaz de schiste et de gaz de formation imperméable. Le Canada possède des excédents de gaz naturel, une ressource qui fait de 
plus en plus défaut dans la région Asie-Pacifique. Certains soutiennent que le Canada n’a qu’à construire et à approvisionner des 
installations afin de liquéfier le gaz et de l’expédier à travers l’océan Pacifique; la réalité n’est pas si simple.
L’une des principales difficultés pour le Canada consiste à profiter de la conjoncture pendant qu’elle est encore favorable. Les 
producteurs du monde entier — dont les États Unis, devenus récemment riches en gaz — se disputent les parts de marché dans la 
région Asie-Pacifique, souvent bien plus activement que le Canada. Ce marché est vigoureux et en pleine croissance, mais il faut 
savoir que les contrats de livraison reposent sur la règle du « premier arrivé, premier servi » : les marges de profit des retardataires 
seront donc plus minces et moins sûres au fil du temps. Plus l’offre augmentera, plus les prix du gaz risqueront de diminuer dans 
la région Asie-Pacifique, ce qui réduira la rentabilité des projets lancés tardivement. Les projets de GNL ne sont possibles que 
dans le cadre de contrats à long terme; par conséquent, un concurrent qui accapare une part du marché pourrait la conserver 
pendant des décennies. Par ailleurs, à l’heure actuelle, l’offre cumulée des projets d’exportation de GNL proposés dans le monde 
dépasse la demande projetée pour un avenir prévisible.
Si le Canada tarde à agir d’ici 2024, les entreprises canadiennes risquent de perdre tout accès concurrentiel au marché. Or, on 
sait déjà que le gouvernement de Colombie-Britannique n’arrivera pas à se doter d’un terminal opérationnel en 2015, comme 
prévu. À cela s’ajoute l’absence de coordination des politiques et des règlements, qui est tout aussi préoccupante; en effet, les 
gouvernements n’arrivent pas à s’entendre sur les normes, le processus et l’indemnisation pour les intervenants qui agiraient dans 
le secteur du GNL. C’est pourquoi des questions aussi fondamentales que la taxation et les redevances pour les livraisons de gaz 
entre les provinces, l’emplacement des installations et les normes en matière de sécurité maritime ne sont toujours pas réglées. 
En outre, le gouvernement de la Colombie-Britannique a annoncé son intention de percevoir des taxes spéciales sur le GNL, une 
politique qui enlèverait toute compétitivité à de nombreuses propositions.
Le marché du GNL est beaucoup plus compliqué que les discussions actuelles ne le laissent entendre; le présent rapport se 
penche sur l’ensemble des aspects pertinents pour le Canada, en tant qu’exportateur potentiel. La perspective d’accroître les 
exportations du pays dans le marché Asie-Pacifique est tout à fait viable, le Canada disposant de presque tous les atouts : une 
stabilité politique, des principes de libre marché, d’immenses ressources, de vastes infrastructures et une grande expérience 
dans ce secteur. Il ne lui manque qu’une chose : un régime de politiques et de règlements coordonnés. Faute de quoi, ce nouveau 
débouché pourrait lui échapper, le laissant ainsi contraint d’exporter exclusivement son gaz aux États-Unis, un pays qui a de 
moins en moins besoin de nous.
† 
Les auteurs tiennent à remercier les lecteurs critiques anonymes de leurs commentaires pertinents. Ils aimeraient également 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this report is to analyze the potential for future deliveries of Canadian natural gas1
to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, in terms of demand in those countries and the cost
competitiveness of Canadian supply. By definition, this report creates a distinction between
natural gas supplies sourced from Canadian provinces, and the physical system (liquefied
natural gas, or LNG) used to transport them. This distinction is important because of the need
for Canadian producers to gain access to domestic tidewater ports using new or repurposed
pipeline systems, to gain access to sufficient capital for construction of new facilities, and to
secure contracts for delivery of reliable quantities of natural gas.
In all of this, costs and benefits to Canadian citizens are at issue, as are political and regulatory
relationships. While costs and benefits for Canadians are critical areas for discussion, the
regulatory arena, where projects are approved or denied, is the appropriate place to evaluate
those costs and benefits.2 We do not discuss these issues in this paper, other than by reference
(such as the success or failure of permits for pipeline and port construction) where they are
factored into our analysis in terms of cost and timing. We do not evaluate the effect of a new gas
export industry on the economy either in terms of consumer impacts, government revenues, the
land impacts on First Nations lands or the extension of those impacts on Aboriginal groups with
and without treaty rights, although we acknowledge that the LNG industry will not develop until
these issues are resolved. Our goal is to evaluate the demand for natural gas in the Asia-Pacific
region, and assess the feasibility of Canadian exports relative to other competitors. 
This report is divided into nine sections. Following the introduction, we provide in the second
section a brief overview of LNG pricing and contracts, supplies from Canada, and expected
demand in the Asia-Pacific region. Third, we provide further detail on the structure of global
LNG markets. Fourth, we detail demand for natural gas and LNG in the Asia-Pacific region.
Fifth, we outline Canada’s competitors in supplying LNG to Asian markets. Sixth, we discuss
Canada’s potential as an LNG supplier, including a discussion of expected costs. Seventh, we
discuss the nature of risk in LNG markets. In the eighth section, we detail the policy
implications of an LNG industry expansion in Canada, and draw final conclusions in section
nine.
The value of this report lies in examining the dynamic public policy prescriptions in Canada in
the context of the competitive role of Canadian natural gas exports. Ultimately, in order to
access Asia-Pacific markets, new policies dealing with interprovincial infrastructure agreements,
environmental standards, tariffs and taxes, and rights of way, must be developed, all in the
context of timely access to markets for Canadian gas supplies. This report also points out the
need for consistent policies and guidelines for tidewater-port choice and development standards.
1 We use dry gas as a reference point; natural gas with liquids (NGL) commands a higher price currently, but market
circumstances for that commodity are currently in a state of flux and consequently we cannot estimate the role of
NGLs in a future Asia-Pacific market. See Appendix B for details on natural gas characteristics.
2 Before the National Energy Board (NEB) grants export permits, it must formally assess and determine that impacts on
Canadian domestic service are fully mitigated and will not result in significant price impacts (See section 6.2 for
details).
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The expansion of shale gas production in Canada and the United States has created
opportunities to export LNG from both countries. This is reflected in the current price
differential between Asian importing countries and the wellhead price for gas in North
America. Overall, demand in the Asia-Pacific region is forecast to grow approximately 4.4 per
cent a year to 2025.3
The risks and rewards represented by entry into the LNG market in the Asia-Pacific region are
substantial. Surplus Canadian natural gas, not consumed domestically, is currently shipped
exclusively to the United States, where market prices are low and projected to remain so for
the foreseeable future. This problem of persistently low prices is amplified by the increasing
development of shale gas and other unconventional sources4 in the United States, leading to
declining shares in one of Canada’s traditional markets.5 Since the current price for natural gas
in the Asian market reflects robust and growing demand, finding shipping access to this market
commands a high priority.
There is a wide range of risks associated with developing this market, from public or
environmental quality to potentially misdirecting capital assets. A key element of risk is that of
the final price, which will naturally fluctuate over time with changes in supply and demand
balances. While the return on investment depends on both the capital cost and the margin
between delivered price and variable costs, a margin as low as US $4/MMBTU ($3.79/GJ) can
still result in a pre-tax rate of return above 10 per cent for projects with relatively low capital
costs. 
A great deal of regulatory and policy co-operation and co-ordination is required to gain
permission to build necessary facilities and convince demand sources and potential investors of
the reliable and consistent delivery of gas from Canada in order to capture viable market
shares. The role of the various actors is important in this arena since, ultimately, the business
community develops and serves new markets and raises the necessary capital for investment. 
However, there are many proposed liquefaction projects around the world and the longer
Canadian projects take to move forward, the more likely it becomes that Canadian supplies
will be displaced by these other projects. The capital requirements to build these facilities mean
long-term contracts are necessary to obtain adequate financing; delays mean contracts from
Asian countries will be signed with other suppliers. 
Thus, it is difficult to overstate the importance of acting before the equivalent market share is
acquired by competitive nations and companies with price levels and contract commitments
that represent costs of delivery below Canadian delivered resources. A race to the bottom risks
diversion and stranding of capital assets that might not be readily re-deployed. The advantage
of a consistent and timely plan for entering the market is represented by a combination of long-
term resource delivery contracts, as well as a strong industry investment domestically.
3 BP, BP Energy Outlook 2030 (2013).
4
“Unconventional gas” is an umbrella term used to describe production of natural gas that does not meet the criteria
for conventional gas production — production where geological pressure, reservoir and fluid characteristics are
sufficient for the resource to flow to the surface — that is a function of resource characteristics and available
technology, among other things. Further details are available in Appendix D (Definitions and Glossary).
5 In the past five years, there has been a shift from western Canadian gas being exported to the Eastern U.S. via
Eastern Canada, to natural gas from the Eastern U.S. supplanting western Canadian gas in supplying Eastern Canada.
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32. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
There is no demand for LNG per se;
there is only demand for natural gas.
LNG is simply natural gas cooled to a
liquid state at -162ºC so that it can be
transported in ships across oceans to
markets where the demand for natural
gas exceeds the supply of natural gas
from local sources. It is therefore
useful to put the “demand” for LNG in
context with the demand for natural
gas. In 2012, global natural gas
consumption (demand) was about
3,300 billion cubic metres (BCM),
equivalent to 117 trillion cubic feet
(TCF) or 9 billion cubic metres per
day (BCM/d).6 Global demand (total
imports) for LNG in 2012 was about
240 million tonnes (MMT), equivalent
to about 330 BCM of natural gas.7
Hence, the global demand for LNG,
natural gas in liquid form, represents
only 10 per cent of the total global
demand for natural gas.
Natural gas provides about one-fifth of
the world’s primary energy supplies.
About 70 per cent of global gas
production is consumed in the country
where it is produced, and about 30 per
cent of global gas production is
exported across international borders.
In 2012, about 1,030 BCM of natural gas was exported, of which about 700 BCM was
exported through cross-border pipelines, while about 330 BCM (32 per cent) was transported
in the form of LNG.8 Figure 2.1 shows major natural gas trade flows via pipeline and LNG for
2012.
6 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 (2014), http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-
economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html.
7 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014
8 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014
NATURAL GAS UNITS OF MEASUREMENT
The unit of measure for natural gas and LNG is not
standardized across or within countries. Natural gas is often
measured by volume — cubic metres (CM) or cubic feet (CF)
— or by heat content: joules (J) or British thermal units
(BTU). In contrast, LNG is often measured by its mass
(tonnes).
Terms used inconsistently and often interchangeably in the
gas and LNG market include:
VOLUME AND COMBUSTION UNITS
MCM = thousand cubic metres
MCM/BCM/TCM = million/billion/trillion cubic metres
MMCM = million cubic metres
MCF/BCF/TCF = million/billion/trillion cubic feet
MT/MMT = million (metric) tonnes
MBTU/MMBTU = million British thermal units
PJ/GJ/MJ/J = petajoule/gigajoule/megajoule/joule
RATE UNITS
MTPA = million (metric) tonnes per annum
MMTPA = million (metric) tonnes per annum
CF/d = cubic feet per day
CM/d = cubic metres per day
Additional details on units and conversion rates are
available in Appendix D.
In this paper, the primary unit of measurement for natural
gas is cubic metres (CM). For LNG, we will measure in
tonnes (T). For facility capacity, the unit is tonnes per
annum (TPA). For prices, as BTU is the international
standard, we will use U.S. dollars per MMBTU, and also
report dollars per GJ. In all cases, million will be represented
by MM.
FIGURE 2.1:  MAJOR NATURAL GAS TRADE MOVEMENTS IN 2012 (BCM)
Notes: The above figure does not show minor trade movements, such as imports to the Canaport facility in Saint John, 
N.B. According to National Energy Board (NEB) data, Canaport import volumes peaked at 3.35 BCM in 2011, 
and were 1.71 BCM in 2012, 49 per cent from Trinidad and Tobago and 51 per cent from Qatar. 
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013 (2013).
In North America, Canadian sedimentary basins and more recently developed shale deposits
(see Figure 2.5, below) supported a large fraction of U.S. demand and Canadian interprovincial
domestic needs.9 Around 2008, U.S. domestic production increased, leading to diminished
demand for Canadian gas and, in the case of Eastern Canada, reversed flows. 
The availability of Canadian gas is increasing, based on technological improvements allowing
access to unconventional shale and tight gas plays. Given the reality of lower demand for
Canadian gas in the continental U.S., a key to the economic development of Canada’s natural
gas resources lies in gaining tidewater access using LNG facilities and shipping. This potential
export market is evolving rapidly as other nations also work to develop export capacity. While
the National Energy Board has issued export permits for many proposed projects in B.C.,10
this is but one step of many. A lengthy regulatory process for site permitting and supply
pipelines has the potential to delay projects to the point where there is no market to supply.
Appearances of policy and regulatory uncertainty will affect access to financing, another
potential source of project failure. Much of the success of future development for Canadian
exports of natural gas will depend directly on development of adequate tidewater-port capacity
that will serve national as well as provincial interests, and ultimately involve Aboriginal as
well as public land holdings. 
9 Additional details on historical Canadian natural gas markets are available in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
10 National Energy Board website, “LNG Export License Applications,” http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rthnb/pplctnsbfrthnb/lngxprtlcncpplctns/lngxprtlcncpplctns-eng.html#s2.
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There are substantial rewards, both public and private, to overcoming challenges and
expanding this sector, including diversifying the Canadian energy economy. Lack of natural
gas export infrastructure in North America, combined with increased production, has led to
natural gas prices in Canada and the U.S. being lower than those in other markets. Natural gas
has been promoted as a “bridge fuel” that allows the transition away from carbon-intensive
energy sources.11 Its advantage is most apparent in terms of energy density, ease of transfer,
storage stability and comparatively attractive environmental impacts in terms of carbon
emissions from combustion.12 Power systems based on natural gas are beginning to displace
older, less-efficient thermal combustion, such as coal. There is some early indication that
compressed natural gas (CNG) and passenger-vehicle use of natural gas may increase. Some
demand growth for natural gas liquids has been appearing and some chemical industries based
on natural gas are coming back onshore. In short, both domestically and internationally, natural
gas markets are seen as having great growth and revenue potential.
Overall, natural gas demand has increased in developed as well as developing countries. For
instance, in 2012, for the first time, South America imported a larger volume of LNG
compared to North America, a reflection of increased demand in South America as well as
growing self-sufficiency in the United States from domestic gas supplies and its subsequent
curtailment of imports. Simultaneously, the Asia-Pacific region has been reaching as far away
as the Middle East and Africa to satisfy growing import demands. Natural gas demand in Japan
and South Korea is supplied by waterborne LNG because there are no pipeline connections to
producing regions. All (current and future) LNG exporters benefit from limited pipeline
networks in the Asia-Pacific region.
Challenges facing entrants to the Asia-Pacific market, however, are formidable if the full
potential of serving this market is going to be achieved. This includes the cost of new facilities
or upgrading/modifying existing facilities, in addition to securing project financing and
contracts with countries in the region. Investment in these new markets is attracting established
exporters who can target new capacity to growth areas in these countries and dominate the
emerging marketplace. Since Canada may arrive late13 to this market, the key challenge is to
obtain contract agreements as early as possible, with firm commitments to production and
access through accessible and safe port facilities. 
Additionally, the rapid increase of both exporters and new import facilities has dramatically
increased the complexity of the market and created price pressures for the existing trading-price
system. For example, LNG importers are pushing for contracts linked to North American prices
(currently much lower than Asian pricing points) rather than the traditional oil-linked prices.
11 Christina Nunez, “Can Natural Gas Be a Bridge to Clean Energy?” National Geographic, March 18, 2014,
http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/energy/great-energy-challenge/big-energy-question/can-
natural-gas-be-a-bridge-to-clean-energy/.
12 Natural gas power generation produces lower levels of NOx, SOx and particulates than does other thermal electric
generation such as coal. Transitioning from hydrocarbons, such as coal, requires consistent policy support ranging
from subsidies for preferred fuels to environmental standards and enforcement — literally a bridge from current to
future energy systems.
13 Other projects appear to be moving faster in securing contracts and proceeding to a final investment decision. U.S.
Gulf Coast projects have a cost advantage from converting regasification facilities to liquefaction; while they are
further from Asia than is the B.C. coast, the U.S. projects have the potential to supply Europe, which would divert
cargoes from suppliers such as Qatar, which supplies both Asia and Europe.
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Additional challenges specific to Canada include:
• Some uncertainty in domestic reserves based in unconventional supplies, adding risk to new
import facility investment.
• Potential new supplies from the Gulf Coast region will offer new challenges in terms of
price competition and volume.
There are associated opportunities in these markets as well including:
• Arbitrage opportunities based on large price differentials between North America and Asia-
Pacific countries.
• The demand for new LNG deliveries has helped drive the development of a more modern
shipping fleet, with safer operating characteristics and large average volume per trip.
2.1 Pricing and Contracts
In the United States and Canada, the price of natural gas is set in competitive markets based on
many variables including overall supply and demand, production and exploration levels,
storage injections and withdrawals, weather patterns, pricing and availability of competing
energy sources and market participants’ views of future trends in any of these or other
variables. Monthly natural gas demand (and prices) tends to fluctuate due to changes in
wholesale natural gas prices that, in turn, reflect seasonal demand for heating and power
generation (with corresponding twin peaks in winter and summer) and industrial base-loads. 
Natural gas trades on real-time (spot) markets as well as futures markets on exchanges such as
the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). The NYMEX natural gas futures contracts are
widely used as an international benchmark price and have been used in conjunction with oil
prices as a core index of value.14 Natural gas prices in North America reflect an integrated
supply-and-demand network, and are linked through an integrated North American marketplace
and pipeline system where the price of natural gas is largely determined based on supply and
demand. 
The physical nature of natural gas makes it less fungible than oil. As a result, regional markets
have developed, each with their own pricing point and energy-content characteristics.15 These
pricing points, or hubs, reflect physical manifolds or redistribution of gas to other regional
markets or storage points. The most common price point is at the Henry Hub in Louisiana; it
lends its name to the pricing point for natural gas futures contracts traded on the NYMEX, and
the over-the-counter swaps16 traded on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). The pricing
arrangements are for spot as well as futures for most of the world, although there are other hub
and transfer points, such as AECO in Alberta, where a price quote can be derived.
14 Gas futures contracts trade in units of 10,000 million British thermal units (MMBTU). The price is based on delivery
at the Henry Hub in Louisiana, the centre of 16 intrastate and interstate natural gas pipeline systems that draw
supplies from the region’s prolific gas deposits. The pipelines serve markets throughout the U.S. East Coast, Gulf
Coast and Midwestern U.S.
15 For an overview of different world pricing mechanisms, see: The Pricing of Internationally Traded Gas, ed. J. Stern
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
16 In this context, a commodity swap is a contract or agreement whereby a floating (market or spot) price is traded for a
fixed price over a specified period.
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Most Canadian gas is sourced from Alberta (with a significant future supply likely to come
from Northeast British Columbia). This gas is traded at the AECO hub, where the AECO “C”
spot price provides a differential benchmark to Henry Hub pricing in the United States.
Although Henry Hub pricing is a reference standard, it is not ubiquitous worldwide, and
primarily serves as a norm in the U.S.
Monthly natural gas prices for major global pricing points are shown in Figure 2.2; there is
clearly regional variation and substantial volatility in the prices shown. Henry Hub and AECO
move together, tied by the North American pipeline network. Most interesting is the divergence
in North American prices from the other three series near the end of 2008. The financial crisis
led to the fall in prices worldwide, and production from newly accessible unconventional gas
plays kept prices low in North America while other regions recovered. Shortfalls in North Sea
fields have begun to appear in recent periods for natural gas supplied to the U.K. market. The
dramatic increase in gas demand in Japan following the Fukushima nuclear disaster has driven
a resurgence of interest in LNG in the Asia-Pacific region, a shift that may continue far into the
future.
FIGURE 2.2:  MONTHLY GLOBAL GAS PRICES 2004 – 2013
Notes: The Europe price is composed of the average import border price and a spot price component, beginning April 
2010 including the U.K.; during June 2000 - March 2010, prices exclude the U.K.
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (Henry Hub, Europe, Japan LNG); Bloomberg (AECO, NGCDAECO; 
UK Net Balancing Point, NBPGWTHN).
In contrast to North America, gas markets in the Asia-Pacific region are dominated by long-
term contracts with the LNG price linked to the price of oil.17 The reason for oil-linked prices
is historical — Japan’s contracts in the 1970s had LNG linked to oil prices, as those were the
two main fuels used in power generation.18 Long-term contracts have three components: the oil   
17 Jonathan Stern, “International gas pricing in Europe and Asia: A crisis of fundamentals,” Energy Policy 64, 1 (2014):
43-48.
18 Stern, “International gas pricing.”
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price benchmark, the “price slope,” and a fixed term.19 The most common oil price benchmark
used is Japan Customs-cleared Crude (JCC), and the fixed term is generally related to shipping
costs. The main focus of contract negotiations between buyers and sellers is the indexation to
oil — known as the “price slope” — which determines the extent to which the LNG price
changes in response to a change in the price of crude oil. Ernst and Young notes that the
contract slope is usually around 14 or 15 per cent, slightly lower than the heat equivalence
between a barrel of oil and 1 million BTUs of natural gas.20 In addition, some contracts adjust
the slope percentages at different oil prices. One such example is a contract that has a flatter
slope at lower oil prices to protect sellers and a flatter slope at higher oil prices to protect
buyers, called an “S-curve.” Other contract variations protect only the seller (via a lower limit
on the oil price) or only the buyer (via an upper limit on the oil price). Figure 2.3 shows
example contracts.
FIGURE 2.3:  EXAMPLE LNG CONTRACT SLOPES
A consequence of the gas boom in Canada and the U.S. is the rash of proposals to export LNG
from Canada’s West Coast, the U.S. Gulf Coast and the U.S. West Coast. However, this has
created a shakeup in the LNG pricing world for two reasons. The first is that Henry Hub is an
alternative pricing point to JCC; the second is that new supplies have created additional
competition previously lacking.21 The Sabine Pass project in the U.S. Gulf Coast entered into
contracts with Asian buyers in 2011 and 2012 on a “Henry Hub-plus” basis.22 With a large
price differential between Henry Hub and Asian price points, it is no surprise that Asian buyers
appear eager for Henry Hub-linked prices rather than the traditional oil-linked contracts.
19 Ernst and Young, “Global LNG: Will new demand and new supply mean new pricing?” (2013).
20 Ernst and Young, “Global LNG.”
21 Stern, “International gas pricing.” 
22 Edward Klump and Rakteem Katakey, “Korea Gas to Buy U.S. LNG as Gas Slump Attracts Asian Importers,”
Bloomberg, January 30, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-30/cheniere-agrees-to-sabine-pass-export-
deal-with-korea-gas-1-.html.
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FIGURE 2.4:  ILLUSTRATIVE LNG PRICING OPTIONS: OIL-INDEXED VERSUS HENRY HUB-INDEXED
Note: The oil-linked price = Oil x 0.15 + 2. Henry Hub-plus = HH x 1.15 + 2. Pricing formulas from: The Pricing of 
Internationally Traded Gas, ed. J. Stern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Chapter 11, “LNG Pricing in Asia.”
Figure 2.4 shows LNG pricing when it is indexed to oil prices and indexed to Henry Hub. We
see from the figure that for oil prices below $90 USD/barrel and Henry Hub prices below $11
USD/MMBTU, a Henry Hub-indexed contract favours the buyer. However, as the slope on the
oil-linked price decreases, the contract line becomes flatter, lowering the oil price where Henry
Hub-plus is less than the oil-linked LNG price. Similarly, if the negotiated fixed component of
the Henry Hub-plus contract increases to $3 USD/MMBTU, the oil-linked contract is again
more appealing to buyers.
2.2 Canadian Gas Supply and Markets 
Canadian natural gas supplies are limited by the location of existing gas reserves in
sedimentary basins and unconventional shale deposits, primarily in western provinces (Figure
2.5). These gas-producing regions are tightly locked to U.S. distribution and consumption
centres in key ways, including existing long-term delivery contracts, existing infrastructure and
a lack of export access points. Coastal tidewater access is limited, with few ports and overland
access routes. 
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FIGURE 2.5:  CANADIAN SEDIMENTARY BASINS
Source: Sedimentary Basins from Natural Resources Canada, “Crude Oil and Natural Gas Resources, 2006,” map,
http://atlas.gc.ca/site/english/maps/energy.html; Shale basins from U.S. EIA, “World Shale Gas Resources: An
Initial Assessment of 14 Regions Outside the United States,” April 2011.
Canadian gas has historically served two markets: exports to the United States and domestic
use. The gas pipeline system in Canada and the U.S. is based around collection/distribution
hubs that serve as pricing points, illustrated in Figure 2.6. While Henry Hub is the main North
American pricing point, there are several additional sub-pricing points based on the location of
the resource, and the pipeline system delivering product to demand centres. Representative gas
flows are displayed in Figure 2.6. Historically, gas from the Western Canadian Sedimentary
Basin has supplied Eastern Canada, the U.S. Midwest, and the U.S. West Coast. Since 2007,
annual Canadian exports have been decreasing, while imports have been increasing since 2005.
More details on historical markets are available in Section 6.1.
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FIGURE 2.6:  REPRESENTATIVE NATURAL GAS HUBS AND TRADE FLOWS
Source: Based on National Energy Board Commodity Statistics database, “Gas – Historical Summary by Port.” 
Net Canadian exports to the U.S. have fallen from the peak of 0.3 BCM per day (BCM/d) in
2007 to 0.22 BCM/d in 2013.23 Bentek forecasts that this trend will continue, at least in the
short term, with Canadian gas exports to the U.S. possibly falling as low as 0.09 BCM/d by
2018.24 Canadian gas production, as a consequence, has fallen from 0.6 BCM/d in 2000 to 0.5
BCM/d in 2013.25 The National Energy Board expects marketable gas production to decline to
0.32 BCM/d (11.2 BCF/d) in 2018; from 2019 onwards, potential price increases and LNG
exports would support more drilling, causing production to increase, reaching 0.49 BCM/d
(17.4 BCF/d) in 2035.26
Canadian gas producers are facing the slow collapse of gas exports to the U.S. The primary
source of the decline can be found in the increase in U.S. shale gas production, coupled with
the construction of new pipelines to deliver U.S. gas to U.S. domestic buyers. Newly
accessible unconventional gas reserves are found widely throughout the U.S., and current costs
of production create strong incentives to build new domestic pipeline facilities to gain access to
this relatively inexpensive resource. In a unique and unexpected reversal, low-cost gas from the
Marcellus is now being imported into eastern Canadian markets at Niagara Falls.
23 Authors’ calculations from: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 131-0001, “Supply and disposition of natural gas.”
24 Bentek Energy, LNG Exports: The Global Thirst for North American Shale Gas (Denver: Platts, 2013).
25 Authors’ calculations from: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 131-0001, “Supply and disposition of natural gas.”
26 National Energy Board, “Canada’s Energy Future 2013: Energy Supply and Demand Projections to 2035 – Natural
Gas Outlook Highlights,” November 20, 2013, http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/nrgyftr/2013/fctshtntrlgs-eng.html.
Alberta Hub
AECO-C Hub
Sumas Center
Malin Center
Chicago Hub
Dawn Hub 
This represents a shift in terms and deliveries for the U.S. (Canada’s sole export client) and,
other than regional changes (Maine to Montreal and Atlantic Canada), a slow contraction of
demand for Canadian gas. The loss of contracted flows from west to east on the TransCanada
mainline reflects these changes domestically within Canada as well.27 In the absence of new
export markets, it is probable that Canadian production will remain stagnant, serving only
domestic and some U.S. demand.
Low domestic gas prices, linked with increased foreign demand, has stimulated interest in
developing alternative methods of shipping Canadian gas to offshore markets, where prices are
currently more robust than in Canada and the continental United States. Potential Canadian
LNG terminal locations are illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
There are currently 14 proposed liquefaction projects along the British Columbia coast, plus an
additional two in Oregon that will be supplied by Canadian natural gas. Eleven of these
projects have secured LNG export licences from the National Energy Board (NEB).28 The total
approved export capacity is 183 MMTPA (249 BCM), compared to Canada’s 2013 marketable
natural gas production of 141 BCM.29
We have identified six zones for the proposed facilities on the B.C. coast, illustrated in Figure 2.7.
In addition, there are seven natural gas pipelines planned to service the region, though the success
of the pipelines will undoubtedly depend on the success of proposed LNG export facilities.
Additional details on the proposed projects can be found in Section 6.3 and Appendix C.
FIGURE 2.7:  POTENTIAL LNG TERMINALS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
Source: See Appendix C.
27 Darren Campbell, “TransCanada launches open season for mainline conversion,” Alberta Oil, April 2, 2013,
http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/2013/04/transcanada-launches-open-season-for-mainline-conversion/.
28 Before the NEB grants export permits, it must formally assess impacts on Canadian domestic service and determine
that they are fully mitigated and will not result in significant price impacts. 
29 Authors’ calculations, from CANSIM Table 131-0001.
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2.3 Asia-Pacific Demand Overview
The Pacific Basin is a term of art, variously used to describe
the ocean area separating North America from Asia, but
occasionally expanded to include the western areas of Central
and South America and their trading ports in the Pacific
Basin. For this report, we are concerned with the practical
market opportunities for Canadian natural gas in the Northern
Hemisphere of the Pacific Basin, broadly including Japan,
China, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia and India.
One of the difficulties faced by exporters is the physical
challenge of navigating narrow channels such as the Straits of
Malacca, or a passage such as the Panama Canal. Speeds are reduced in these areas, safety is
potentially at risk from collisions, and vessel size is constrained. Smaller ships influence the
number of trips made to complete contracts and, while they do not strictly limit the potential to
meet market demand, the constraints do influence the price floor for the commodity.
FIGURE 2.8:  LNG IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS IN THE PACIFIC BASIN 
Source: See Appendix E amd F.
As noted by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Asia-Pacific natural gas market is
fragmented, and not highly interconnected by pipelines, as is the case in Europe and North
America.30 It can be argued that the region has three separate markets. The first is the
developed markets of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, considered to be traditional LNG
buyers, with limited future growth. The second is the emerging large consumers of India and
China, expected to have considerable future natural gas demand. The third market is in
Southeast Asia, with several large natural gas and LNG producers, in addition to limited
pipeline interconnections.
30 IEA, Developing a Natural Gas Trading Hub in Asia (Paris: 2013).
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DEFINING “ASIA-PACIFIC”
The IEA defines the Asia-Pacific
region as including OECD Asia-
Oceania (minus Israel), non-OECD
Asia, and China. Alphabetically:
Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei
Darussalam, Taiwan (Chinese
Taipei), India, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, New
Zealand, Pakistan, China (including
Hong Kong), the Philippines,
Thailand, Vietnam, and “other.”
The world demand for natural gas delivered as LNG increased 275 per cent between 1993 and
2012, equivalent to a compound annual average growth rate of 7.21 per cent.31 In the Asia-
Pacific region, recent strong growth in LNG imports is concentrated in China and India, though
year-over-year growth in Asia excluding China has averaged 12.9 per cent between 2009 and
2012.32
Growth in regasification capacity is a convenient proxy for the demand growth in the Asia-
Pacific basin since 2008 as LNG buyers expanded capacity in anticipation of increased
imports. Table 2.1 and Figure 2.9 show capacity utilization (imports divided by capacity) for
the major Asian LNG importers.33
TABLE 2.1:  MAJOR LNG IMPORTERS’ REGASIFICATION CAPACITY AND UTILIZATION (BCM)
Source: IEA, Natural Gas Information 2009-2013, 93-97. 
Four of the major importers in the Asia-Pacific region increased regasification capacity
between 2008 and 2012; China by almost 250 per cent. Taiwan is the sole country with a
capacity decrease. Capacity utilization increased in all five major importers, reflecting
increased demand for natural gas. It is noteworthy that China’s utilization rate is only 10
percentage points lower in 2012 than in 2009, despite almost it tripling its regasification
capacity. This is graphically demonstrated in Figure 2.9 below in the context of year over year
growth in percentage by country (not total volume).
31 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information
Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en.
32 ibid.
33 In some cases utilization is over 100 per cent. This can occur if imported natural gas is stored, by operators
increasing pressure in storage tanks, or if functional capacity is greater than designed capacity (similar to red-lining a
car engine). However, both GIIGNL and IEA report a sudden decrease in Taiwanese regasification capacity, with a
loss of 53 per cent in 2012 or 57 per cent in 2011, respectively. In that time period, it does not appear that any
regasification facility in Taiwan closed, went offline, or was damaged. No note addressing this decrease was
available in each respective report. The IEA did not report a change in the number of vaporization units at any of
Taiwan’s facilities during this time. The most likely explanation of this change was the correction of a reporting or
statistical error.
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China Capacity 9.1 10.7 13.4 26.8 31.8
Utilization 50.55% 71.31% 85.82% 61.90% 60.09%
India Capacity 11 16.8 16.8 16.8 18.4
Utilization 101.45% 74.46% 73.57% 85.00% 91.85%
Japan Capacity 252.6 263.4 264.2 252.1 273.8
Utilization 37.76% 35.27% 37.39% 46.20% 44.42%
South Korea Capacity 107.6 110 110 124.6 128
Utilization 34.59% 30.65% 39.84% 37.50% 37.34%
Taiwan Capacity 33.8 33.8 33.8 14.2 15.7
Utilization 35.15% 34.29% 42.99% 112.61% 104.46%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FIGURE 2.9:  MAJOR LNG IMPORTERS’ REGASIFICATION CAPACITY UTILIZATION
Source: IEA, Natural Gas Information 2009-2013, 93-97.
As seen in Table 2.2, power generation dominates the demand for natural gas, while industrial
shares are relatively low, with the exception of Indonesia, which has a large petro-chemical
sector. In countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the source most relied upon is LNG.   
TABLE 2.2:  ASIA-PACIFIC NATURAL GAS DEMAND (2011)
*Note: Demand shares do not add to 100 per cent because of other demand sources.
Source: PFC Energy, Global LNG Demand and Supply Study (May 2013).
Much of the 2012 LNG sourced to Japan and other Asia-Pacific nations (approximately 40 per
cent) came from within the Pacific Basin — primarily from Australia, Malaysia and
Indonesia.34 The Middle East (Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen) provided
another 40 per cent, with the balance secured from other exporting countries. However, supply
sources for individual countries vary widely; for example, India sourced 80 per cent of its LNG
from Qatar in 2012, with the remainder from other Middle Eastern countries.35 At the other
extreme, China imported 55 per cent from in-region and 25 per cent from Qatar in 2012; Japan
imported 43 per cent from in-region and 11 per cent from Qatar. The 2012 supply-demand
balance for Asia-Pacific is reported in Table 2.3.
34 BP, BP Statistical Review (2014).
35 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
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Japan 21% 97% 68% 8% 0% 26%
South Korea 16% 99% 47% 18% 3% 32%
Taiwan 12% 98% 78% 8% 0% 9%
China 6% 12% 24% 17% 8% 27%
India 7% 27% 41% 18% 5% 0%
Thailand 29% 2% 68% 10% 6% 0%
Indonesia 19% 0% 25% 30% 0% 0%
Share of Gas Per cent of Total Gas Demand By Sector*
in Energy Mix Gas Supplied Power Industry Transportation Distribution
as LNG Generation
TABLE 2.3:  2012 ASIA-PACIFIC NATURAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND BY COUNTRY (BCM)
* China includes the Hong Kong Special Administration Region, but not Singapore. All figures exclude pipeline imports.
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013 (2013).
Japan imports the most LNG in the Asia-Pacific region and is also the world’s largest importer,
sourcing between 87 and 90 MMT (118 to 122 BCM) in 2012.36 This reflects an increase in
LNG demand (around 16.8 MMT, depending on the source) as a result of the increased
demand for gas-fired power generation after the Fukushima nuclear incident led to policy
shifting away from nuclear power. Future demand for LNG in Japan is highly contingent upon
the government’s policies with respect to nuclear power. Japan’s LNG demand is not expected
to grow much beyond 89 MMTPA, since this reflects a “high-water mark” for LNG demand,
with all nuclear facilities shut down. Further substitution away from nuclear to coal- or natural
gas-based electricity to support demand growth would only have a marginal effect on LNG
demand, as new natural gas plants are expected to be more efficient than Japan’s existing
natural gas power facilities. 
South Korea’s LNG demand is expected to exceed 40 MMT by 2020, while demand in Taiwan
is expected to pass 15 MMT.37 In non-OECD Asia, the economies of China and India are
expected to command the most interest in natural gas and LNG, according to the EIA.38 China
is expected to increase LNG demand from 15 MMT in 2012 to 50 MMT in 2020.39 Existing
contracts will provide India with 18.55 MMT in 2020,40 but PFC Energy suggests that actual
imports could be much higher, at 30 MMT.41
36 Note that the reported imports vary by source; IEA data report 90 MMT in 2012, while GIIGNL and BP report 88
MMT, and IGU reports 87 MMT.
37 PFC Energy, “Global LNG Supply and Demand Study,” 2013.
38 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2013 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Department of Energy, 2013). Under the reference
case, non-OECD Asia is the only regional grouping that changes from a natural gas exporter to a natural gas
importer.
39 PFC Energy, “Global LNG.”
40 Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG Contract database.
41 PFC Energy, “Global LNG.”
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China* 3,100 107.2 146.6 20
India 1,300 40.2 54.6 20.5
Japan 116.7 118.8
Singapore 8.3
South Korea 50 49.7
Taiwan 16.3 16.9
Thailand 300 41.4 51.2 1.4
Australia 3,800 49 25.4 28.1
Brunei 300 12.6 9.1
Indonesia 2,900 71.1 35.8 25
Malaysia 1,300 65.2 33.3 31.8
Myanmar 200 12.7
Pakistan 600 41.5 41.5
Bangladesh 200 21.8 21.8
Country Proved Domestic Domestic LNG LNG 
Reserves Production Consumption Imports Exports
Demand by country and sources of supply for the Asia-Pacific region are described in greater
detail in Section 4.1, but the extent to which new natural gas demand will be supplied by LNG
depends heavily on the extent to which inter-regional pipelines are developed. The current lack
of pipeline interconnection suggests new demand will be supplied via LNG imports, but this
may change. In particular, China’s choices will be particularly influential.
3. OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL LNG MARKETS
The supply system for natural gas is a function of a complex set of interdependent systems and
installed capacity ranging from wells, gathering and processing, and transport to market via
pipeline or liquefaction and regasification. On the demand side this includes power generation,
heating for industrial buildings, plastics, chemical and fertilizer production and ultimately town
gas for distributed customers. Increasing demand is emerging for transportation systems.
Global demand for natural gas has been increasing as a function of increased energy demand in
developing countries as well as new environmental policies designed to phase out coal-fired
electricity generation, among other things. 
3.1 Commercial Structure of LNG Markets
LNG markets operate as a subcategory of general natural gas development and delivery. In the
tidewater delivery of natural gas, when terrestrial pipelines cannot be used, LNG ships carry
out the transportation and handling function, linking export tidewater ports to tidewater
importing and regasification facilities for importing nations. LNG markets depend on a supply
system that is large and typically diverse in order to assure adequate sourcing and quality.
These supplies are guaranteed in various iterations of delivery contracts including take or pay,
firm delivery and (less often) spot-market purchases. Because of the nature of the delivery
stream serving key clients such as utilities for power generation, supply contracts are subject to
penalties for failure to deliver or interruptions of service.
The market is built on access to shipping and special-purpose refrigeration ships capable of
holding chilled gas from exporting to importing nations. These purpose-built fleets are unique
in design and structure and travel predictable and uniform routes from exporter to importer on
regular schedules. Pricing for LNG delivered gas typically includes all costs of operation of the
ships, including net generation demands from on-board gas to power the vessel. As discussed
above, LNG markets are a special sub-category of natural gas markets. The simplified process
that natural gas goes through to become LNG is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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FIGURE 3.1:  PHYSICAL FLOW OF LNG MARKETS
Source: Based on Philip R. Weems and Monica Hwang, “Overview of issues common to structuring, 
negotiating an documenting LNG Projects,” Journal of World Energy Law and Business 6, 4 (2013).
This report deals with LNG as a market-
changing phenomenon; it is important to
note that LNG is a transportation and
fuel-phase system. In reality, the demand
for LNG, and the nature of LNG
markets, is rooted in the demand for
natural gas as a fuel or feedstock. The
heart of LNG markets is based in a
traditional natural gas market, replacing
pipeline transmission as the primary
transportation mechanism between
markets.
According to Weems and Hwang, LNG
projects were historically developed as
an integrated supply chain with dedicated
facilities and associated activities (gas
production, transmission, liquefaction
and storage in the exporting country;
marine transport; and regasification and
distribution in the importing country).42
They note that “in a fully integrated LNG
chain, all parties are effectively exposed
to all risks in the LNG chain since failure
in any part of the chain affects all other
parts.” However, commercial structures
vary across projects, and there is no
worldwide standard for determining 
42 Philip R. Weems and Monica Hwang, “Overview of issues common to structuring, negotiating an documenting LNG
Projects,” Journal of World Energy Law and Business 6, 4 (2013).
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COMPONENTS OF NATURAL GAS MARKETS
Gas Producers – These companies perform exploration
and development activities, from drilling and producing
wells to field gas gathering and separation of produced
gas, hydrocarbon liquids and water. They range from
large, integrated producers (majors) to small operators
with limited facilities.
Gas Processing – Processing companies gather gas
from gas producers, separate natural gas and
hydrocarbon liquids, and remove additional impurities in
the gas to meet transmission-pipeline quality
specifications.
Transmission Pipelines – Pipeline capacity is necessary
for consolidating, transporting, and in-line temporary
storage of delivered gas to appropriate markets.
Natural Gas Storage – Natural gas storage operations
act as buffers in managing the delivery of gas supplies
to consumers (due to daily and seasonal demand
fluctuations, facility upsets, etc.).
Marketing – Most of the gas in North America is
handled by natural gas marketers in the form of
managing physical delivery and arranging financial
compensation and accounting. The volume of non-
physical natural gas that passes through the hands of
marketers is very large, and can be much greater than
the actual physical volume consumed, when both
domestic and export volumes are taken into account. 
Local Distribution Companies – Local distribution from
regional or district pipelines is accomplished using these
companies that maintain delivery capacity to final users.
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Storage Vaporization
project structure. Participation, financing, gas supply, revenue sharing, transfer pricing and the
contracts determining these components all must satisfy the requirements of the project
developers, resulting in commericial structures unique to each project. However, there are types
of structures that have evolved such that the majority of projects can be classified as: project
company, tolling company and unincorporated joint venture (JV).
Under the project-company structure, the project sponsors are shareholders in a company that
owns the LNG export plant. The project company purchases gas from upsteam producers,
liquefies the gas, sells the LNG to third parties, and receives revenue from the LNG sale. The
revenues are distributed to the participants as dividends. The project-company structure has
been used in the countries of Trinidad and Tobago, Australia, Malaysia, Qatar, and Russia,
among others. Figure 3.2 illustrates the typical commericial structure of a project-company
framework.43 An interesting feature of the project-company framework is that shareholders can
participate in some parts of the LNG supply chain but not others.44
FIGURE 3.2:  PROJECT COMPANY COMMERCIAL STRUCTURE
Source: Philip R. Weems and Monica Hwang, “Overview of issues common to structuring, negotiating an
documenting LNG Projects,” Journal of World Energy Law and Business 6, 4 (2013).
Under the tolling-company structure, the tolling company provides liquefaction services to the
gas owners for a fee. In the Indonesian version of a tolling-company structure, the tolling
facility is owned and operated by the government of Indonesia on a non-profit basis, with all
revenues passed through to the government and upstream gas producers. Many of the U.S.
LNG export projects (e.g., Freeport LNG and Cameron LNG) use a tolling-company structure,
where the tolling company provides liquefaction services for a negotiated fee. Figure 3.3
illustrates the typical commericial structure of a tolling-company framework.45
43 Weems and Hwang, “Overview of issues.”
44 Further details are available in Weems and Hwang, “Overview of issues.”
45 Weems and Hwang, “Overview of issues.”
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FIGURE 3.3:  TOLLING COMPANY COMMERCIAL STRUCTURE
Source: Philip R. Weems and Monica Hwang, “Overview of issues common to structuring, negotiating an 
documenting LNG Projects,” Journal of World Energy Law and Business 6, 4 (2013).
The unincorporated-JV approach to LNG structure is common for large upstream or integrated
oil and gas companies looking for alternative markets, similar to the environment in Canada.
One notable example of the unincorporated-JV structure is the Northwest Shelf Project in
Australia. Each participant in this project owns one-sixth of the LNG plant, supplies one-sixth
of the feed gas, and receives one-sixth of the revenues, although the participation shares could
have been different, as they are in most unincorporated-JV projects.46 The governing document
for the management and operation of an unincorporated-JV is a joint-venture project
agreement. Figure 3.4 illustrates a simplified version of an unincorporated-JV framework.
FIGURE 3.4:  SIMPLE UNINCORPORATED JOINT VENTURE COMMERCIAL STRUCTURE
Source: Stillwater Associates.
It is anticipated that most of the Canadian LNG export projects will be structured as
unincorporated-JVs. A more detailed framework for a Canadian joint venture is likely to have
the physical and commercial components illustrated in Figure 3.5.
46 Weems and Hwang, “Overview of issues,” 283.
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FIGURE 3.5:  CANADIAN UNINCORPORATED JOINT VENTURE COMMERCIAL STRUCTURE
Source: Stillwater Associates.
The financing of capital-intensive liquefaction facilities is underpinned by long-term (15-30
year) LNG contracts or sales-and-purchase agreements (SPAs). Typically, liquefaction projects
require that long-term sale-and-purchase agreements representing at least 80 per cent of plant
capacity be executed before a final investment decision (FID) is taken and a notice to proceed
(NTP) is issued to start construction. The project sponsors, and their financiers, usually require
a portfolio of buyers to mitigate performance risk. The balance of plant capacity is available
for incremental sales to long-term customers, for short-term (zero to four years) and medium-
term (five to 15 years) sales, and spot sales (individual cargoes). Spot cargoes are traded in
individually negotiated transactions, often based on pre-negotiated master sales agreements put
in place in advance, between sellers and buyers with longstanding relationships.
3.2 Recent Activity in LNG markets
Finance and financing arrangements appear to be the major driver in spot47 and short-term
trades in the LNG market. Following a long period of stable shipping arrangements, this
market has seen an increase in volatility according to the International Gas Union (IGU), an 
47 Spot and short term are contracts that trade at current delivered price or less than “long-term” contracts that are
greater than five years in the future. They may also include those contracts serviced in addition to existing take-or-
pay arrangements per shipment.
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industry association.48 The IGU cites a considerable increase in divertible options, and more
flexible contracts have allowed trading companies to arbitrage shipments, greatly enhancing
the volumes and value of the market overall.
LNG has been delivered under long-term arrangements between buyers and sellers and traded
on a spot and short-term basis in the Asian markets at the end of a contract delivery. Prior to
2000, spot and short-term sales comprised less than five per cent of total deliveries in terms of
volume.49 By 2005 this had changed, growing to nearly 20 per cent by 2010, and 25 per cent in
2012.50 The increase in short-term and spot sales is the result of “tail-end” sales from projects
that have passed their original long-term contract periods; the increased flexibility of the
industry resulting from the growing number of suppliers and buyers; the expanding role of
portfolio suppliers; and the diversion of deliveries from the U.S. to Asia due to the shale gas
revolution in the U.S. and the huge spike in LNG demand in post-Fukushima Japan. The
inability of buyers in Japan and South Korea to commit to long-term LNG purchases due to
policy uncertainties, and negotiating standoffs between suppliers and buyers over prices, has
continued to underpin demand for spot and short-term purchases in the Asia-Pacific region. 
In the current market, Asian buyers made up 72 per cent of spot LNG in 2012.51 Of this, Japan,
South Korea, and India combined accounted for 61 per cent.52 Before 2000, spot and short-
term sales were estimated to be less than five per cent of total volume traded, expanding to as
high as 73.5 MMT by 2012 — 31 per cent of global sales (driven in large measure by Japan
replacing lost nuclear generating-capacity).53
In 2012, LNG shipments fell by 1.9 per cent from 240.4 MMT in 2011 to 235.6 MMT.54 Japan
and South Korea were the most significant importers, in part due to the Fukushima accident,
capturing 52.8 per cent of the world market, up three per cent from 2011. World spot and short-
term LNG sales were 73.5 MMT in 2012, or 31 per cent of total volumes, an increase from
65.1 MMT in 2011.55 The International Gas Union states that almost half of spot export
volumes were supplied by Qatar and Nigeria.56 Much of this demand reflects the structure of
regional gas systems that are limited by national borders, and a lack of domestic production in
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, forcing a greater dependency on spot-market supplies when
demand increases beyond contracted volumes.
48 International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 7.
49 ibid., 13.
50 International Group of LNG Importers (GIIGNL), The LNG Industry in 2012 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2012),
http://www.giignl.org/system/files/publication/giignl_the_lng_industry_2012.pdf. The International Gas Union
reports that spot trades accounted for 31 per cent of total volume in 2012. (International Gas Union, World LNG).
51 International Gas Union, World LNG.
52 ibid., 7.
53 ibid., 13.
54 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
55 International Gas Union, World LNG.
56 ibid.
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The LNG market is highly dependent on adequate shipping capacity. According to the
International Gas Union, “at the end of 2012, the global LNG fleet consisted of 362 vessels of
all types, with a combined capacity of 54 BCM … This is more than one and a half times the
size of the fleet at the end of 2006.”57 Additional detail on LNG shipping is available in
Section 3.5.2, below. In recent years, seven countries re-exported LNG imported from other
countries. In 2012, 3.5 MMT of LNG was re-exported, primarily from Europe, where natural
gas demand was weak, to South America and the Asia-Pacific, where demand was stronger and
prices were higher.58 The number of cargoes re-loaded rose from 44 in 2011 to 75 in 2012.59
3.3 North American Natural Gas and LNG Prices
Natural gas prices in North America60 have been volatile, especially when viewed over an
extended period (see Figure 3.6). Over the short term, natural gas prices have a normal
seasonal volatility.61 However, over the longer term, the natural gas prices also reflect the
supply and demand balance of North American gas production to the demand for natural gas
supply that is served by the gas pipeline infrastructure. 
Figure 3.6 shows monthly prices for AECO and Henry Hub since 1995. The underlying price
trends were upward until late 2008 when the price declined sharply, driven by the
advancements that made shale gas reserves available. The Henry Hub price reached a low
monthly average of $1.93/GJ ($2.04 per million BTU) in May 2012 but has since drifted back
up to the four-dollar range. 
Linked by a pipeline infrastructure system, Canadian gas prices are closely tied to U.S. prices.
For instance, the price of Canadian gas at AECO closely tracks that of Henry Hub, but reflects
the slight discount applied for distance, as seen in Figure 3.6. The close linkage of the U.S. and
Canadian markets via the well-developed pipeline infrastructure ties the price destiny of
Canadian gas to U.S. gas. 
57 ibid., 7.
58 ibid.
59 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2012.
60 Although natural gas markets include flows from Canada, the United States and Mexico, the primary pricing hub for
North America is in the United States at Henry Hub.
61 Space heating in the winter generally increases natural gas consumption. Typically this seasonal demand exceeds
pipeline delivery capacity, creating a need for local or regional storage to balance supplies, typically filling during
the summer months when production exceeds demand. However, the seasonal nature of demand for natural gas is
changing throughout North America. This suggests that the balancing roles for storage are changing and new outlets
for excess natural gas supplies will be needed — whether from new domestic demand or in the form of LNG exports.
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FIGURE 3.6:  AECO AND HENRY HUB MONTHLY PRICES
Note: AECO price is 30-day spot, Henry Hub price is NYMEX close. Conversion of AECO price from Canadian to U.S. 
dollars used Sproule exchange rate. Original prices in $/MMBTU; conversion factor used is 0.947817.
Source: Sproule website, “Forecasts,” http://www.sproule.com/forecasts
The recent developments that have opened reserves of shale gas in the U.S. and Canada (but
not yet in Mexico) have led many to project that gas prices will remain at current levels
(reflecting the cost of development) for the foreseeable future.62
In contrast to North America, the Asia-Pacific region lacks the gas resources and regional gas-
pipeline networks to lace the region into a single market. Instead, natural gas and oil must be
imported and are, in effect, competing fuels. Thus, oil has served as the marker price for gas in
Asia-Pacific. 
LNG pricing in the Asian market is less influenced by short- and mid-term supply and demand
for gas because it has long been underpinned by long-term supply contracts with formula
pricing. Japan has historically defined the market since it has been the major LNG customer.
As demand developed in other Asian countries, the Japanese pricing model was basically
followed. The primary index used is the JCC price, which is the average price of customs-
cleared crude oil imports into Japan (formerly the average of the top 20 crude oils by volume)
as reported in customs statistics — nicknamed the “Japanese crude cocktail.” 
JCC is a commonly used index in long-term LNG contracts in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
The data to calculate JCC are published by the Japanese government every month. These are
the raw- and crude-oil import prices in yen per kilolitre, the daily dollar yen exchange rate, and
the total Japanese imports of all commodities for the month.
The fact that Asian natural gas prices have been high relative to other markets is a function of
the effect of limited gas supply on gas competition due to a lack of inter-country pipeline links
and existing 20-year rolling contracts that are based on JCC. Recently, the loss of nuclear base-
load capacity in Japan has put short-term, upward pressure on LNG prices. 
62 The EIA predicts natural gas prices will remain low, at $4.57/GJ ($4.33/MMBTU) in 2015. See: EIA website, “Short
Term Energy Outlook — Natural Gas,” http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/natgas.cfm.
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There is currently a great deal of attention being paid to alternative pricing mechanisms to
eliminate the linkage to oil markets and to price deliveries closer to world market prices. One
of these alternative pricing mechanisms arises from the development of American LNG export
terminals. The pricing model in the U.S. is Henry Hub-cost-plus, where pipeline gas is tolled
through the liquefaction plant and transported to its destination. Thus, the price to the customer
is the Henry Hub price, plus the fee to toll through the liquefaction plant, plus the cost of
transport. In this model, the developer of the liquefaction plant may be completely independent
of the gas producer, pipeline transporter, LNG transporter, LNG marketer and LNG customer.
3.4 World LNG Demand
Demand for LNG is derived solely from the demand for natural gas where there is a lack of
adequate domestic production or terrestrial pipeline delivery capacity. In 2012, global natural
gas consumption (demand) was about 3,300 BCM, while global demand (total imports) for
LNG was about 240 million tonnes (MMT), equivalent to about 330 BCM of natural gas.63
Today the global demand for LNG, natural gas in liquid form, represents only 10 per cent of
the total global demand for natural gas.
The EIA’s 2013 International Energy Outlook64 projects that world energy consumption will
grow by 56 per cent between 2010 and 2040. Total world energy use in non-OECD countries is
expected to increase by 90 per cent; in OECD countries, the expected increase is 17 per cent.
The EIA expects total natural gas trades, both by pipeline and by shipment in the form of LNG,
to increase steadily over the next decade. In North Africa and Southeast Asia, domestic natural
gas consumption is forecast to have higher value than exports, leading to the underutilization
of liquefaction facilities in those countries during this period.
As mentioned previously, world LNG demand (proxied by trade volume) grew by 275 per cent
between 1993 and 2012, equivalent to a compound annual rate of 7.2 per cent. Figure 3.7 plots
the world’s natural gas trade between 1993 and 2012. While pipeline trade dominates, the LNG
share of the world’s natural gas trade has increased from 18 per cent in 1993 to 31 per cent in
2012. World demand for natural gas is forecast to grow on average at 1.6 per cent per year to
2035, and inter-regional gas trade by two per cent per year, with LNG trade projected to
account for 60 per cent of this increase in trade, showing its growing importance as an
alternative to pipeline supplies.65 
63 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
64 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2013.
65 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (London: IEA, 2013), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publications/weo-2013/.
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FIGURE 3.7:  WORLD NATURAL GAS TRADE 1993 – 2012 (BCM)
Source: IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en.
3.4.1 WORLD LNG-RECEIVING TERMINALS
LNG facilities delivering natural gas to the marketplace rely on specialized shipping to move
product between tidewater ports. Regasification terminals receive natural gas, expand the gas
from its liquid state, and store or transfer it via pipeline to client storage. These facilities allow
it to come back to normal conditions of temperature and pressure before being used.
Regasification facilities are dispersed throughout the world, with slightly less than two-thirds
of capacity in 2013 concentrated in Japan, South Korea and the U.S. (Figure 3.8). At the end of
2013, there were 100 regasification terminals in the world with a total regasification capacity
of 689 million tonnes per annum. There is some expected growth in regasification capacity,
with 94.6 MMTPA expected to be added by 2018, a 14 per cent increase.66 However, 273
MMTPA in total is under construction, proposed or announced. A new development in this
market is that Singapore and Malaysia are scheduled to construct their first import terminals by
2017. In addition, Indonesia — currently an LNG exporter — is constructing its first import
terminal, also expected to be completed by 2017.67
66 The increase in capacity is based on terminals under construction between 2013 and 2018, identified in Appendix F.
67 Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia are further discussed in Appendix B.
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FIGURE 3.8:  REGASIFICATION CAPACITY BY COUNTRY IN 2013 AND 2018 (MMTPA)
Note: Additional capacity for 2018 includes only regasification facilities currently listed as under construction, and 
does not account for proposed conversions to export terminals.
Source: See Appendix F
Historically, global utilization of existing LNG import terminals has been under 50 per cent
due to the seasonal nature of many markets, and because gas infrastructure is not integrated in
many countries. Utilization fell to 37 per cent in 2012 as a result of expanded capacity and
slumping demand in Europe and the U.S.68
3.5 World Supply Sources
According to the EIA, LNG shipments are expected to more than double from about 280
billion cubic metres (205.8 MMT) in 2010 to around 560 BCM (411.6 MMT) in 2040.69 Most
of the increase in liquefaction capacity is expected in Australia and North America. The EIA
notes that world LNG flows adjusted quickly to accommodate Japan’s increased demand, post-
Fukushima, showing greater flexibility compared to past demand or supply swings. The EIA
predicts that an LNG trade surge will occur between 2015 and 2025, as planned and under-
construction projects in Australia, Canada and the U.S. come online.70
3.5.1 WORLD LIQUEFACTION FACILITIES
LNG liquefaction facilities are located on all continents except Antarctica. Prior to 2000, LNG
was primarily sourced from North Africa, Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf. Since 2000,
LNG capacity has been installed in Eastern Russia, West Africa, South America and the
Caribbean. In addition to these regions entering the LNG market, significant growth in capacity
has occurred in the Persian Gulf and Australia. Currently, Qatar has the largest liquefaction
capacity of any country, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia.  
68 International Gas Union, World LNG.
69 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2013, “Natural Gas,” http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/nat_gas.cfm.
70 ibid.
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In order to meet growing demand for natural gas in areas without sufficient domestic
production or pipeline connections, additional liquefaction capacity is required from current
and potential exporters. As illustrated in Figure 3.9, the increase in liquefaction capacity is
regional and incremental in nature. For most countries, there is no projected growth in
capacity; the stable nature of their facilities also illustrates the stable and — for most —
limited growth in new contracts for delivery. A major exception is the growth in capacity in
Australia, which is poised to surpass Qatar as the biggest LNG exporter in the world.
Australia’s huge natural gas resources dwarf the domestic demand for those resources. The
U.S. will also become a major exporter in the next decade, with 16 proposed export projects,
but most of these projects will not start producing until after 2018.71
FIGURE 3.9:  LIQUEFACTION CAPACITY BY COUNTRY IN 2013 AND 2018 (MMTPA)
Note: Capacity additions in 2018 reflect projects currently under construction, and do not account for conversions to 
regasification, nor include speculative terminals.
Source: See Appendix E.
The capacity additions shown in Figure 3.9 bring world export capacity to 406 MMT; this is
only slightly smaller than the EIA’s projected world LNG trade of 411.6 MMT in 2040. As
these additions are only projects currently under construction, the aggregate global capacity of
proposed liquefaction projects appears to exceed the growth in projected global LNG demand.
As a consequence, many of the proposed projects will not be realized or may get delayed for
an extended period of time. 
71 As of March 26, 2014, only Sabine Pass had FERC approval to export LNG (and is the only facility under
construction); future approvals may be limited by political pressure or industry-association lobbying and a desire to
keep domestic natural gas prices low. (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “North American LNG
Import/Export Terminals Approved,” news release, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-
approved.pdf).
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3.5.2 WORLD LNG SHIPPING
The LNG shipping industry has grown apace with the growth of LNG trade. At the end of
2013, there were 393 vessels in the global LNG fleet, ranging in age from one to 44 years, with
an average age of 12 years.72 The average ship capacity of the existing fleet is 143,200 cubic
metres.73 The LNG vessel order-book is for 113 vessels, 98 with a capacity over 50,000 CM.74
Tanker efficiency, capacity and safety features such as double hulls are critical for overall
industry performance and compliance with rules and standards. The ships designed for
transportation of super chilled natural gas have evolved not only in terms of containment vessel
stability, but also in the added capability to serve propulsion systems using on board stored
natural gas. The result eliminates the need for bunker fuel oil and improves overall air
emissions. An illustration of the design is shown in Figure 3.10. The tanker on the right uses
LNG as fuel, whereas the tanker on the left has onboard bunker fuel.
FIGURE 3.10:  LNG TANKER
Fewer than seven per cent of the ships in the existing global fleet are able to transit the Panama
Canal,75 the 77-kilometre long shortcut from the Caribbean to the Pacific. However, the canal
expansion project currently underway will create a deeper and wider third lane and a new
system of locks to accommodate much larger ships. Once the expansion is completed in 2015,
most of the global LNG fleet will be able to transit the canal, reducing voyage distances from
the U.S. Gulf Coast to Asia by 5,000 to 7,000 nautical miles (depending on the route taken)
vis-à-vis voyages around Cape Horn. Only the biggest Q-Flex (210,000 CM – 216,000 CM)
and Q-Max (266,000 CM) ships will not be able to transit the canal.
LNG shipping costs influence LNG trade flows and LNG pricing dynamics. Shipping costs are
a key driver of the value created by moving gas between locations and the price spreads
between regions in the global LNG trade. Shipping costs play a critical role in decisions to
divert cargoes to higher-priced markets, and are also a key consideration in understanding the
extent to which global prices may converge in the future.76
72 International Group of Liquefied Gas Importers (GIIGNL), The LNG Industry in 2013 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2013),
http://www.giignl.org/publications/lng-industry-2013.
73 ibid.
74 ibid.
75 ibid.
76 Timera Energy blog, “Getting to grips with LNG shipping costs”, September 16, 2013, http://www.timera-
energy.com/continental-gas/getting-to-grips-with-lng-shipping-costs/.
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As a result of the industry’s inability to time the construction of new ships precisely in line
with shipping requirements, there are periods when there is an oversupply or an undersupply of
shipping capacity. The mismatch between shipping capacity and requirements is exacerbated
when shipping patterns (routes) shift unexpectedly, as they did in 2011 when LNG demand in
Europe fell and demand in Japan suddenly increased. Short-haul voyages became long-haul
voyages, absorbing shipping capacity. In 2011, demand for spot cargoes, particularly in Japan
and South America, propelled short-term charter rates higher. Spot charter rates rose from
$30,000 to $50,000 per day in mid-2010, to a peak of about $150,000 per day in mid-2012.77
In mid-2012, as incremental demand for spot cargoes began to subside in North Asia and
outages occurred at key LNG export plants — freeing up shipping capacity — spot charter
rates started to fall. By October 2013, spot charter rates had fallen to a yearly low of about
$95,000 per day for 160,000 CM ships.78 However, the majority of charter party contracts for
five years or more continue to be at around $80,000 per day.79
Given the pace at which new export and import projects are being constructed, the rapid
expansion of the LNG shipping fleet, and developing market phenomena such as the re-
exporting of LNG, make the tracking and accounting for LNG trade flows more complicated.
Combined, all of these are making the LNG trade increasingly more dynamic, flexible, liquid
and competitive.
3.6 LNG and Associated Costs
The demand for natural gas continues to grow annually, and it is growing worldwide. This
trend is linked to gas-turbine power generation displacing coal and nuclear facilities and
serving new demand. This power generation source creates lower emissions, is relatively
inexpensive to install and has high demand-responsive rates. In developing countries, such as
those in the Asia-Pacific region, cost effective access to these supplies is only possible via
LNG shipments. Since the cost of regasification terminals is competitive, entering long-term
contracts for shipments of natural gas through tidewater ports is an attractive strategy for
energy security and economic development.
The system needed to support natural gas development, transport, processing, shipping and
regasification is highly co-ordinated between producers, pipeline owners, facility operators,
shipping companies and finance agents. The oversight and approval by government agencies
does not end with pipeline siting and well development, but continues with oversight,
inspection and ultimately marine-safety programs.
The price of the delivered gas depends, consequently, on a similar sequence of elements of the
pipeline system from wellhead to pipeline, liquefaction, shipping and, ultimately, regasification
at delivery ports. Expansion or improvement of any point on the system will be dependent on
long-term contract arrangements with clients rather than merchant investment in submarkets
such as pipelines. 
77 International Gas Union, World LNG. 
78 Poten & Partners, “Weekly LNG Spot Shipping Report”, October 4, 2013.
79 International Gas Union, World LNG.
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3.6.1 TIDEWATER LNG SHIPPING PORT FACILITIES (LIQUEFACTION)
A critical link in the natural-gas-to-delivered-market chain is the nature and cost of tidewater
port facilities. In this paper we do not make a judgment as to which facilities are likely to be
approved, their ultimate size beyond a critical minimum, and competition with interested
development companies. Rather, we assume a model plant for illustration, which would to be
scalable with consistent access to new supplies, electrical power and wharfing facilities. For
consistency, we have assumed that each plant is capable of processing two trains of natural gas
at a rate of 4.5 MMTPA per train.
FIGURE 3.11:  LNG PORT FACILITIES
Source: Adapted from Repsol, “Repsol starts up its first gas liquefaction plant in Latin America,” press release,
June 10, 2010, http://www.repsol.com/es_en/corporacion/prensa/notas-de-prensa/ultimas-notas/10062010-
Repsol-planta-licuefaccion-latinoamerica.aspx.
The illustration in Figure 3.11 shows the overall facilities at a typical liquefaction plant. The
LNG train, and storage components and export terminals, typically require either electrical-grid
access or onsite power generation. Lastly, a jetty is necessary for the LNG tankers to berth and
receive and load the LNG product.
3.6.1.1 Tidewater Port Development Locations and Costs
Waterborne transport is an extremely efficient means of moving heavy cargo, and for
transportation of a fuel such as natural gas in the form of LNG, it is the only feasible method
of long-distance movement in the absence of pipelines. In general, the historical market for
LNG has been based on dedicated bi-lateral contracts from port to port. In the case of existing
shipments to the Asia-Pacific region, the bulk of transfers are based on contracted flows, with
little activity in the form of spot-market trades. This characteristic highlights the reliance of the
market on limited port facilities and shipping capacity sized to match contract demands that
are, in turn, matched to dedicated sources of supply. 
Recent years have seen some growth in the use of spot or short-term contracts in the Asia-Pacific
region, largely in response to dramatic demand shifts from Japan. Some of the spot-market
activity may also reflect surplus capacity that can be made available to ship to those ports with
new and expanding regasification facilities that are not fully covered by existing contracts.80
3.6.1.2 Cost of Plant  
In order to viably transport natural gas via tanker, its volume must be greatly reduced. This is
accomplished through the process of liquefaction at the site of export. By cooling natural gas
to a temperature of approximately -162 °C, the gas condenses to a liquid state occupying
roughly 1/600th the original gaseous volume at room temperature. 
The cost of a plant can be split into two components: the capital cost associated with
construction and the variable operation costs. As noted above, the capital costs of liquefaction
facilities are substantial. Figure 3.12 plots capital cost per tonne of capacity for various projects
in 2012 dollars, also adjusted for exchange-rate fluctuations. The average cost per tonne of
operating terminals is $998 (2012 USD); the under-construction terminals have an expected
average cost double that of operating terminals at $1,896 (nominal USD)/tonne. Proposed
terminals (not shown) have an average cost of $1,430/tonne, suggesting that initially reported
capital costs may be an underestimate. IHS CERA tracks construction costs in a variety of
industries, including LNG, refining and petrochemicals, and power generation plants.81
According to these indices, construction-cost increases appear to be a general trend worldwide
and are not a phenomenon only in LNG projects. 
FIGURE 3.12:  LNG CAPITAL COST PER METRIC TONNE
Note: Costs for operating terminals adjusted for inflation- and exchange-rate changes between completion year and 
2012. Under-construction terminal costs are in nominal dollars.
Source: See Appendix E. 
80 Extensions on the primary term of contracts are not unusual in the industry. A contract may provide for automatic
extensions after a period for a set number of years, at the option of the buyer or seller, depending on initial terms and
the market forecast. M.D. Tusiani and G. Shearer, LNG: A Nontechnical Guide (Tulsa, Ok.: PennWell, 2007).
81 IHS website, “Costs & Strategic Sourcing,” http://www.ihs.com/info/cera/ihsindexes/index.aspx.
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Many proposed and under-construction export terminals have the estimated cost-of-plant data
available; these facilities have an average cost estimate of approximately $1,577 per metric
tonne of annual LNG export capacity. Figure 3.13 reflects the wide range of cost versus
capacity worldwide. Panel A shows costs by status, while Panel B shows costs by location.
FIGURE 3.13:  CAPITAL COST PER TONNE OF CAPACITY FOR EXPORT TERMINALS
PANEL A: LIQUEFACTION TERMINAL COSTS BY STATUS
PANEL B: LIQUEFACTION TERMINAL COSTS BY LOCATION
Notes: “Proposed” LNG projects are those where a source was available for cost, capacity and start year, while 
“announced” are projects where a source was available for start year and capacity, and where there is no 
evidence of cancellation. Projects without a start year, cost or capacity are not included in the figure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on various sources. See Appendix E for sources.
As suggested above, in this paper we assume a base train-production rate of 4.5 MMTPA
(million tons per annum) of LNG with two trains per facility. This number is used for
comparison and addresses only the LNG liquefaction portion of the LNG system. 
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Regasification facilities will be sized relative to import demand and the regional distribution
system involved. Overall, our stylized export facility includes:
• production rate of 9 MMTPA of LNG,
• 95 per cent plant availability,
• average ambient temperature of 22°C,
• gas-turbine supplied electricity, drivers and air-cooling.82
Even with all these elements, each LNG plant will be unique to a specific location and market
destination.83 Construction of new terminals will be a function of land use and access
approvals, construction timing (estimated to be between four and six years per facility
depending on starting dates), marine-safety capability, labour-force commitments and ship
availability. The construction-cost distribution for a Canadian unconventional gas-fed (shale or
coal-bed methane) LNG plant is shown below. 
TABLE 3.2:  COST DISTRIBUTION FOR A TWO-TRAIN 10.3 MMTPA CANADIAN LIQUEFACTION FACILITY
($US BILLION, 2012)
Source: Michael Ellis, Christiaan Heyning and Olivier Legrand, Extending the LNG boom: Improving Australian 
LNG productivity and competitiveness (McKinsey & Company, May 2013), 37, Appendix 3,
http://www.mckinsey.com/global_locations/pacific/australia/en/latest_thinking/extending_the_lng_boom; currency
converted from Australian dollars to U.S. dollars using the conversion rate found on page 4, box 2.
Turning to the operational components of liquefaction facilities, the basic layout of LNG
liquefaction plants and the gas conversion process is fairly standard; export terminals primarily
differ only in regards to size and capacity as described above. The compression and chilling
process is standardized as well. First, the natural gas must be supplied to the liquefaction plant
via pipeline. Once at the plant, the gas is treated to remove CO2, N2, mercury, H2S, water, and
other liquids. This purification is in addition to the initial treatment that natural gas undergoes
near the wellhead to make it suitable for pipeline transport. Once treated, the purified gas is
then refrigerated until transformed to its liquid form; at this point it is stored and prepared for 
82 We have assumed that all electrical facilities will be located on site (i.e., not grid dependent) and will utilize gas
turbines served by main pipeline gas supplies that consequently must be sized to meet this additional load. We assume
that each facility will need approximately 750 MW of capacity to include reserves, for each two trains of capacity.
83 McKinsey & Company compare LNG projects in Australia to Canada and Mozambique, and found that costs are
approximately 20 to 30 per cent higher in Australia. Michael Ellis, Christiaan Heyning and Olivier Legrand,
Extending the LNG boom: Improving Australian LNG productivity and competitiveness (McKinsey & Company, May
2013), http://www.mckinsey.com/global_locations/pacific/australia/en/latest_thinking/extending_the_lng_boom.
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Project management labour 0 1.95 1.65
Construction labour 0.82 3.09 2.67
Engineering labour 0 1.03 0.93
Rental equipment 0 0.21 0.10
Installed equipment 0.21 0.72 0.62
Materials 0.10 0.93 0.72
Contingency 0 1.03 0.82
Other 0 0.93 0.82
Total 1.13 9.87 8.33
Site Infrastructure Train 1 Train 2
loading onto a tanker. LNG export terminals are built based on modular construction of the
preceding processes, referred to as “trains.” Most LNG export terminals have more than one
train, which are capable of operating in tandem. For this report, in order to provide order of
magnitude comparison between future facilities, we have arbitrarily assumed that each port
terminal will utilize two trains of fuel annually.
There is considerable loss of gas volume — 20 to 30 per cent — associated with the
conversion from feed gas to LNG, illustrated in Figure 3.14. The majority of the loss is due to
processing and fueling the liquefaction process.
FIGURE 3.14:  MAXIMUM TREATING PLANT
Source: KBR, “LNG Liquefaction – Not All Plants Are Created Equal,” Technical Paper, February 2007,
http://www.kbr.com/Newsroom/Publications/Technical-Papers/LNG-Liquefaction-Not-All-Plants-Are-Created-Equal.pdf. 
Data on operational expenditures are difficult to acquire, though they could undoubtedly be
collected via annual reports of various liquefaction projects. Woodside Energy reports that its
16.3 MMTPA North West Shelf project’s operating costs are almost $600 million Australian
dollars per year,84 or roughly US$34.60 per tonne.85 Tusiani and Shearer suggest that operating
expenditures for liquefaction are two to five per cent of the project’s total capital cost, though
they note that operational expenses are highly dependent on location.86 The stated operational
expenditures are 2.2 per cent of an “investment amount” of $27 billion Australian dollars for
the North West Shelf project.87 McKinsey & Company estimate that operational expenditures
will be 23 per cent of revenue ($3.01 USD/MMBTU) for a conventional Australian project,
assuming a price of $13.08 USD/MMBTU ($14 AUD/MMBTU).88 As Australia and Canada
are relatively similar countries, these provide a rough guide to expected operational costs in
Canada as well.
84 Woodside Energy, “North West Shelf Project,” Overview Brochure, http://www.woodside.com.au/Our-
Business/North-West-Shelf/Documents/NWSV%20Corporate%20Brochure.PDF.
85 Using a conversion rate of $1 USD = $1.07 AUD.
86 Tusiani and Shearer, LNG: A Nontechnical, Chapter 11.
87 Woodside Energy, “North West Shelf.”
88 Ellis, Heyning and Legrand, Extending the LNG, 5, Exhibit 1. Exchange rate used is $1 USD = $1.07 AUD.
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While liquefaction plants require pipelines for feed gas, these are generally considered to be
separate capital investments.89 The capital cost of the pipelines will be rolled into the
transportation charge from wellhead to destination, and will be part of the cost to deliver gas to
the liquefaction facility. The cost of feed gas is, of course, part of operational expenses.                                            
3.6.1.3 Gas Turbines and Electricity
Access to consistent and reliable electric power is critical for LNG facilities that must operate
continuously for chilling, storing and compressing gas supplies as well as support facilities. A
high reliability requirement is based on two key elements: the need to support a rapid
turnaround for loading ships and the need to maintain constant refrigeration in order to sustain
a stable environment for liquid gas.
The base demands for electric power consequently are established by a combination of power
supplied for system operations plus reserve power for unforeseen upsets as well as routine
maintenance. There are two primary methods of achieving appropriate levels of service and
redundancy. First, a standalone system can be developed at the port facility using the gas
(parasitic load) supplied for liquefaction needs. Second, grid-based connections, when close
enough to high-voltage regional transmission systems, can offer power in a bilateral contract
with provisions to “net” usage from surplus generation, although most facilities using grid
power will also develop backup facilities to cover occasional grid outages.
3.6.2 LNG DELIVERY PORT FACILITIES (REGAS)
Natural gas must be refrigerated and liquefied at the site of export to make it dense enough
such that tanker transportation becomes economically viable. Once an LNG-laden tanker
arrives at an import terminal, the LNG is offloaded to insulated storage containers. Despite the
insulation, the LNG continually regasifies and must either be re-liquefied, delivered, or flared.
When needed, the LNG is pumped through a vaporization system that increases the
temperature of the liquefied product through the use of a heat exchanger utilizing seawater, or
gas-fired heating. Now in its gaseous state, the natural gas is odorized and delivered to the
pipeline, ready for consumption.
Though regasification terminals are significantly cheaper to construct than their liquefaction-
capable counterparts, pre-arranged supply contracts and significant capital are still necessary to
undertake construction. Lower capital costs for regasification terminals are the result of a
combination of factors. The plants themselves are less complicated, and require far less power
to operate. They are typically located closer to demand centres and, as a result, construction is
cheaper, logistics are more manageable, and often only short connecting pipelines need be
built. The capital cost disparity is reflected in the per-unit levies, with regasification typically
costing between $0.29/GJ to $1.90/GJ ($0.30/MMBTU to $2.00/MMBTU), and liquefaction
more expensive at $2.81/GJ to $5.04/GJ ($2.96/MMBTU to $5.30/MMBTU).90
89 For example, while many of the B.C. LNG project proponents are looking for partnerships with pipeline companies,
the feed pipelines will not be owned by the LNG projects. See: LNG Canada, “TransCanada Selected by Shell and
Partners to Develop Multi-Billion Dollar Natural Gas Pipeline to Canada’s West Coast,” News Release, June 5, 2012,
http://lngcanada.ca/news/transcanada-selected-by-shell-and-partners-to-develop-multi-billion-dollar-natural-gas-
pipeline-to-canadas-west-coast/.
90 PFC Global Energy cites $0.40/MMBTU as the low end of their range for regasification costs, with $2.00/MMBTU
as the high end (PFC Energy, “Global LNG,” 7). Data from Poten & Partners via Bloomberg (ticker: POTN) has the
range of $0.30/MMBTU to $0.40/MMBTU; estimates of liquefaction costs come from Table 5.5.
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The cost of regasification is a factor in the overall import cost of natural gas, but it is borne by
the importer and charged back to industrial and power users in the importing nation. Although
the cost affects the users, it does not reflect on the competitive position or value of the LNG
cargo. Other factors may influence the value of the LNG import, such as heat content or purity,
but discounts on the cargo still occur on the sea side of the regas facility.
Import terminals are typically sized to match expected domestic growth for the importing
nation, a function of the capacity of the distribution network, existing power and heating
capability and expected growth in demand. Capital cost per annualized capacity for announced,
proposed and under-construction regasification terminals is plotted in Figure 3.15. Most
facilities are clustered around costs between $100 and $400 per tonne. The average cost for
terminals plotted in Figure 3.15 is $300/tonne. 
FIGURE 3.15:  CAPITAL COST PER TONNE OF CAPACITY FOR IMPORT TERMINALS
PANEL A: REGASIFICATION TERMINAL COSTS BY STATUS
PANEL B: REGASIFICATION TERMINAL COSTS BY LOCATION
Notes: “Proposed” LNG projects are those where a source was available for cost, capacity and start year, while 
“announced” are projects where a source was available for start year and capacity, and where there is no 
evidence of cancellation. Projects without a start year, cost or capacity are not included in the figure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on various sources. See Appendix F for sources.
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4. LNG DEMAND IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
Largely lacking international pipeline infrastructure and domestic supplies, countries in the
Asia-Pacific region have relied on LNG regasification terminals for much of their natural gas
supply. Though many terminals are planned and under construction in the region, steady
increases in natural gas demand have begun to stress import capacity at various Asian
countries. With the exception of China, many Asian importers have experienced stagnant LNG
import capacity since at least 2008. As a result, regasification capacity-utilization has been
steadily increasing, reinforcing the need for greater import capacity. The availability of import
capacity in the Pacific Basin will prove to be an important catalyst for Canadian LNG export
growth.
According to BP, natural gas consumption in the Asia-Pacific region is set to increase to 1,181
BCM by 2025, and to 1,328 BCM by 2035.91 Production in the Asia-Pacific region will remain
below consumption, with the deficit increasing to 372 BCM by 2035 and 514 BCM by 2035.
Table 4.1 displays the natural gas trade balance by country for the Asia-Pacific region between
2012 and 2025. Growth rates for production and consumption are based on projected regional
growth rates from the BP World Energy Outlook 2035. This will overestimate growth in some
countries and underestimate growth for others. However, it does serve to illustrate a persistent
regional trade deficit. 
TABLE 4.1:  ASIA-PACIFIC NATURAL GAS TRADE BALANCE (BCM)
Notes: Supplies increase based on projected regional production and consumption growth rates from BP Energy Outlook 
2035. Data for China include Hong Kong.
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013 (2013); BP, BP Energy Outlook 2035 (2013).
91 BP, BP Energy Outlook 2035 (2013). Converted from million tonnes of oil equivalent.
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Asia-Pacific Importers
China 107.20 146.60 20.00 24.20 (39.40) (48.42) (67.15) (91.63)
India 40.20 54.60 20.50 (14.40) (17.73) (24.65) (33.71)
Japan 116.70 118.80 (116.70) (132.69) (164.36) (203.58)
Singapore 8.30 9.50 (8.30) (9.44) (11.69) (14.48)
South Korea 50.00 49.70 (50.00) (56.85) (70.42) (87.22)
Taiwan 16.30 16.90 (16.30) (18.53) (22.96) (28.44)
Thailand 41.40 51.20 1.40 8.50 (9.80) (12.54) (18.31) (25.94)
Asia-Pacific Exporters
Australia 49.00 25.40 28.10 10.90 23.60 25.18 27.91 30.70 
Brunei 12.60 9.10 12.60 13.90 16.37 19.29 
Indonesia 71.10 35.80 25.00 10.20 35.30 37.74 41.98 46.39 
Malaysia 65.20 33.30 31.80 2.30 31.90 34.07 37.83 41.72 
Myanmar 12.70 8.50 12.70 14.01 16.50 19.44 
Supply-Demand Balance (138.80) (171.30) (238.93) (327.46)
Natural Gas Trade Balance
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4.1 Asia-Pacific Natural Gas Consumption
Natural gas consumption in the Asia-Pacific region has grown an average of six per cent year
over year for over two decades.92 Japan was the largest gas consumer in the region until 2010,
when China surpassed Japan as the largest Asia-Pacific gas market.
FIGURE 4.1:  NATURAL GAS DEMAND IN ASIA-PACIFIC 1980 – 2012 (BCM)
Source: IEA “World – Natural gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en.
FIGURE 4.2:  SECTOR DEMAND FOR NATURAL GAS IN ASIA-PACIFIC 2000 – 2017 (BCM)
Notes: Source for forecast natural gas use: IEA,"Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2013" (Paris: IEA, 2013), 178, 
Table 31.
Source for 2000-2011 residential, commercial, industry and other: IEA World Energy Statistics and
Balances, eISSN:1683-4240DOI:10.1787/enestats-data-en. 
Source for 2000-2011 power data: IEA Sankey Diagram, http://www.iea.org/Sankey/. 
Source for forecast natural gas use: IEA, “Medium-Term Gas Market Report” (Paris: IEA, 2013), 178, Table 31.
92 IEA, Developing a Natural.
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Natural gas consumption in the power sector predominates, accounting for 50 per cent of
consumption between 2000 and 2011 (Figure 4.2), compared to residential (10 per cent),
commercial and public services (six per cent) and industry (16 per cent). Power’s share of total
consumption is forecast to fall to 45 per cent beyond 2012 as industrial use increases.93 The
strongest growth in natural gas use is from the industrial sector, with consumption forecast to
double between 2011 and 2018. Natural gas use by residential and commercial and public
services is also forecast to grow substantially, by 45 per cent between 2011 and 2018 for both
sectors.
4.2 Asia-Pacific Natural Gas Trade
Although natural gas traded through pipelines exceeds the trade of LNG on a global basis,
within the Asia-Pacific, LNG trade dominates, accounting for 89 per cent of the natural gas
trade in the region (Figure 4.3). The share of pipeline-traded natural gas is set to increase to
about 18 per cent of the region’s trade in 2017, mainly driven by increased Chinese imports
from Central Asia and Myanmar, as no other new cross-border pipeline interconnections are
anticipated in the near future.94
FIGURE 4.3: PIPELINE AND LNG TRADE IN ASIA-PACIFIC 1993 – 2017 (BCM)
Notes: Forecast based on IEA, Developing a Natural Gas Trading Hub in Asia (Paris: 2013); assume six per cent annual 
growth for natural gas trade and 15 per cent annual growth for pipeline trade.
Source: IEA, “World – Natural gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics
(database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. 
93 Forecasts are from IEA, Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2013 (Paris: IEA, 2013).
94 IEA, Developing a Natural.
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4.3 Asia-Pacific LNG Supply and Demand
Six countries in the Asia-Pacific region — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, India, and
Thailand —imported LNG in 2012. They imported about 164 MMT, representing 70 per cent
of global LNG demand.95 About 69 MMT (46 per cent) of this demand was met through intra-
regional trades, with LNG supplies from regional exporters (Malaysia, Australia, Indonesia and
Brunei) to north Asia buyers (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China).96 This south-to-north,
Asia-Pacific intra-regional trade has constituted the majority of the global LNG trade for
decades. In recent years, Middle East suppliers have supplanted Asia-Pacific suppliers to the
region. Qatar alone supplied 24 per cent of LNG imported by China, Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan in 2012.97
Qatar is by far the largest LNG exporter in the world, and accounted for 31 per cent of global
LNG supply in 2012. Qatar’s LNG exports in 2012 reached a record level of 73 MMT, of
which 46.5 MMT was shipped to Asia-Pacific countries.98 Qatar’s significance as an LNG
supplier to the region is highlighted by the fact it was the largest supplier of LNG to South
Korea, China, India and Taiwan, and Qatar’s LNG exports to Japan were only exceeded — just
slightly — by shipments from Australia (17.6 MMT versus 15.7 MMT). Malaysia, a distant
second to Qatar as an LNG exporter, shipped 23 MMT of LNG during 2012, barely 30 per cent
of the quantity supplied by Qatar.99 However, all of Malaysia’s LNG exports were shipped to
North Asia buyers, meeting 14 per cent of the region’s demand. 
TABLE 4.2:  TOP 10 LNG IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS (2012)
Source: IEA “World – Natural gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 
10.1787/data-00482-en.
The Asia-Pacific region is more dependent on LNG imports to meet natural gas demand than
are other regions. The region meets 36 per cent of its aggregate natural gas demand through
LNG imports. However, within the region there are significant differences in the dependence
on LNG imports.
95 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural gas imports.”
96 ibid.
97 ibid.
98 ibid.
99 ibid.
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Japan 89.38 37.94% Qatar 73.00 30.98%
S. Korea 35.12 14.91% Malaysia 23.14 9.82%
China 14.05 5.96% Australia 22.20 9.42%
Spain 15.54 6.60% Nigeria 19.76 8.39%
India 12.42 5.27% Indonesia 17.75 7.53%
Taiwan 12.05 5.12% Trinidad & Tobago 14.58 6.19%
U.K. 10.04 4.26% Russia 11.01 4.67%
France 6.65 2.82% Algeria 10.86 4.61%
Turkey 5.78 2.45% Oman 7.90 3.35%
Italy 5.39 2.29% Brunei 6.89 2.92%
IMPORTERS EXPORTERS
COUNTRY Volume Share (% of COUNTRY Volume Share (% of 
(MMT) World Trade) (MMT) World Trade)
FIGURE 4.4:  DEPENDENCE ON LNG IMPORTS
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013 (2013).
4.4 The Big Five: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China and India
According to BP, Asia-Pacific LNG imports grew by 10 per cent from 2011 to 2012.100 Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, China and India accounted for almost all of the region’s LNG demand in
2012, and imports into each of these countries grew substantially from 2010 to 2011 and from
2011 to 2012.101
Japan, as the largest LNG-consuming country in the world, imported 89 MMT of LNG in
2012, up from 72 MMT in 2010, before the Fukushima nuclear plant crisis. Following at a
distant second to Japan, South Korea imported 35 MMT during 2012. LNG imports to Taiwan,
for decades the third largest importer of LNG in the region, were surpassed by imports in
China in 2011 and India in 2012. Despite continued growth in LNG demand, Taiwan fell to
fifth place among the region’s LNG importers, with imports of 12.8 MMT in 2012. 
Japan and South Korea rely almost entirely on LNG for their natural gas supply. Both Japan
and South Korea have small domestic natural gas resources offshore, but gas production in
both countries is negligible. Taiwan, with no natural gas resources, is 100 per cent dependent
on LNG imports to meet its natural gas needs.
In 2012, China and India, two of the fastest-growing LNG markets in the world, imported 14
MMT and 12.4 MMT of LNG, respectively. China and India have significant natural gas
resources and are striving to rapidly develop their domestic resources in parallel with, and in
preference to, increasing natural gas imports. However, both China and India have struggled to
develop their domestic resources quickly enough to meet the rapidly growing demand for natural
gas. Hence, both have looked to pipeline gas and LNG imports to meet increasing demand.
100 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
101 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural gas imports.”
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In 2012, China consumed 142 BCM of natural gas, the equivalent of 104 MMT of LNG.102
China still produces the majority of the natural gas that it consumes, but its imports of natural
gas are growing quickly. In 2012, China produced 107.2 BCM of natural gas, “exported” 2.85
BCM to Hong Kong, and imported 38.4 BCM, of which 50 per cent was imported through the
1,833-kilometre Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan pipeline.103 In 2012, LNG met 13 per
cent of China’s natural gas demand.
In 2012, India consumed 56.3 BCM of natural gas, equivalent to 41 MMT of LNG.104 India
still produces the majority of the natural gas that it consumes, but its imports of natural gas are
growing quickly. In 2012, India produced 40.4 BCM of natural gas, and imported 16.9 BCM in
the form of LNG.105 Although proposals to import pipeline gas from Central Asia and
Bangladesh have been discussed for decades, at this time India does not import any natural gas
via cross-border pipelines.
FIGURE 4.5:  BIG FIVE LNG IMPORTS 2010 - 2012
Source: IEA, "World – Natural gas imports by origin," IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi:
10.1787/data-00482-en.
102 IEA, "World - Natural gas statistics", IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-
00482-en.
103 ibid.
104 ibid.
105 ibid.; and IEA, “World – Natural gas imports.”
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4.5 Southeast Asia
Thailand entered the ranks of LNG buyers when it took delivery of its first LNG cargo from
Qatar in 2011. It was the first country in Southeast Asia to import LNG. In 2012, Thailand
imported 1 MMT of LNG in spot and short-term purchases from Yemen, Peru, Qatar, Nigeria,
and Trinidad and Tobago.106 Thailand was unable to agree on the terms for long-term LNG
purchases with an LNG supplier until December 2012, when it executed an agreement with
Qatar. Under the terms of the agreement, Qatar will deliver 2 MMTPA to Thailand starting in
2015.107
In 2012, Thailand consumed 43.1 BCM of natural gas, the equivalent of 31.6 MMT of LNG.108
Most of the natural gas was supplied by domestic producing fields in the Gulf of Thailand
(31.3 BCM) and pipeline gas imports from Myanmar (9.7 BCM).109 Just over three per cent of
the natural gas consumed came from LNG imports. According to the U.S. EIA, Thailand’s
Energy Ministry expects natural gas production to peak in 2017 and to be depleted by 2030 at
current production levels.110 In the absence of new discoveries, Thailand will need to import
increasing volumes of LNG to supplement and replace depleting domestic gas resources in the
Gulf of Thailand and pipeline gas imports from Myanmar. Thailand’s LNG imports can be
expected to grow steadily to a substantial level.
In addition, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia commissioned LNG import terminals, which
can now take delivery of LNG. A floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) import
terminal was commissioned offshore West Java, Indonesia in mid-2012.111 Indonesia can import
LNG, or can ship LNG from three Indonesian LNG export plants (in East Kalimantan and
Papua provinces) to the West Java terminal in Western Indonesia. In 2012, 0.7 MMT of LNG
was delivered from the Bontang LNG plant in East Kalimantan (Borneo) to West Java.112 In
2013, Indonesia signed its first import contract with Cheniere Energy for imports from the
U.S., with delivery starting in 2018.113
Indonesia has been an LNG exporter for four decades. However, increasing domestic demand
for natural gas, combined with a decline in natural gas production feeding its liquefaction
plants at Arun and Bontang, led to speculation that Indonesia might become a net importer of
LNG before the end of the decade. Plans are in place to convert the Arun liquefaction facility
in Sumatra to an import terminal to supply the domestic market in Aceh province.114
106 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2012.
107 Qatargas, “Qatargas 3 signs long-term agreement with PTT of Thailand,” press release, December 12, 2012,
http://www.qatargas.com/English/MediaCenter/PressReleases/2012/Pages/12DecSPAwithPTT-PR.aspx.
108 IEA, “World – Natural gas statistics.” 
109 ibid.; and IEA, “World – Natural gas imports.”
110 EIA website, “Thailand,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Thailand/thailand.pdf.
111 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2012.
112 ibid.
113 EIA website, “Indonesia,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=id.
114 ibid.
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In 2013, Singapore took the first delivery of LNG under a long-term agreement to purchase 3
MMTPA of LNG from BG Group’s LNG supply portfolio.115 Singapore will import LNG to
supplement and replace its pipeline gas supplies, assuage concerns about the long-term security
of pipeline gas imports from neighbouring countries, and to help establish Singapore as a
regional natural gas trading hub.
In 2012, Singapore consumed 9.4 BCM of natural gas.116 Singapore met its natural gas
requirements through pipeline gas imports from Malaysia (18 per cent) and Indonesia (82 per
cent).117
Although Malaysia did not import LNG in 2012, it can now ship LNG within Malaysian
territory, from LNG export plants in Sarawak to an import terminal in peninsular Malaysia, or
import LNG from other countries.
4.6 The West Coast of the Americas
The west coasts of Mexico and Chile are on the eastern rim of the Pacific Basin. The Energia
Costa Azul import terminal on Mexico’s west coast started commercial operations in 2008,
with the intent of importing LNG from Indonesia (Tangguh) and Russia (Sakhalin) to supply
Northern Mexico and Southern California. However, as the cost of natural gas supplies in the
U.S. fell, the LNG sellers exercised options to divert LNG supplies from Costa Azul to higher-
priced markets in North Asia. In 2012, Costa Azul took delivery of only 0.2 MMT of LNG
from Indonesia. Manzanillo, the second LNG import terminal on Mexico’s west coast, was
placed into service in 2012.
Chile has two operating LNG import terminals and a third under construction with an expected
startup date in 2014. Chile imported 3 MMT of LNG in 2012, supplied from Trinidad (2.3
MMT), Equatorial Guinea (0.3 MMT), Yemen (0.2 MMT), Egypt (0.1 MMT), and Norway
(0.1 MMT).
Costa Azul is a candidate for conversion from an import to an export terminal, as it is
connected to the U.S.-Mexico pipeline grid and could feasibly be supplied by U.S. pipeline
gas. The other liquefaction facilities are not connected via pipeline to U.S. supplies, and are not
candidates for conversion.
115 BG Group website, “Singapore,” http://www.bg-group.com/252/where-we-work/singapore/.
116 IEA, “World – Natural gas statistics.”
117 IEA, “World – Natural gas imports.”
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5. DETAILED COMPETITION FROM WORLD SOURCES
While demand for natural gas has been growing throughout the Pacific Basin in recent years,
regional suppliers have been able to match that demand in the face of the attractive price
differentials available. New production in the U.S. (in excess of domestic demand) has the
potential to compete in terms of new supply and to capture a larger share of the market. This
opportunity highlights the potential for new, cost-effective supplies from Canada, given its
distance advantage relative to the U.S. Gulf Coast.
Within the Asia-Pacific region, Australian LNG export capacity has increased and will more than
triple, from 24 MMTPA today to 85.8 MMTPA by 2017-18 based on current construction.118 In
Table 5.1 we illustrate the growth of LNG supply by country, excluding Canada, that supplies or
might logically supply Asia-Pacific countries. As can be seen, the number of countries that have
LNG liquefaction plants and their aggregate capacity has grown significantly. 
TABLE 5.1:  GROWTH OF LNG SUPPLY CAPACITY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES
Notes: "Projected" is based on liquefaction terminals currently under construction. Oman/Qalhut LNG has three trains, 
with two owned by Oman LNG and one owned by Qalhut LNG, although they are part of the same facility. 
Projected capacity for Indonesia includes capacity subtractions due to conversions to regasification. Supply from 
Alaska stopped between October 2012 and April 2014, and is not likely to last past 2016, as noted below in 
Section 5.1.1.
Source: See Appendix E.
Global trade in LNG has grown dramatically since 2000 as demand for natural gas has grown
in countries without sufficient native gas resources, and worldwide LNG export capacity has
increased to meet the demand. From 2000 to 2011, LNG trade grew by 134 per cent, an
average growth rate of eight per cent per year.119 
118 Authors’ calculations. See Section 5.2.2 for details on Australia’s terminals, and Appendix E for detailed data
sources.
119 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, "World – Natural gas imports.”
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U.S. (Alaska) 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.5
U.S. Gulf Coast - - - - - - - - 1 9
Peru - - - - - - 1 4.45 1 4.45
Australia 1 4.4 1 6.6 1 11 2 19.7 9 82.2
Indonesia 2 22.28 2 33.71 2 33.71 3 41.31 4 37.73
Malaysia 1 8.1 1 15.9 1 22.7 1 24.2 2 29
Brunei 1 7.1 1 7.1 1 7.1 1 7.1 1 7.1
Papua New Guinea - - - - - - - - 1 6.9
Russia - - - - - - 1 9.55 1 9.55
Qatar - - 2 12.6 2 26 2 69.7 2 69.7
U.A.E. 1 5.8 1 5.8 1 5.8 1 5.8 1 5.8
Oman - - 1 6.7 1 6.7 1 10.4 1 10.4
Yemen - - - - - - 1 6.7 1 6.7
Equatorial Guinea 1 3.7 1 3.7
Total 7 49.18 10 89.91 10 114.51 16 204.11 27 283.73
World Total 10 74.48 15 124.61 18 177.96 29 280.36 42 366.61
1990 2000 2005 2010 2015/6 (projected)
Country Export MMTPA Export MMTPA Export MMTPA Export MMTPA Export MMTPA
Sites Sites Sites Sites Sites
In the early 1990s, Southeast Asia (Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia) and Australia were the
primary suppliers of LNG to the Asia-Pacific region. By the late 1990s, Qatar entered the
market as an LNG supplier and has grown to become the largest supplier to the Asia-Pacific
region. Since 1993, Australia has been a consistent supplier to the region (providing, on
average, 12 per cent of imports)120 and is forecast to overtake Qatar as the top exporter of LNG
worldwide. This impressive growth is noted by PFC energy:121
“LNG trade has not only grown in volume, but in geographic reach as well.
In 2006, only 13 countries exported LNG... Another five countries have
since brought liquefaction capacity on-stream… Further, seven countries
have expanded existing liquefaction capacity… and five countries have re-
exported LNG during this period.”
Figure 5.1 illustrates potential growth in world liquefaction capacity. If all currently proposed
and announced projects go forward, and no current capacity is mothballed, liquefaction
capacity could reach 777 MMT. There are an additional 14 liquefaction projects without
projected in-service dates that have a combined capacity of 127.45 MMT.122 However, not all
announced or even proposed projects will necessarily go forward; both PFC Energy123 and
Goldman Sachs124 predict around 500 MMT by 2025.
FIGURE 5.1:  FORECAST WORLD LIQUEFACTION CAPACITY
Notes: “Proposed” LNG projects are those where a source was available for cost, capacity and start year, while 
“announced” are projects where a source was available for start year and capacity, and where there is no 
evidence of cancellation. Projects without a start year or capacity are excluded from the figure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on various sources. See Appendix E for sources.
120 Author’s calculations; ibid.
121 PFC Energy, “Global LNG,” 43.
122 Various sources; see Appendix E (data sources).
123 PFC Energy, “Global LNG.”
124 Goldman Sachs, “Global LNG Update: Asian LNG Outlook Remains Strong; Pursuit of Lower Prices Remains
Challenging,” September 23, 2013.
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The Asia-Pacific countries lacking indigenous natural gas resources or without import-pipeline
supply opportunities are the logical markets for LNG exported from coastal British Columbia.
LNG from British Columbia will face competition from those countries that are highly
dependent on sales to the Asia-Pacific market. Table 5.2 illustrates the 2012 world LNG trade
patterns, sorted for the top suppliers to the Asia-Pacific, where the Asia-Pacific region
represents almost 70 per cent of world export volumes.125 The rightmost column shows exports
to the Asia-Pacific as a percentage of total exports from each exporting country. This highlights
the dependence of many LNG exporters on the Asia-Pacific market and those that are likely
direct market competitors with LNG from Canada. 
As noted earlier, the increase in liquefaction capacity in the near term is limited, except for in
Australia and the U.S. The next sections review liquefaction activities outside of Canada by
region. 
TABLE 5.2:  LNG TRADE MOVEMENTS 2012 (BCM)
Note: Export volumes from U.S. and Other Europe include re-exports.
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013 (2013).
125 Data is sourced from: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012 (2012),
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Statistical-Review-2012/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2012.pdf.
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Qatar 3.6 1.3 31.1 2.9 6.8 16.1 21.3 14.2 7.9 0.3 66.5 105.4 63%
Malaysia - - - - 2.5 - 19.9 5.6 3.8 - 31.8 31.8 100%
Australia - - - 0.1 4.8 - 21.6 1.1 0.3 - 28.0 28.1 100%
Indonesia 0.3 - - - 3.3 0.2 8.4 10.3 2.6 - 24.7 25.0 99%
Russian 
Federation - - - - 0.5 - 11.3 3.0 - - 14.8 14.8 100%
Nigeria 1.1 0.5 11.6 0.8 0.4 2.1 6.5 2.5 1.6 0.1 13.1 27.2 48%
Oman - - - - 0.1 - 5.4 5.7 - - 11.2 11.2 100%
Brunei - - - - - - 8.0 1.1 - - 9.1 9.1 100%
United Arab 
Emirates - - - 0.1 - - 7.5 - - - 7.5 7.6 99%
Yemen 0.9 0.3 - - 0.8 0.6 0.4 3.6 - 0.5 5.9 7.1 82%
Equatorial 
Guinea - 0.4 0.1 - - - 3.8 0.5 0.2 - 4.5 4.9 91%
Egypt 0.1 0.3 2.4 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.3 - 3.8 6.7 56%
Trinidad & 
Tobago 4.2 10.1 2.6 0.4 0.2 - 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.1 1.9 19.1 10%
Peru 1.2 - 2.6 - - - 1.1 - - 0.4 1.5 5.4 29%
Other Europe - 1.1 1.1 - - 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 - 0.9 3.2 27%
Algeria - - 14.4 - 0.1 0.6 0.2 - - - 0.9 15.3 6%
Norway 0.2 0.6 3.1 0.2 - - 0.6 0.1 0.1 - 0.7 4.7 15%
U.S. 0.0 0.2 0.1 - - 0.1 0.4 - - - 0.5 0.8 61%
Brazil - 0.4 - - - 0. - - - 0.1 0.4 16%
Total imports 11.6 15.2 69.3 4.6 20.0 20.5 118.8 49.7 16.9 1.4 227.2 327.9 69%
North South & Europe Middle China India Japan South Taiwan Thailand Asia Total Asia
America Central and East Korea Pacific exports Pacific
America Eurasia as %
of Total
Exports
5.1 Eastern Pacific
The Eastern Pacific, including the U.S. Gulf Coast and East Coast, has had limited LNG
liquefaction capacity. This picture is changing.
5.1.1 ALASKA
Alaska is home to the second-oldest commercial liquefaction plant in the world. The Kenai
LNG plant in Alaska was put on standby in October 2012, and its export licence expired in
2013. A new licence was issued April 14, 2014, which grants licence to export 1.13 BCM (40
BCF) of LNG over two years.126 The suspension was to preserve natural gas for domestic use
as Cook Inlet reserves were depleted, until new discoveries allowed for a resumption of
exports.127 Without additional discoveries, it is uncertain whether Alaska will continue to
export beyond 2016.
Alaska’s North Slope has large gas reserves.128 Development of these reserves has been
analyzed numerous times, including to assess the case for piping gas to the Lower 48 states
(the historic Alaska gas pipeline project) and, more recently, piping to South-central Alaska to
convert to LNG.129 The state of Alaska has a major incentive to develop the North Slope
reserves, and numerous proposals and methods have been proposed, including gas-to-liquids
(GTL) technology, large- and small-scale LNG, pipeline to the Lower 48 and development for
in-state use. To date, none of these ideas have come to fruition, primarily because of the high
cost of implementation.
Recently, the State of Alaska joined a consortium including ExxonMobil, BP, ConocoPhillips
and TransCanada Corp., in a project to export LNG.130 This project is estimated to cost
between $45 and $65 billion and includes gas processing on the North Slope and a 1,287-
kilometre gas pipeline and liquefaction plant on the Kenai Peninsula, with shipments projected
to begin in 2021.131 The State of Alaska agreed to take as much as a 25 per cent stake in the
project to help expedite its development.132
5.1.2 U.S. LOWER 48
Historically, the U.S. has been an LNG importer and there are no operating LNG export plants
in the U.S. Lower 48. This is changing as the revolution in shale- and tight-gas production has    
126 ConocoPhillips website, “Kenai LNG Exports,” http://alaska.conocophillips.com/what-we-do/natural-
gas/lng/Pages/kenai-lng-exports.aspx.
127 Tim Bradner, “First LNG ship since 2012 arrives at ConocoPhillips plant near Kenai,” Alaska Journal of Commerce,
May 2, 2014, http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/Breaking-News-2013/First-LNG-ship-
since-2012-arrives-at-ConocoPhillips-plant-near-Kenai/.
128 According to the U.S. Geological Survey’s National Oil and Gas Assessment, the Central North Slope has 37.5 TCF
of gas (assessed in 2005), the entire North Slope has 18 TCF of coal-bed gas (assessed 2006) and 40.6 TCF of shale
gas (assessed 2012). U.S. Geological Survey website, “National Oil and Gas Assessment,”
http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/AssessmentsData/NationalOilGasAssessment.aspx#.U1gAbvldXmc. 
129 Alaska Pipeline Project website, “Commercial Information,” http://thealaskapipelineproject.com/commercial.
130 Bradley Olson and Rebecca Penty, “Alaska to Pay $5.75 Billion for Exxon LNG Project Stake,” Bloomberg, January 15,
2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-15/alaska-to-pay-5-75-billion-for-exxon-lng-export-project-stake.html.
131 ibid.
132ibid.
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dramatically increased gas-supply potential. The U.S. has the opportunity to add gas
liquefaction equipment to idle LNG import infrastructure to convert these sites for LNG
export. The equipment existing with the LNG import terminals, jetty, tanks, infrastructure, and
pipeline connections, significantly reduces the investment required for converting plants to
liquefaction. Based on analysis of brownfield- and greenfield-project cost estimates on the U.S.
Gulf Coast, a greenfield project costs about one-third more than a brownfield project.133
While not technically in the Pacific Basin, U.S. Gulf Coast projects have access to the Pacific
Ocean through the Panama Canal. A number of plants are planned for the U.S.; all but three are
on the U.S. Gulf Coast. One Gulf Coast plant, Cheniere at Sabine Pass, is under construction,
with an estimated in-service date of the fourth quarter of 2015.134 The first two trains of the plant
will have a capacity of 9.0 MMTPA. The three proposed plants not on the Gulf Coast are at:
Cove Point in Maryland (5.25 MMTPA);135 Oregon LNG (9.9 MMTPA)136 at Warrenton, Ore.;
and Jordon Cove (6 MMTPA)137 in Coos Bay, Ore. The Oregon projects plan to use gas supplied
from Canada and have applied for and received Canadian export permits for long-term supply.138
TABLE 5.3:  POTENTIAL U.S. LOWER 48 LNG EXPORT PROJECTS
Source: See Appendix E for details. “Proposed” LNG projects are those where a source was available for cost, capacity
and start year, while “announced” are projects where a source was available for start year and capacity, and where
there is no evidence of cancellation.
133Stillwater Associates LLC analysis.
134Cheniere Energy website, “Sabine Pass Liquefaction Project,”
http://www.cheniere.com/lng_industry/sabine_pass_liquefaction.shtml.
135Dominion Resources Inc. website, “Dominion Cove Point,” https://www.dom.com/business/gas-transmission/cove-point/.
136Oregon LNG website, “Terminal,” http://www.oregonlng.com/terminal/.
137Jordan Cove Energy Project LP website, “Project Overview,” http://www.jordancoveenergy.com/project.htm.
138National Energy Board website, “LNG Export License Applications,” http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rthnb/pplctnsbfrthnb/lngxprtlcncpplctns/lngxprtlcncpplctns-eng.html.
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Louisiana Sabine Pass T1-T2 2015 9 Under construction Conversion from regas
Louisiana Sabine Pass T3-4 2017 9 Under construction Conversion from regas
Maryland Cove Point LNG 2017 5.25 Proposed Conversion from regas
Gulf of Mexico Main Pass Energy Hub 2017 24 Proposed Floating LNG
Texas Corpus Christi LNG 2018 13.5 Proposed
Georgia Elba Island LNG Phase 1 & 2 2018 2.5 Proposed Conversion from regas
Texas Freeport Expansion 2018 14.2 Proposed Existing regas plant, addition
of liquefaction capacity
Texas Golden Pass 2018 15.6 Proposed
Oregon Jordan Cove - Coos Bay 2018 6 Proposed
Louisiana Magnolia LNG T1-2 2018 4 Proposed
Louisiana Cameron LNG 2019 12 Proposed Conversion from regas
Louisiana Lake Charles Expansion 
(Trunkline LNG) 2019 15 Proposed Conversion from regas
Oregon Oregon LNG 2019 9.9 Proposed
Texas South Texas LNG T1-2 2018 8 Announced
Louisiana Gasfin LNG 2019 1.5 Announced
Louisiana Venture Global LNG 2018 5 Announced
Texas Gulf Coast LNG T1-4 21 Announced
Texas Texas LNG 2018 2 Announced
Location Name Completion MM Status Notes
Year TPA
The current Panama Canal has limits that restrict the size of LNG carriers that can use this
shorter route to the Pacific Basin from the Gulf Coast. In 2015, the expanded Panama Canal
will allow all but the largest LNG carriers to traverse the canal. The expansion will improve
the economics for the U.S. Gulf Coast LNG facilities to supply the Pacific Basin, provided the
canal tolls are less than the costs (in time and operation) for shipping around Cape Horn or
Tierra del Fuego. Another consideration is that U.S. East Coast and Gulf Coast projects can
more logically supply Europe, which would have the effect of freeing up cargoes from the
Middle East that supply Europe, which could then be diverted to Asia.
5.1.3 CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA
There are two LNG facilities in this region. One is in Trinidad and Tobago, with a capacity of
14.8 MMTPA, that originally began operations in 1999.139 It was expanded from the original 3
MMTPA in 2002, 2003 and 2005. The other facility is on the coast of Peru. Started up in 2010,
the plant has a capacity of 4.4 MMTPA. There is one new small project planned for the area, a
0.55-MMTPA barge-mounted facility in Colombia.140 LNG facilities were also planned for
Venezuela, however, the government decided to reserve the gas for domestic use.141 It is
anticipated that there will be little change in LNG export activity in Central and South
America.
5.2 Western Pacific
5.2.1 SOUTHEAST ASIA
The following table summarizes the current and under-construction LNG-liquefaction capacity
in Southeast Asia.
139Atlantic LNG website, “Our Trains,” http://www.atlanticlng.com/our-business/our-trains.
140 Gurdip Singh, “EXMAR launches FLRSU to exploit stranded gas offshore Colombia,” Offshore 1, 8 (August 2012). 
141 Reuters, “UPDATE 3-Venezuela freezes LNG projects, eyes local demand,” September 28, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/28/venezuela-gas-idUSS1E78R0UG20110928.
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TABLE 5.4:  SOUTHEAST ASIA LNG EXPORT PROJECTS
Source: See Appendix E for details. “Proposed” LNG projects are those where a source was available for cost,
capacity and start year, while “announced” are projects where a source was available for start year and capacity,
and where there is no evidence of cancellation.
5.2.1.1 Indonesia
Indonesia was a pioneer in LNG exports, opening the Arun LNG plant in 1978.142 Currently,
Indonesia has three operating LNG export facilities with a combined capacity of 41.3 MMTPA.
However, 14 MMTPA of this capacity is at Arun, and Pertamina, the owner of the facility, is
looking to convert Arun into an import terminal.143 The LNG facility at Bontang, which began
exporting in 1977, may be a candidate for idling if gas reserves dwindle. The Tangguh LNG
facility is of more recent vintage, having started up in 2009. In Sulawesi, the 2.0 MMTPA
Donggi-Senoro and 2.0 MMTPA Sengkang LNG plants are under construction, and expected to
be completed in 2014. An additional floating LNG facility, Abadi FLNG, with capacity of 2.5
MMTPA, has been proposed, with a projected start year of 2019.144
142 PT Arun NGL website, “Our Profile,” http://www.arunlng.co.id/profile.php.
143 Pertamina, “Repositioning Arun LNG Plant – 1st Time in LNG History, From Liquefaction Become Ragasification
Terminal,” presentation by Daniel Purba at LNG 17 conference, April 16, 2013,
http://www.gastechnology.org/Training/Documents/LNG17-proceedings/03_05-Daniel-Purba-Presentation.pdf.
144
“Inpex delays Indonesia Abadi LNG project startup to 2019 – media,” London South East, June 25, 2013,
http://www.lse.co.uk/FinanceNews.asp?code=kvkqidfa&headline=Inpex_delays_Indonesia_Abadi_LNG_project_star
tup_to_2019_media.
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Brunei Lumut 1973 7.10 Operating
Indonesia Bontang 1977 19.63 Operating Original size: 4.5 MMTPA;
expansions occurred in 1983,
1989, 1993 and 1996
Indonesia Arun 1978 14.08 Operating Converting to imports. Original
size: 3.4 MMTPA; expansions
occurred in 1979, 1981,
1983, 1984, 1986 and 1993
Malaysia Bintulu 1983 24.20 Operating Original size: 8.1 MMTPA; 
expansions occurred in 1995,
2003 and 2010
Indonesia Tangguh 2009 7.60 Operating
Indonesia Donggi Senoro 2014 2.00 Under construction
Indonesia SengKang LNG 2014 2.00 Under construction
Papua
New Guinea PNG LNG T1-T2 2014 6.90 Under construction
Malaysia MLNG Mini-Expansion 2014 0.70 Under construction Expansion
Malaysia Petronas FLNG 1 2015 1.20 Under construction Floating Unit
Malaysia Petronas LNG 9 (Bintulu) 2015 3.60 Under construction Expansion
Brunei Lumut Expansion 2015 4.00 Announced Expansion
Papua 
New Guinea InterOil Gulf LNG 2016 8.00 Proposed
Malaysia Petronas FLNG 2 2018 1.50 Announced Floating Unit
Indonesia Abadi FLNG 2019 2.50 Proposed Floating Unit
Location Name Completion MM Status Notes
Year TPA
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5.2.1.2 Malaysia
Malaysia was the third country in the region to become an LNG exporter when the first train
was opened at the Bintulu LNG facility in 1983. There are three plants, owned and operated by
Petronas’s three joint-venture companies.145 The capacity at this site was expanded in 1995,
2003 and 2010. Total LNG capacity at the Bintulu site is 24.2 MMTPA.146 An expansion is
planned at the Bintulu site with a ninth LNG train. The train is expected to have a capacity of
3.6 MMTPA and to start up in 2015.147 An additional floating project is planned by Petronas
with a capacity of 1.2 MMTPA, and is expected to be the world’s first operational floating LNG
project when it is completed in 2015.148
5.2.1.3 Others
The Brunei LNG plant has a capacity of 7.1 MMTPA and was started up in 1972. The facility
was renovated in 1993, and Japanese buyers extended their contracts for another 20 years.149 A
Heads of Agreement was reached in 2012 for an additional 10-year term at about half the
volume.150 Papua New Guinea will become an LNG exporter in 2014 when the 6.9 MMTPA
PNG LNG facility starts up.151 A second LNG project, Gulf LNG, with capacity of 8 MMTPA,
has been proposed for Papua New Guinea, with projected completion in 2016.152
5.2.2 AUSTRALIA
Australia is projected to have the largest global LNG export capacity by 2016, reaching 82.2
MMTPA. Currently there are three export sites that are operational: NW Shelf, Pluto and
Darwin. The combined capacity of these three sites total 24 MMTPA. There are an additional
seven export sites that are reported to be under construction that total an additional 61.8
MMTPA. Five additional projects with a combined capacity of 20.9 MMTPA have been
proposed. Some proposed projects have been cancelled; a 2013 article in Oil & Gas Journal
quotes Chevron officials expressing doubts as to whether an expansion of the Gorgon project
will proceed, despite brownfield cost advantages.153 One project — Fisherman’s Landing LNG
— started construction, but is currently on hold.154 There is a potential expansion for the Darwin
site, but nothing further has been announced.155
145 Petronas website, “Petronas LNG Complex,” http://www.petronas.com.my/our-business/gas-
power/lng/pages/lng_complex.aspx.
146 International Gas Union, World LNG.
147 Warren R. True, “Petronas lets contract for Train 9 compression, targets 2013 FID,” Oil & Gas Journal, June 7, 2012,
http://www.ogj.com/articles/2012/06/petronas-lets-contract-for-train-9-compression-targets-2013-fid.html.
148 Nina Rach, “Petronas’ Kanowit field FLNG facility under construction,” OE, August 19, 2013,
http://www.oedigital.com/component/k2/item/3760-petronas-kanowit-field-flng-facility-under-construction.
149 Brunei LNG website, “History and Background,” http://www.bruneilng.com/about_history.htm.
150 Goh De No and Bandar Seri Begawan, “Brunei signs pact with Japan's Tepco for 10-year LNG supply,” The Brunei Times,
March 15, 2012, http://www.bt.com.bn/news-national/2012/03/15/brunei-signs-pact-japans-tepco-10-year-lng-supply.
151 Jane Wardell and James Regan, “Exxon’s PNG LNG project costs balloon to $19 billion,” Reuters, November 11,
2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/12/us-exxon-png-idUSBRE8AA0GR20121112.
152 InterOil website, “Economics and Financing of Integrated Gulf LNG Project,” September 2012,
http://www.interoil.com/iocfiles/documents/investorrelations/presentationanddocuments/2012/LNG%20Project%20Up
date%20Investor%20Presentation%20September%2029%202012.pdf.
153 Rick Wilkinson, “Chevron doubtful about fourth train for Gorgon LNG project,” Oil & Gas Journal, November 5,
2013, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/11/chevron-doubtful-about-fourth-train-for-gorgon-lng-project.html.
154 James McGrath, “LNG project short of gas as big players snap up supply,” The Observer, January 8, 2014,
http://www.gladstoneobserver.com.au/news/project-short-of-gas-for-start-up/2133489/.
155 James Paton, “Conoco Weighs Larger Darwin LNG Amid Santos ‘Disappointment,’” Bloomberg, April 14, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-14/conocophillips-still-evaluating-expansion-of-darwin-lng-venture.html. 
The following table summarizes the current and under-construction LNG liquefaction capacity
in Australia.
TABLE 5.5:  AUSTRALIA LNG EXPORT PROJECTS
Source: See Appendix E for details. “Proposed” LNG projects are those where a source was available for cost,
capacity and start year, while “announced” are projects where a source was available for start year and capacity,
and where there is no evidence of cancellation.
Of note, and possibly very relevant to understanding the challenges for Canadian LNG
development, are the projects in Eastern Australia. There are three projects under construction,
Queensland Curtis LNG, Australian Pacific LNG and Gladstone LNG (and possibly a fourth,
Arrow LNG), that are being built on Curtis Island, Gladstone. These projects will be supplied
with natural gas from the interior by a long-distance pipeline to the liquefaction sites. The feed
gas is from coal-seam methane reserves that require continuous development to supply the gas
to the plants. On the plant site, the location is remote and requires development of
infrastructure and facilities to support construction and operations. While the gas-reserve
characteristics differ, two of these characteristics — long-distance pipelining and remote,
undeveloped plant sites — are shared by the proposed Canadian projects. Eastern Australia
LNG development may provide some learned lessons that may help guide Canadian LNG
development.
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Western Australia North West Shelf (T1-5) 1989 16.3 Operating Expansions in 1993, 2004
and 2008
North Australia Darwin 2006 3.4 Operating
Western Australia Pluto 2012 4.3 Operating
Eastern Australia Queensland Curtis (T1-T2) 2014 8.5 Under Construction
Eastern Australia Australian Pacific 2015 9 Under Construction
Eastern Australia Gladstone Santos 2015 7.8 Under Construction
Western Australia Gorgon (T1-3) 2015 15.6 Under Construction
North Australia Ichthys (T1-2) 2016 8.4 Under Construction
Western Australia Wheatstone LNG T1-T2 2016 8.9 Under Construction
Western Australia Prelude FLNG 2017 3.6 Under Construction Floating Unit
Eastern Australia Fisherman’s Landing T1 2017 1.9 Under Construction Construction on hold pending
project securing gas supplies
North Australia Sunrise – Timor Leste 2017 4 Proposed Floating Unit; project on hold
pending dispute resolution
between governments of
Australia and Timor Leste
Eastern Australia Arrow T1-T2 2018 8 Proposed
North Australia Bonaparte FLNG 2019 2.4 Proposed Floating Unit; FID scheduled
for 2015
North Australia Scarborough FLNG 2020 6.5 Proposed FID scheduled for
2014/2015
Western Australia Cash Maple 2019 Announced FID scheduled for 2015
Location Name Completion MM Status Notes
Year TPA
5.3 Europe and Russia
5.3.1 EUROPE
Europe’s sole liquefaction facilities are in Norway, which has two operating terminals. Snohvit
(Hammerfest) has an annual capacity of 4.3 MMT,156 and Skangass has an annual capacity of
0.3 MMT.157 However, Norway’s traditional markets have been in Europe, with only small
volumes going to the Asia-Pacific, given the distance of that region’s markets.158
Other European countries have occasionally re-exported LNG to the Asia-Pacific; for example,
in 2013, Belgium re-exported to South Korea, France re-exported to Japan, and Spain re-
exported to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.159
5.3.2 RUSSIA
Russia has one operational export terminal and three proposed. In Eastern Russia, the 9.6
MMTPA Sakhalin II facility started operations in 2009.160 A memorandum of understanding
between Shell and Gazprom has been signed to expand the facility with a third — presumably
4.8 MMTPA — train.161
The proposed Vladivostok LNG export terminal, nestled between Japan, China, and South
Korea, will have a starting capacity of 5 MMTPA (expanding to as large as 15 MMTPA
afterwards), with operations beginning in 2018.162 
Located on the shores of the Kara Sea in Russia’s Arctic North is the proposed Yamal LNG
export terminal. The Yamal project will have a starting capacity of 5.5 MMTPA from one train in
2017, and future expansions to a total capacity of 16.5 MMTPA.163 However, due to its northern
location, icebreaker LNG tankers will be required to transport LNG via the Arctic Ocean.
Exxon and Rosneft have an LNG project in Northeast Russia that will have a capacity of
5 MMTPA if built. The project has begun the FEED stage.164 This project is somewhat
complicated because Gazprom currently has a monopoly on export sales of Russian gas.165
156 Subsea IQ website, “Snohvit,” http://www.subseaiq.com/data/PrintProject.aspx?project_id=223.
157 Skangass website, “About Skangass,” http://www.skangass.com/index.cfm?id=352980.
158 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
159 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2013.
160 Gazprom website, “Eastern Gas Program,” http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/east-program/.
161 2b1st Consulting website, “Gazprom approved Shell Sakhalin-2 LNG Expansion Roadmap,” March 12, 2014,
http://www.2b1stconsulting.com/gazprom-approved-shell-sakhalin-2-lng-expansion-roadmap/.
162 Gazprom website, “Vladivostok-LNG project,” http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/vladivostok-lng/.
163 Oil & Gas Journal, “Yamal LNG Owners issue FID,” December 18, 2013,
http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/12/yamal-lng-owners-issue-fid.html.
164 Rosneft, “Rosneft and ExxonMobil Selects Contractors for Initial Phase Engineering and Design for Russian Far East
LNG Project,” press release, September 27, 2013, http://www.rosneft.com/news/pressrelease/27092013.html.
165 Ilya Arkhipov and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Rosneft, Exxon Weigh $15 Billion LNG Plant to Vie With Gazprom,”
Bloomberg, April 11, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-11/rosneft-exxon-weigh-15-billion-lng-plant-
to-vie-with-gazprom.html.
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5.4 Middle East
The following table summarizes the current LNG liquefaction capacity in the Middle East.
TABLE 5.6:  MIDDLE EAST LNG EXPORT PROJECTS
Source: See Appendix E for details. “Proposed” LNG projects are those where a source was available for cost,
capacity and start year, while “announced” are projects where a source was available for start year and capacity,
and where there is no evidence of cancellation.
Qatar has the largest LNG export capacity in the world with a capacity of 77.5 MMTPA. Sixty-
eight per cent of total Qatari LNG exports between 1993 and 2012 have gone to Asia.166 Qatar
has the third-largest gas resource in the world, with 885.1 trillion cubic feet.167 Although Qatar
has ample reserves, there do not appear to be any immediate plans to expand LNG export
capacity.
Yemen has a 6.7 MMTPA two-train LNG export facility that went into operation in 2009.
Oman LNG is a 6.7 MMTPA facility that started in 2000. Qalhat LNG is a 3.7 MMTPA export
facility that is considered to be the third train of Oman LNG, but is owned separately by Qalhat
LNG.168 The three-train ADGAS facility in Abu Dhabi has a capacity of 5.8 MMTPA. The
plant receives feed gas from natural gas fields as well as associated gas from oil production.169
Iran does not have any LNG export facilities in spite of having the largest reserve position in
the world at 1,187.3 trillion cubic feet.170 Previously planned projects with external investors 
166 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural gas imports.”
167 BP, BP Statistical Review (2012).
168 Oman LNG website, “In Brief,” http://www.omanlng.com/tabid/158/Default.aspx.
169 Adgas website, “Our Plant,” http://www.adgas.com/En/SitePages/Our%20Business/Our%20Plant.aspx.
170 BP, BP Statistical Review (2012).
56
Libya (stopped) Marsa-el- Brega 1970 3.2 Non-Operating Shut down in 2011 due to civil war
Abu Dhabi Das Island 1977 5.8 Operating 
Qatar Ras Laffan (Qatargas 1 T1-3) 1999 10 Operating Expansion in 2005
Oman Oman LNG (T1-T2) 2000 6.7 Operating 
Oman Qalhat (Oman LNG T3) 2005 3.7 Operating 
Qatar Ras Laffan (Rasgas 1 T1 &2) 2000 6.6 Operating 
Qatar Ras Laffan (Rasgas 2 - T1) 2004 9.4 Operating 
Qatar Ras Laffan (Rasgas 2- T3) 2007 4.7 Operating 
Qatar Ras Laffan (Qatargas 2 - T1-T2) 2009 15.6 Operating 
Qatar Ras Laffan (Rasgas 3 - T1 & T2) 2009 15.6 Operating 
Yemen Balhaf (T1-T2) 2009 6.7 Operating 
Qatar Ras Laffan (Qatargas 3 - T1) 2010 7.8 Operating 
Qatar Ras Laffan (Qatargas 4 - T1) 2011 7.8 Operating 
Iran Iran LNG Unknown 10.8 Under
Construction
Location Name Completion MM Status Notes
Year TPA
have been suspended, having been hampered by sanctions.171 Iran is developing on its own a
10.5 to 10.8 MMTPA project called Iran LNG,172 which is currently under construction.173
5.5 Remaining LNG Projects around the world
The rest of the world represents about 19 per cent of the global LNG trade. Most planned
projects are primarily in Africa, where a number of LNG-liquefaction facilities currently
operate. The following table summarizes other current LNG-liquefaction capacity in the world
not included above, or in Canada.
TABLE 5.7:  OTHER LNG EXPORT PROJECTS
Source: See Appendix E for details. “Proposed” LNG projects are those where a source was available for cost,
capacity and start year, while “announced” are projects where a source was available for start year and capacity,
and where there is no evidence of cancellation.
171 Robert Tuttle and Yeganeh Salehi, “Iran Burning $7 Billion to Lead Gas OPEC as It Faces Sanctions,” Bloomberg,
November 3, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-03/iran-burning-7-billion-seeks-to-lead-gas-opec-
facing-u-s-lng.html.
172 ibid.
173 Iran LNG website, “Current Status,” http://www.iranlng.ir/en/our-project/current-status.
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Algeria Arzew GL 1Z 1981 7.9 Operating
Algeria Arzew GL 2Z 1972 8.3 Operating
Algeria Skikda T1 1971 0.85 Operating
Algeria Skikda T2 & T3 1973 1.7 Non-operating Destroyed in 2004
Algeria Skikda T4 1981 0.85 Non-operating Destroyed in 2004
Algeria Skikda T5 1981 1.25 Operating
Algeria Skikda T6 1981 1.25 Operating
Algeria Skikda Rebuild 2013 4.5 Operating
Angola Angola Soyo LNG Terminal 2013 5.2 Operating
Egypt Damietta 2005 5 Operating
Egypt Idku 2005 7.2 Operating
Equatorial Guinea Bioko Island 2007 3.7 Operating
Nigeria Bonny Island NLNG T1 1999 3.2 Operating
Nigeria Bonny Island NLNG T2 2000 3.2 Operating
Nigeria Bonny Island NLNG T3 2002 3.2 Operating
Location Name Completion MMTPA Status Notes
Year
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6. CANADA AS AN LNG SUPPLIER
6.1 Historical Markets for Canadian Gas
Developments in the U.S. Lower 48 have and will continue to have an impact on the Canadian
natural gas industry. In the Lower 48, dry gas production increased by 17 per cent from 1.57
BCM/d in January 2010 to 1.85BCM/d in December 2011.174 Beginning in 2012, U.S. production
began to level off, except in the Marcellus in the East, where it continues to increase.175
The U.S. Lower 48 has served as the export market for Canadian natural gas. Development of
shale gas and other tight-gas resources in the U.S. has slowly been displacing imported gas from
Canada while simultaneously increasing exports of gas to Eastern Canada. Figure 6.1 illustrates
the Canadian gas export/import trends with the U.S. The U.S. has become a declining market for
Canadian gas exports, leaving LNG as the only other option to export Canadian gas.
FIGURE 6.1:  U.S. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS FROM CANADA
Source: EIA, “U.S. Natural Gas Imports by Country,” http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_m.htm and
“U.S. Natural Gas Exports by Country,” http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_expc_s1_m.htm.
6.2 Canadian Domestic Demand and Supply 
Between 1995 and 2012, Canadian domestic consumption of natural gas grew by 25 per cent,
equivalent to a compound annual average rate of 1.3 per cent.176 Between 2007 and 2012,
consumption slowed, growing by only six per cent over the period. Driven by lower prices, 
174 EIA website, “U.S. Dry Natural Gas Production,” http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9070us2m.htm (data accessed
April 28, 2014).
175 EIA, “Marcellus region to provide 18% of total U.S. natural gas production this month,” Today in Energy blog,
December 9, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14091.
176 Authors’ calculations, based on: CANSIM Table 128-0016 (Statistics Canada category used for domestic demand
was “availability”).
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consumption is expected to increase at an average annual rate of 2.32 per cent between 2015
and 2040.177 These figures account for net increases in population, increased power demand
and natural gas substitution for coal and other hydrocarbons for power generation, increased
demand from oilsands production, and some increases in manufacturing and agriculture. As
shown in Figure 6.2, Canadian domestic consumption has remained stable. Export growth
figures reflect pipeline shipments to the U.S. and show slight declines over time.
FIGURE 6.2:  CANADIAN NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION, TRADE MOVEMENTS, AND DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013 Workbook (2013); Canadian Gas Association “Exports,
Imports and Sales, annual.”
Natural gas demand in Canada has a pronounced seasonal pattern that is reflected in storage
volumes. Throughout the summer, when demand for gas-fired heating is low, excess product is
stored (see Figure 6.3). Throughout the winter, the stored gas is drawn down as demand rises.
However, even when faced with slow increases in gas demand and declining production, gas
storage volumes have increased, especially since 2008. Likewise, imports of natural gas from
the Eastern U.S. to Eastern Canada have doubled since 2008.178 These changes in flows are no
coincidence, and are the result of newly revived competition from U.S. gas producers
exploiting plentiful shale gas resources in the Marcellus, Utica and Barnett shales, among
others. 
177 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2013, Figure 43.
178 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2013.
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FIGURE 6.3:  CANADIAN NATURAL GAS STORAGE LEVELS 2001 – 2012
Source: Natural Resources Canada, Canadian Natural Gas Monthly Market Update: Historical Data,
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/sources/natural-gas/monthly-market-update/1173.
Natural gas is displacing coal-fired generation in terms of retirements and new-build capacity
in both Canada and the U.S.. The National Energy Board projects a 27 per cent increase in
electricity-generating capacity by 2035, with “natural gas-fired and renewable-based capacity
showing the largest increases.”179 Specificially, gas-fired capacity is expected to increase from
18 GW in 2010 to 28 GW in 2035.180 These increases come largely at the expense of coal- and
coke-based power generation, as emissions concerns and competitive natural gas prices present
a comparative advantage. These advantages explain why the switch to gas-fired generation is
expected to be most pronounced in Alberta, where growth in co-generation capacity from
oilsands producers and a gradual decommissioning of coal-fired capacity is taking place.181
When viewed by sector (Figure 6.4), the key drivers of Canadian domestic demand have been
the industrial sector and mining/oil-and-gas extraction industries. Of the major users depicted,
only transformation to electricity and mining and oil and gas increased consumption between
2002 and 2012. In 2012, natural gas use by mining and oil and gas was 605 PJ or 15 BCM.
The National Energy Board predicts natural gas use in the oilsands will increase to 34.7 BCM
in 2035, suggesting the oil and gas sector will be the major source of domestic demand growth
in the future.182 The net result is that some domestic demand will help offset the diminishing
export market in the United States. 
179 National Energy Board, Canada’s Energy Future: Energy Supply and Demand Projections to 2035 (November 2011),
http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/nrgyftr/2011/nrgsppldmndprjctn2035-eng.html.
180 ibid.
181 ibid, 45. NEB forecasts are based on the price of natural gas increasing from US$4.50/MMBtu in 2011 to
US$8.00/MMBtu in 2035 at Henry Hub (page 3). As of Oct. 28, 2013, the price is US$3.61/MMBtu.
182 National Energy Board, Canada’s Energy.
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The natural gas markets of Canada and the United States are physically connected via pipelines
and subject to similar drivers of supply and demand. With the United States traditionally
importing Canadian-produced natural gas, it remains an important market for Canada. Overall,
American growth in natural gas consumption has been slower than Canada’s, with a compound
annual rate of growth of 0.98 per cent since 1998 (consumption in Canada grew at 1.35 per
cent).183 The EIA expects U.S. growth to slow to a rate of only 0.62 per cent a year until
2025.184 Demand for gas within Canada, currently at about 252 MMCM/d, is seen as growing
by 2.58 per cent per year on average through the same time period.
FIGURE 6.4:  CANADIAN NATURAL GAS USE BY SECTOR 2002 – 2012
Notes: “Other” includes agriculture; construction; public administration; forestry, logging and support activities; 
transformation to steam generation; and transformation to refined petroleum products. “Producer consumption” 
is the consumption by the producing industry of its own produced fuel. Non-energy use is natural gas used for 
non-fuel purposes.
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 128-0016, “Supply and demand
of primary and secondary energy in terajoules.” 
6.2.1 CANADIAN NATURAL GAS BASINS
Canada has an estimated 1,660 BCM (58.6 TCF) of remaining established natural gas reserves,
with approximately 94 per cent of those found in British Columbia and Alberta.185 Most of
Canada’s shale gas, by known reserve volume, is in the Horn River/Liard basins in
Northeastern British Columbia, and in the Montney formation in Northeastern B.C. and
Western Alberta (see Figure 6.7). Drilling in these basins has been limited in the past by low
natural gas prices, limited infrastructure and lack of market demand. Prices at the Alberta
AECO hub traded (on average) $0.56/GJ below NYMEX Henry Hub between 2008 and
2013.186 This differential tends to make most new drilling projects uneconomical unless there 
183 Derived from: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009 (2009); and BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
184 Derived from: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2013, Figure 43 Data.
185 National Energy Board, Canadian Energy Overview 2012, Appendix 2.
186 Authors’ calculations, based on prices retrieved from World Bank Historical Commodity Price Data (Henry Hub) and
Bloomberg (AECO, ticker NGCDAECO).
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are liquids associated with the gas. The Canadian Gas Association data show that natural gas
exports to the U.S. were 105.1 BCM (10.28 BCF/d) in 2005 and fell to 91.7 BCM (8.97
BCF/d) in 2011 — a 12.75 per cent decline.187 Regional domestic demand is primarily
increasing due to expanding demand for natural gas in the oilsands; overall exports to the U.S.
are not increasing, primarily because of new development in the Bakken, Utica and Marcellus
shale formations.  
Recent trends toward American self-sufficiency in natural gas have the potential to weaken
long-term demand for Canadian products. The result has been regional supply-surpluses and
flat price-levels. As a consequence, Canadian producers have begun to examine the feasibility
of constructing new east/west pipelines and export terminals to reduce surplus and develop
new markets. In the process, however, they face challenges in domestic politics and capital
availability188 and the potential for established, low-cost competition in the marketplace.
When considering access and supply to serve Asia-Pacific nations, the most accessible
formations from both British Columbia and Alberta are found in northern regions. These are
shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below, and reflect relative characteristics of dry to wet for each
formation.189
The reserves in Western Canada with the highest gas liquid content — the Montney, Duvernay,
and Muskwa — are all found in Northern Alberta or Northeast British Columbia. Not only do
these plays have the highest ratio of natural gas liquids (NGLs) to dry gas, but also the largest
absolute amount of natural gas liquids. The gas play most likely to be productive is the
Montney, a resource shared by both British Columbia and Alberta. This formation is
characterized by both dry gas and natural gas liquids. Depending on market conditions, NGLs
can have greater value for oilfield operations domestically and in the United States, and
operators may choose to separate NGLs prior to shipment.
Figure 6.5 shows the volume of Canada’s proved reserves190 and the reserves-to-production
(R/P) ratio, which determines how many years of reserves are left given annual natural gas
production rates. The R/P ratio closely follows reserves, and both have leveled off following
the fall in North American natural gas prices. Based on production rates from 2012, Canada
has enough reserves to produce the same amount of natural gas for 12 years. Canada’s
consumption in 2012 was 64 per cent of total production, compared to the U.S., where
consumption was 105 per cent of production in 2012.191
187 Canadian Gas Association, “Canadian Natural Gas Exports, Imports and Domestic Sales,” http://www.cga.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/Chart-11-Exports-Imports-Sales2.pdf.
188 Recent investments from Asia-Pacific countries, including state-owned companies such as CNOOC, highlight the
reliance on foreign capital to sustain investment in Canadian hydrocarbon development.
189 See Appendix B for a description of natural gas characteristics.
190 Proved (or proven) reserves are typically defined as a quantity of energy sources estimated with reasonable certainty,
from the analysis of geologic and engineering data, to be recoverable from well-established or known reservoirs with
the existing equipment and under the existing operating conditions. This should be distinguished from probable or
possible reserves, which have a lower probability of being recoverable.
191 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
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TABLE 6.1:  NATURAL GAS RESERVES IN CANADA (BCM)
Notes: (1) Includes West Coast Intermontane and Offshore; (2) includes Labrador, East Newfoundland Basin, Grand 
Banks, Southern Grand Banks, Laurentian Sub-Basin, Nova Scotia, George's Bank, and Gulf of St. Lawrence; (3) 
includes Northwest Territories – Colville Hills, Mackenzie-Beaufort, Yukon-Eagle Plains and others, Arctic Islands, 
Eastern Arctic, and Hudson Bay.
Sources: Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Statistical Handbook (2013); National Energy Board,
“Ultimate Potential for Unconventional Natural gas in Northeastern B.C. Horn River Basin,” (Table 2.4a); National
Energy Board, Canadian Energy Overview 2012 (Appendix 2); National Energy Board, Energy Briefing Note: The
Ultimate Potential for Unconventional Petroleum from the Montney Formation of British Columbia and Alberta
(November 2013), 6; Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 153-0014.
FIGURE 6.5:  NATURAL GAS PROVED RESERVES AND RESERVES-TO-PRODUCTION RATIO (1993 – 2012)
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013 (2013).
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British Columbia Established Reserves 805.76 555 533.3
Ultimate Potential 10,642 1,345 (1)
Alberta Established Reserves 972.4 1,007 1,064.7
Ultimate Potential 6,994 2,201
Saskatchewan Established Reserves 60.06 59 63.7
Ultimate Potential 86 106
Ontario Established Reserves 19.21 18 19.5
Ultimate Potential 33
Maritimes,
Newfoundland and Labrador Established Reserves 9.57 8 7.8
Ultimate Potential 2,591 (2)
Northern Canada Established Reserves
Ultimate Potential 3,285 (3)
Source and CAPP NEB NEB – Conventional CANSIM 
(Data Year) (2012) (Established 2011, Only (2009) (2010)
Ultimate 2012)
TABLE 6.2:  SHALE- AND TIGHT-GAS RESERVES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALBERTA
Notes: (1): Used Risked Technically Recoverable Resource (Low) – Risked Resource In-Place (High); 
(2): Used Marketable Gas (Low) – Gas In Place (High)
Sources: 
(1) National Energy Board, Energy Briefing Note: The Ultimate Potential for Unconventional Petroleum from the Montney
Formation of British Columbia and Alberta (November 2013), 5, Tables 2 and 3, http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/ntrlgs/ltmtptntlmntnyfrmtn2013/ltmtptntlmntnyfrmtn2013-eng.pdf.
(2) EIA, Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources (2013), I-3.
(3) National Energy Board: Energy Briefing, 9, Table 2.1.
(4) Nathan Vanderklippe, “Massive B.C. reservoir could double gas output,” The Globe and Mail, June 14, 2012,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/massive-bc-reservoir-could-double-gas-output/article4264200/.
(5) ERCB, ST98-2013 Alberta’s Energy Reserves 2012 and Supply/Demand Outlook 2013-2011 (2013), 2-9, Table 2.1.
Well drilling activity closely parallels the trading hub price of gas (lagged by a predictable
amount) and is subject to rig and personnel availability. This is evident in Figure 6.6 below,
which highlights the recent downward trend in gas prices and drilling activity. It can be
expected that without new export markets and the tidewater-port capacity to access those
markets, prices and drilling activity will remain low. 
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Cordova British Columbia 574.83 1 2,293.66
Doig Phosphate British Columbia 713.58 1 2,851.51
Horn River British Columbia 10,466 12,629 14,894
Liard British Columbia 1,359.21 2 5,946.54
Montney British Columbia (48%) 42,435 55,664 69,630 1:3.64 11,974 15,310 19,172
Montney Alberta (52%) 45,917 60,095 79,684 1:13.11 1,852 4,583 8,631
Basal Banff/Exshaw* Alberta 446 993 1,975 1:66.2 5 15 35
Duvernay Alberta 9,934 12,479 15,219 1:6.94 1190 1,798 2,589
Muskwa Alberta 8,132 11,812 14,839 1:5.02 949 2,350 4,181
Nordegg* Alberta 1,968 4,164 7,905 1:18.26 77 228 555
Wilrich* Alberta 3,237 6,918 16,007 1:21.16 109 327 707
Total 125,182.62 164,758 231,244.71 1:6.69 16,156 24,611 35,870
Play Name 
(* Indicates a preliminary
estimate)
Origin by Province
(% of medium case dry gas)
Low             Medium          High Case Low         Medium    High Case
Ratio BCM
Dry Gas to
MMCM
NGL
(Medium
Case)
Ultimate Potential NGL
Estimates (MMCM)
Ultimate Potential Dry Gas Estimates
(BCM)
FIGURE 6.6:  CANADIAN NATURAL GAS WELLS DRILLED VERSUS AECO PRICE (2001 – 2012)
Source: Natural Resources Canada, “Canadian Natural Gas Monthly Market Update: Historical Data,”
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/sources/natural-gas/monthly-market-update/1173. 
6.3 Developing LNG Exports
Low natural gas prices and newly developed shale resources in North America have spurred
substantial interest in the potential for leveraging the B.C. Pacific coast as a way to develop
new export markets for Canadian gas producers. The only available opportunities for Canadian
port expansion that would efficiently serve the Asia-Pacific region in the near term are on the
northern coast of B.C.192 There are challenges for any site development that include Aboriginal
land ownership and access, mountainous terrain, coastal land constraints and marine-safety
issues, as well as political/fiscal issues involving other provinces.
Given their significant infrastructure requirements, LNG export terminals are extremely capital
intensive. The large investment necessary is compounded in British Columbia, as most
proposed terminals and their proposed connecting pipelines are located in remote areas with
difficult terrain for pipeline location.
6.3.1 PROPOSED PORT LOCATIONS
There are nine projects along British Columbia’s coast that have already secured LNG export
licences from Canada’s National Energy Board, and another three applications are under
review (Table 6.4). Two additional projects in Oregon have also secured export licences from
the National Energy Board. Two more projects have been proposed for the B.C. coast, but very
192 Later opportunities may be found in the Northwest Passage and the coasts of the Canadian territories. In addition,
Canaport LNG on Canada’s East Coast may convert to an export terminal (fed by U.S. shale gas) as it could feasibly
serve demand from Europe or Western Asia. There are two additional export terminals proposed for Canada’s East
Coast: Goldboro LNG and H-Energy LNG.
65
$0.00  
$2.00  
$4.00  
$6.00  
$8.00  
$10.00  
$12.00  
0 
500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
2,500 
De
c-
03
 
M
ar
-0
4 
Ju
n-
04
 
Se
p-
04
 
De
c-
04
 
M
ar
-0
5 
Ju
n-
05
 
Se
p-
05
 
De
c-
05
 
M
ar
-0
6 
Ju
n-
06
 
Se
p-
06
 
De
c-
06
 
M
ar
-0
7 
Ju
n-
07
 
Se
p-
07
 
De
c-
07
 
M
ar
-0
8 
Ju
n-
08
 
Se
p-
08
 
De
c-
08
 
M
ar
-0
9 
Ju
n-
09
 
Se
p-
09
 
De
c-
09
 
M
ar
-1
0 
Ju
n-
10
 
Se
p-
10
 
De
c-
10
 
M
ar
-1
1 
Ju
n-
11
 
Se
p-
11
 
De
c-
11
 
M
ar
-1
2 
US
 $/
GJ
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f W
el
ls
 D
ril
le
d 
Wells Drilled AECO Price 
little information is available about them. The total approved export capacity is 183.145
MMTPA (249 BCM), compared to marketable production of 141 BCM in 2013, though less
than peak production of 188 BCM in 2006. The remaining projects have a planned capacity of
10 to 35 MMTPA.193
There are seven proposed locations for facilities on the B.C. coast (see Figure 6.7). We have
illustrated these potential export locations within “zones,” since all but Kitsault and Woodfibre
have at least two potential liquefaction sites.194 Pipeline developers are involved as well,
planning to deliver Horn River/Liard and Montney gas to the eventual export sites. One
includes a 530-mile pipeline from Northeastern British Columbia to Prince Rupert, while
another would create a 287-mile pipeline from Summit Lake to Kitimat. 
FIGURE 6.7:  PROPOSED TERMINAL LOCATIONS AND PIPELINE NETWORK
Source: See Appendix C. 
193 We note that not all projects, even those with export licences, are guaranteed to proceed, or even export their
maximum allowable amount if constructed.
194 The attraction of these sites is not limited to LNG. Opportunities for crude-oil shipping facilities, liquefied petroleum
gas or derivatives, and return pipeline capability for condensate or other products provide attractive co-location
alternatives for developers.
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Kitsault
Grassy Point
Prince Rupert 
& Port Edward
Kitimat
Campbell River
Port
Alberni
Proposed Terminal 
Proposed Terminal
Zone
Proposed Pipeline
Existing Pipeline
Shale Basin 
TABLE 6.3:  PROPOSED LNG EXPORT FACILITIES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE NORTHWEST UNITED STATES
Notes: Maximum annual export allowance includes annual tolerance. Dates: Announced date of first export/initial 
opening. Capacity: Capacity at initial opening, not full potential capacity.
Source: See Appendix C.
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Kitimat, B.C.
Kitimat, B.C.
Kitsault, B.C.
Woodfibre, B.C.
Kitimat or Prince
Rupert, B.C.
Lelu Island, Port
Edward, B.C.
Coos Bay, Ore. 
Astoria, Ore. 
Campbell River, B.C.
Kitimat, B.C.
Kitimat or Prince
Rupert, B.C.
Ridley Island, Prince
Rupert, B.C.
Grassy Point, B.C. (13)
Stewart, B.C.
Grassy Point, B.C.
Vancouver, B.C.
Douglas Channel
Energy Project
Kitimat LNG
Terminal
Kitsault
Woodfibre LNG
Triton LNG
Pacific Northwest
LNG
Jordan Cove LNG
Oregon LNG
Discovery LNG
LNG Canada
Terminal
WCC LNG
Prince Rupert
LNG
Aurora LNG
Stewart Energy
LNG
TBA
Tilbury LNG
Haisla Nation/LNG Partners
(50%), Golar LNG (25%),
unnamed Asian investor (25%)
Apache Canada Ltd. (50%),
Chevron Corp. (50%)
Kitsault Energy and a
Memorandum of Understanding
signed “with an Asian oil and gas
major”
Woodfibre (Pacific Oil & Gas
Group) 
AltaGas Ltd. (50%), Idemitsu
Kosan Co. (50%)
Petronas (62%), SINOPEC (15%),
Indian Oil Corp. (10%), Japex
(10%), Petroleum Brunei (3%)
Versen Inc.
Oregon LNG
Quicksilver Resources Canada,
and a “to-be-determined third
party”
Shell Canada Ltd. (40%),
Mitsubishi Corp. (20%), Korea
Gas Corp. (20%), PetroChina
(20%)
Imperial Oil Ltd. (50%),
ExxonMobil Canada (50%)
BG Group
Nexen (60%), Inpex Corp. and
JGC Corp. (40%)
Canada Stewart Energy Group
Ltd.
Woodside Petroleum
WesPac Midstream LLC
1.8
5
5
2.1
2.3
12
6
9.74
12
10-15
14
24
5 to 30
3
Approved;
20 years
Approved;
20 years
Under
review; 25
years
Approved;
25 years
Approved;
25 years
Approved;
25 years
Approved;
25 years
Approved;
25 years
None
Approved;
25 years
Approved;
25 years
Approved;
25 years
Approved;
25 years
Under
review; 25
years
None
Under
review; 25
years
1.98
11
2.53
2.645
24.13
13.63
11.2
27.6
35.23
25.6
27.6
3.5
2015
2017
2017
2017
2017
2018
2018
2019
2019
2020
2021-2022
2021
2021-2023
2017
2016
Location Asset Name Capacity(MMTPA)
NEB Export
Application
Status and
Length
NEB
Maximum
Annual
Export
Allowance
(MMTPA)
Expected
Start DateOwnership
The B.C. government has signed two long-term agreements for LNG development and for access
to the land required to build the terminals, both at Grassy Point, B.C.195 The two developers are
Woodside Petroleum Ltd. and Aurora LNG (a joint venture led by CNOOC). The B.C.
government has also recently signed a letter of intent with Petronas to “work collaboratively to
secure long-term investments in British Columbia’s Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry” as
well as to develop terms of reference for a project-development agreement.196
There are an additional three proposed projects/sites with very little information available
about them. A South Korean company, SK E&S, has filed an expression of interest with the
B.C. government for the Grassy Point location, but little additional detail is available.
Quicksilver Resources has proposed a facility on a former paper-mill site at Campbell River,
with an unknown number of trains. Quicksilver reports that it is in discussions with potential
joint-venture partners.197 Port Alberni, on Vancouver Island, has been promoted by the Port
Alberni Port Authority as an alternative location for firms unable to secure agreements for land
at Grassy Point. However, there is no project associated with the port as of yet.
A stated goal of the B.C. government is to have at least one LNG pipeline and terminal
operating in Kitimat by 2015 and three in operation by 2020.198 This goal represents a
challenge not only in collaborating with other governments, but completion of a complex
pipeline delivery system and, in the end, reaching collaborative agreement with Aboriginal
groups who control land and access rights in the pipeline rights of way and the port-facility
zones. The government will likely not realize its goal of having at least one terminal in
operation by 2015, as it is estimated that even the design and construction of the Douglas
Channel Energy Project (the smallest proposed facility) will take two years. The goal of three
facilities by 2020 is more reasonable, but will also depend on developments in the LNG
market, including competition from the U.S. Gulf Coast and Australia.
6.3.2 SHIPPING COSTS
Shipping costs for LNG are competitive and consistent with normal pipeline tolls. Transporting
one gigajoule of natural gas 3,000 kilometres via the TransCanada mainline from Empress,
Alta. to Dawn, Ont. costs $1.42, or US$1.54 ($1.62 USD/MMBTU).199 TransCanada’s B.C. leg
of the Foothills pipeline system has a current tariff of $2.61 CDN/GJ ($2.75 CDN/MMBTU) or
$2.99 USD/MMBTU.200 By comparison, shipping one gigajoule of natural gas approximately
7,735 kilometres to Japan’s Senboku LNG terminal from Kitimat, B.C. is expected to cost
$1.21 USD/GJ ($1.28 USD/MMBTU).
195 Brent Jang, “Australia’s Woodside wins B.C. approval for LNG project,” The Globe and Mail, January 16, 2014.
196 Government of British Columbia, “B.C. and PETRONAS commit to developing LNG industry,” press release, May
5, 2014, http://www.newsroom.gov.bc.ca/2014/05/bc-and-petronas-commit-to-developing-lng-industry.html.
197 Discovery LNG website, “Ownership,” http://www.discoverylng.com/project-details/ownership/.
198 British Columbia Ministry of Energy and Mines, Liquefied Natural Gas: A Strategy for B.C.’s Newest Industry,
http://www.gov.bc.ca/ener/popt/down/liquefied_natural_gas_strategy.pdf.
199 National Post, “National Energy Board approves new tolls for TransCanada’s Mainline pipeline,” March 27, 2013,
http://business.financialpost.com/2013/03/27/national-energy-board-approves-new-tolls-for-transcanadas-mainline-
pipeline/?__lsa=e62c-8de9. Exchange rate used is $1.00 Canadian = US$0.92.
200 TransCanada Corp., “TransCanada’s – Foothills BC Transportation Rates,”
http://www.transcanada.com/customerexpress/2768.html. Exchange rate used is $1.00 Canadian = US$0.92.
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TABLE 6.4:  KITIMAT LNG SHIPPING COST ESTIMATES
Notes: Stewart World Port is used to approximate the distance to Kitimat. It is located approximately 300 kilometres 
north of Kitimat in a similar inland location. Average shipping cost of $0.0002516/nautical mile/GJ, based on 
observed shipping costs for 4,000-5,400 nautical-mile voyages (cost data from Bloomberg, shipping distances 
from sea-distances.com). Average distance to Japan is calculated from the following regas facilities/ports: Chita,
Hagashi Ogishima, Himeji, Kagoshima, Mizushima, Nagasaki, Ogishima, Oita, Sakai, Sakaide, Senboku, Tobata, 
Wakayama, Yokkaichi. Average distance to China is calculated from the following regas facilities/ports: Dalian, 
Guangzhou, Qingdao, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hong Kong.
It is important to remember that the LNG supply chain still requires pipelines to deliver natural
gas to and from LNG terminals; these add additional costs for liquefaction and regasification.
Regasification typically costs between $0.29/GJ and $1.90/GJ ($0.30/MMBTU to
$2.00/MMBTU), and liquefaction is more expensive, ranging from $2.81/GJ to $5.04/GJ
($2.96/MMBTU to $5.30/MMBTU).201 The cost for regasification occurs primarily because of
capacity utilization and, to some extent, the cost of the facility, since these costs are amortized
to the product. The regasification costs vary since the nature of regasification normally will
mean installing more capacity than is initially required, with ramp-up occurring as the demand
for natural gas develops. This causes the unit costs to be high when the utilization is low and
costs decline as the throughput increases. Facility costs for liquefaction will vary according to
when the facility was built, where the facility was built, and the scope of the project. Older
facilities have less cost to amortize because their legacy costs are lower than the costs of
building new facilities. The location matters, as costs for building in remote areas are higher
than where the construction infrastructure is developed, such as on the U.S. Gulf Coast. Project
scope impacts the cost for liquefaction, because of differences for individual projects in project
scope,202 such as whether a project is greenfield or brownfield, or whether cross-country
pipelines and other elements are included.   
Despite the low costs of shipping, the transport of natural gas in the form of LNG via tankers
introduces new challenges. Environmental concerns regarding possible spills, as well as
aggregate well-to-wheel emissions, are commonly cited points of contention. Further, the
regasification of LNG during transportation — called boil-off — erodes margins. Tankers can
expect boil-off of 0.1 to 0.15 per cent of full cargo content each day during a voyage,203 though
some is recaptured and used as fuel in ships equipped with gas-turbine generators. LNG 
201 PFC Global Energy cites $0.40/MMBTU as the low end of its range, with $2.00/MMBTU as the high end (PFC
Global Energy, LNG Supply and Demand Study, May 2013, 7). Data from Poten & Partners, via Bloomberg (ticker:
POTN), has the range of $0.30/MMBTU to $0.40/MMBTU. Estimates of liquefaction costs come from Table 6.5.
202 Reported costs for liquefaction may vary due to the project scope that the reporter includes. Differences in project
scope include whether elements such as the following are included: wharfs and jetties, LNG storage, natural gas
pipelines, other infrastructure (roads, housing, etc.), project interest, and owner’s cost.
203 M. Hasan, I. Karimi and H. Alfadala, “Optimizing Compressor Operations in an LNG Plant,” Proceedings of the
First Annual Gas Processing Symposium, 2009.
69
Japan – Senboku Port 4,177 1.11 1.05
Japan – Average Distance 4,203 1.11 1.06
South Korea – Incheon Port 4,663 1.23 1.17
China – Hong Kong 5,406 1.43 1.36
China – Average Distance 5,021 1.33 1.26
Taiwan – Yun-An LNG Terminal 5,155 1.37 1.30
To: Distance from Average Cost Average Cost
Stewart World Port ($/MMBTU) ($/GJ)
tankers also typically retain a portion (often five per cent) of the LNG product, even after
unloading the majority of it, which is called the heel. The heel is used to maintain the
temperature of the storage tanks in order to avoid flash boil-off during tank loading.204
6.3.3 COST ASSUMPTIONS FOR CANADIAN PRODUCTION
Canadian natural gas prices are derived from a common set of components shared throughout
the industry. Conventional gas resources have been in decline over the last decade, but are
being replaced by new production from unconventional sources, largely based on horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing. They reflect a combination of well costs and stimulation
costs, and are subject to distance and transportation surcharges, defining the wellhead price
before transshipment to liquefaction facilities. The presence of natural gas liquids affects the
market value of the gas stream, depending on heat content, corrosive materials and other
contaminants.
This report develops pricing and market penetration estimates based primarily on dry gas,
assumed to have a normal range of heat content, in order to have comparable values that would
be available from competing nations. However, the market for both liquids-rich gas (NGLs)
and other derivatives such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for boosting heat values at the
destination ports is robust and may constitute additional or parallel market opportunities for
Canadian producers.
FIGURE 6.8:  NOMINAL SUPPLY COSTS BY WELL TYPE AND PROVINCE (CANADIAN DOLLARS) 
Source: NEB, Natural Gas Supply Costs in Western Canada in 2009, Energy Briefing Note,
November 2010, 11, http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/ntrlgs/ntrlgsspplcstwstrncnd2009_2010/ntrlgsspplcstwstrncnd2009-eng.html.
204 ibid.
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In this section, we briefly establish common production costs and assumptions by segment of
the industry, primarily to support this platform of comparison with other shipping nations or
provinces within Canada with competing reserves of natural gas. The NEB publishes estimates
of supply costs by region including wellhead and transfer costs. Figure 6.8 above illustrates the
range by nature of cost, province and well type in the most recent reported values as of 2009.
The supply cost defined by the NEB is “the minimum price required to produce a gigajoule (GJ)
of natural gas, covering all costs, royalties, and taxes and includes a 15 per cent rate of return
(ROR) after tax.”205 Table 6.5 gives supply costs from B.C. sources in 2012 U.S. dollars. The
best-case scenario for supply costs based on the NEB data is $3.72/GJ ($3.93/MMBTU), and the
worst case is $17.56/GJ ($18.53/MMBTU). It is possible that production costs have increased
since 2012, though depreciation of the Canadian dollar will make Canadian supplies less costly.
TABLE 6.5:  SUPPLY COSTS BY WELL TYPE IN B.C. (2012 U.S. DOLLARS)
Notes: Deflated from 2009 Canadian dollar using CANSIM Table 384-0038. Average exchange rate between Canadian 
and U.S. dollars in 2012 is parity.
Source: NEB, Natural Gas Supply Costs in Western Canada in 2009, Energy Briefing Note, November 2010, Table 1,
http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/ntrlgs/ntrlgsspplcstwstrncnd2009_2010/ntrlgsspplcstwstrncnd2009-eng.html.
LNG export plants are extremely capital intensive. As illustrated in Figure 3.12, liquefaction
plant capital costs in U.S. dollars per tonne of annual capacity (a standard industry metric) are
high relative to pre-2010 construction. The cost of projects in Australia, where most of the
plants currently under construction are located, have experienced significant cost overruns. In a
February 2011 report, Wood Mackenzie adopted a “High Capex” sensitivity involving an
increase of 25 per cent in its base-case capital cost estimates for Australian projects in response
to upward cost pressures. With this cost increase, the break-even delivered-LNG prices for
eight Australian LNG export projects increased from a range of US$6.65 to
US$12.20/MMBTU to a range of US$9.42 to US$14.31/MMBTU.206 In light of continued cost
pressures since February 2011, Wood Mackenzie’s high cost-sensitivity may prove to have
been optimistic.
205 NEB, Natural Gas Supply Costs in Western Canada in 2009, Energy Briefing Note, November 2010,
http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/ntrlgs/ntrlgsspplcstwstrncnd2009_2010/ntrlgsspplcstwstrncnd2009-eng.html. 
206 Wood Mackenzie, “Might Rising Costs in Australia Propel North America LNG Exports?” (February 2011).
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B.C. Deep Basin Conventional Lower Triassic 5.71 6.02 5.78 6.10
B.C. Deep Basin Tight Mannville 6.60 6.96 6.63 6.99
B.C. Deep Basin Tight Lower Triassic 7.94 8.38 7.94 8.38
Fort St. John Conventional Mannville 9.56 10.09 9.66 10.19
Fort St. John Conventional Triassic 4.88 5.15 4.89 5.16
Fort St. John Tight Triassic 3.72 3.93 3.72 3.93
Northeast B.C. Tight Upper Devonian 17.32 18.28 17.56 18.53
B.C. Foothills Conventional Colorado and Mannville 8.85 9.34 8.95 9.44
Production-weighted average 6.21 6.56 6.26 6.60
Supply Cost
$/GJ         $/MMBTU
Supply Cost
$/GJ         $/MMBTU
Area Resource Type Resource Group 100% Success Rate Historical Success 
(un-risked) Rates (risked)
International suppliers provide the equipment components for all of the liquefaction plants in
the world. However, LNG export-plant costs vary significantly from country to country, and
between locations within the same country, depending on: the remoteness of the project site;
the infrastructure in place; local geotechnical and marine conditions; environmental
regulations; climatic conditions; the availability, cost and productivity of the labour force; and
currency exchange rates, among other things. These factors will lead to upward pressure on the
cost of constructing liquefaction plants in Canada. At this point, it is difficult to estimate what
liquefaction plants will cost in Canada; nevertheless, several authors have attempted to do so.
Wood Mackenzie, in its February 2011 report, assumed that the remoteness of Canadian sites,
coupled with the potential for resource and labour competition with other sectors, could
contribute to high development costs. Wood Mackenzie assumed a capital cost range of
US$900 to US$1,200/TPA for Canadian projects. A more recent report by Macquarie Private
Wealth, assumed a capital cost of US$1,200/TPA, which is consistent with the upper end of
Wood Mackenzie’s range.207 In December 2012, NERA Economic Consulting published an
estimate of $1,145/TPA for Canadian liquefaction plant costs.208
Canadian LNG projects are in competition with export projects in the U.S., most of which are
brownfield conversions of LNG import terminals. Several U.S. projects are at an advanced stage
of the development process. One project, Cheniere’s Sabine Pass LNG, is already under
construction. Based on published cost information, it is clear that brownfield projects on the
U.S. Gulf Coast (USGC) have a significant cost advantage over Canadian greenfield projects.
Contracts awarded by Cheniere for its 18 MMTPA Sabine Pass project suggest brownfield
liquefaction capital costs of about $622/TPA for the first two 4.5 MMTPA trains, and $556/TPA
for the third and fourth 4.5 MMTPA trains, for an average of $588/TPA for the four trains.209 
It should be noted that Cheniere’s capital costs are higher than assumed by NERA
(US$544/TPA) in December 2012, and by Wood Mackenzie in February 2011 (“High Capex”
of US$500/TPA), suggesting that projects in the U.S. are not immune to all of the factors
driving costs higher in Australia. Cheniere will recoup its LNG plant capital and operating
costs through a liquefaction processing fee between US$2.13/GJ and $2.84/GJ
(US$2.25/MMBTU to US$3.00/MMBTU), plus 15 per cent of the Henry Hub price (to cover
the cost of fuel and plant losses).210
Liquefaction-plant costs are a major component of the LNG value-chain project costs for
delivering LNG to markets. In addition, there are upstream costs, pipeline transmission costs
(if LNG plants are distant from gas resources), and LNG shipping costs. Upstream costs
(wellhead gas prices) will vary by field and over time. Table 6.6 summarizes the views of
Wood Mackenzie, Macquarie and NERA regarding Canadian and USGC LNG value-chain
project costs downstream of the wellhead, and negotiated liquefaction charges for Cheniere’s
Sabine Pass LNG project. 
207 Macquarie Private Wealth, “Canadian LNG: The race to the coast” (September 10, 2012).
208 NERA, “Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports from the United States” (December 3, 2012).
209 Cheniere Energy Partners LP, “Cheniere Issues Notice to Proceed (“NTP”) for Construction of First Two
Liquefaction Trains”, press release, August 9, 2012; and Cheniere Energy Partners, “Cheniere Partners Enters into
Lump Sum Turnkey Contract with Bechtel for Trains 3 and 4 at Sabine Pass Liquefaction,” press release, December
21, 2012.
210 Cheniere Energy Inc., Corporate Presentation for Sabine Pass LNG, September 11, 2013.
72
TABLE 6.6:  VIEWS OF VALUE-CHAIN PROJECT COSTS ($US/MMBTU)
Notes: This table does not include every cost associated with the gas-to-LNG-to-gas value chain, but it does provide an 
indication of the various estimates for each component of costs.
Sources: Cheniere Energy Inc., Corporate Presentation for Sabine Pass LNG, September 11, 2013; NERA,
“Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports from the United States” (December 3, 2012); Macquarie Private Wealth,
“Canadian LNG: The race to the coast” (September 10, 2012); Wood Mackenzie, “Might Rising Costs in Australia
Propel North America LNG Exports?” (February 2011). 
6.3.4 CANADIAN COSTS OF DELIVERED ENERGY
We have assumed the delivered cost of energy will reflect a range of costs as shown in
published literature. They are commonly divided into three key sections: wellhead costs and
transport to liquefaction facilities; liquefaction and loading; and shipping to the final
destination port. We use dry gas as a reference point; gas with liquids commands a higher price
currently, but market circumstances for that commodity currently are in a state of flux and
consequently we cannot estimate the role of NGLs in a future Asia-Pacific market.
The range of estimates for wellhead costs have led us to use the figures published by the
NEB211 as a starting point that is in a range of those costs published by private companies or
applicants.212
211 See Figure 6.8. Source: National Energy Board, Natural Gas Supply Costs in Western Canada in 2009, 11.
212 See: Macquarie Private Wealth, “Canadian LNG”; and NERA, “Macroeconomic Impacts.” 
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Pipeline Toll from
Wellhead/Upstream
to LNG Export Plant
Fixed
Liquefaction Costs
(i.e., Capital Cost
Recovery)
Variable
Liquefaction Costs
Total 
Liquefaction Costs
Shipping
-
$2.18
Based on high-
capex case of
$500/TPA
$0.78
10% plant losses
(assumed Henry
Hub at
$7.00/MMBTU)
$2.96
$1.58 
To Japan via
Panama Canal
$1.00
$1.61 
Based on capex
of $544/TPA
$0.53 
9% of wellhead
price (assumed
$3.83/MMBTU),
plus operating
cost of
$0.16/MMBTU
$2.14 
$2.54 
To Japan via
Panama Canal
-
$2.25 - $3.00
Liquefaction fees
range from
$2.25/MMBTU to
$3.00/MMBTU
$1.05 
15% times Henry
Hub (assuming
Henry Hub at
$7.00/MMBTU)
$3.30 - $4.05
$1.40 
$4.07
Based on high-
capex case of
$1,200/TPA
$0.56
10% plant
losses (assumed
AECO at
$6.00/MMBTU)
$4.63 
$0.75 
To Japan
$0.80 $1.00 
$4.10 $4.10
Based on capex of
$1,200/TPA
$1.20 $1.20 
Operating costs ($1.00),
maintenance capex
($0.10), plus G&A ($0.10)
included in $5.30
breakeven cost in
Macquarie report
$5.30 $5.30
$0.80 $0.80 
Implied destination is Japan
$0.70
$3.39 
Based on capex
of $1,145/TPA
$0.49
9% of wellhead
price (assumed
$3.72/MMBTU),
plus operating
cost of
$0.16/MMBTU 
$3.88
$1.23
To Japan
Costs per MMBTU
(U.S. Dollars)
U.S. Gulf Coast (Brownfield) Western Canada (Greenfield
Wood
Mackenzie
(2011)
NERA
(2012)
Cheniere Sabine
Pass (2013)
Wood
Mackenzie
(2011) Montney       Horn River
NERA
(2012)
Macquarie (2012)
TABLE 6.7:  CANADIAN DELIVERED COST COMPONENTS ($US)
The delivered cost of Canadian gas, before a risk premium, taxes, capital-cost recovery, or
required rate of return on investment, ranges from $6.65/GJ ($7.03/MMBTU) to $14.77/GJ
($15.57/MMBTU). The delivered cost of Canadian gas is unlikely to average below US$10.40
per GJ (US$11 per MMBTU) in the low-cost case when capital recovery and a risk premium
on the liquefaction facility is applied (based on suggested capital-cost recovery charges in
Table 6.6). Table 6.8 shows before-tax rates of return for a range of capital costs and revenue
streams. We see that low-cost facilities have a high rate of return even at low margins between
the landed price and delivery costs, whereas a margin of $9.50/MMBTU is required before the
most expensive facility reaches a before-tax rate of return above 15 per cent.
TABLE 6.8: BEFORE-TAX RATE OF RETURN CALCULATIONS
Notes: Assumes constant revenue stream for 20 years, based on a two-train, 9 MMTPA facility operating at full capacity.
Previous prices for delivered gas in the Asia-Pacific region were averaging above US$15.60
per GJ (US$16.50 per MMBTU), a function of the JCC pricing convention based on a basket
of oil products delivered in Japan. Japanese demand for LNG has underpinned a strong
demand component of the market; these prices could be expected to decline if a new pricing
standard is developed, if substantially larger supplies of LNG were to emerge in the
marketplace from the U.S. or Qatar in the near term or even if the nuclear facilities in Japan
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Well Supply Cost 3.72 9.66 3.93 10.19
Pipeline toll 1.42 2.61 1.50 2.75
Liquefaction 0.46 1.14 0.49 1.20
Shipping 1.05 1.36 1.11 1.43
Total 6.65 14.77 7.03 15.57
Cost Range ($/GJ) Cost Range ($/MMBTU)
Component Low High Low High
3.00 2.84 154,800,000 30.82% 14.44% 8.18% 4.58% 2.13% 0.30%
3.50 3.32 180,600,000 36.04% 17.32% 10.37% 6.44% 3.79% 1.84%
4.00 3.79 206,400,000 41.24% 20.11% 12.44% 8.18% 5.34% 3.25%
4.50 4.27 232,200,000 46.42% 22.84% 14.44% 9.83% 6.79% 4.58%
5.00 4.74 258,000,000 51.59% 25.53% 16.37% 11.42% 8.18% 5.83%
5.50 5.21 283,800,000 56.75% 28.18% 18.26% 12.95% 9.51% 7.03%
6.00 5.69 309,600,000 61.92% 30.82% 20.11% 14.44% 10.79% 8.18%
6.50 6.16 335,400,000 67.08% 33.44% 21.94% 15.89% 12.03% 9.29%
7.00 6.63 361,200,000 72.24% 36.04% 23.74% 17.32% 13.25% 10.37%
7.50 7.11 387,000,000 77.40% 38.64% 25.53% 18.73% 14.44% 11.42%
8.00 7.58 412,800,000 82.56% 41.24% 27.30% 20.11% 15.60% 12.44%
8.50 8.06 438,600,000 87.72% 43.83% 29.06% 21.48% 16.75% 13.45%
9.00 8.53 464,400,000 92.88% 46.42% 30.82% 22.84% 17.88% 14.44%
9.50 9.00 490,200,000 98.04% 49.00% 32.56% 24.19% 19.00% 15.41%
10.00 9.48 516,000,000 103.20% 51.59% 34.31% 25.53% 20.11% 16.37%
10.50 9.95 541,800,000 108.36% 54.17% 36.04% 26.86% 21.21% 17.32%
11.00 10.43 567,600,000 113.52% 56.75% 37.78% 28.18% 22.30% 18.26%
Margin (landed price less variable costs) Capital expenditure per tonne
$/MMBTU $/GJ $/MMT $500 $1,000 $1,500 $2,000 $2,500 $3,000
were partially reinstated. Given that Japan’s spot LNG price peaked at approximately $17/GJ
and has traded as low as $13.625/MMBTU,213 the projects are potentially still economically
feasible, but this will depend heavily on the supply cost of natural gas.
The short-term increase in demand associated with the loss of Japanese nuclear capacity led to
a substantial and attractive price differential between the calculated cost of production for
Canadian natural gas, if it could be shipped to the Asia-Pacific market, and the delivered port
price. As more countries build liquefaction capacity — especially those producers in the Gulf
Coast region — and begin to deliver into this market, there will be a tendency of this
differential to close. It is not possible to estimate the differential over time, but estimates in the
marketplace suggest long-term convergence between Henry Hub, Japan and the U.K.’s Net
Balancing Point prices.214 Any reduction of the differential impacts Canadian producers;
ultimately this will be borne by producers, who must decide if residual values will support
long-term contracts. If Asian prices stabilize at $13/MMBTU, the best-case cost scenario yields
a margin of $6.50/MMBTU; higher-cost supplies will correspondingly decrease the economic
feasibility of potential facilities.
7. RISK AND LNG MARKETS
This paper deals with markets for Canadian natural gas resources; the development of which
inherently implies risk, both public and private. While we do not intend to re-invent business-
textbook treatment of this topic, it is worth noting that markets and development in this energy
sector are unique and pose inherent challenges for all parties involved.
The actors in this market are: investors; the public in the form of decision-makers and
regulators; the public in the form of landowners and stakeholders at the various points of
project development; and the project developers and their finance partners. We do not attempt
to directly portray risk for any given party, since that would involve unique facts and
assumptions that are dynamic and subject to change in any case. What we can do is to describe
the categories of risk that might curtail or even obstruct the success of this market, assuming
that it is the collective will of the Canadian public that it go forward.
Risk and uncertainty in markets such as these are expected, since without them there is no
incentive for returns to capital. In this case, risks and uncertainty are magnified by recent
changes in policy prescriptions and environmental standards, competitive entry into the market
by other natural-gas-rich nations, price uncertainty and shifts in demand preference. For
purposes of this paper, we have assumed that all the normal risk categories (see Table 7.1
following) can be managed and have assigned costs that are associated with “manageable” risk.
In this vein, delays in market access, or project denial can represent insurmountable costs or
actions and represent the potential loss of sunk cost or access to markets. The revenues that
would flow from project completion are not considered in this analysis.
213 Eriko Amaha, “Platts LNG JKM for July starts trading at $13.625/MMBtu amid weak demand,” Platts, May 16,
2014, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/asia/platts-lng-jkm-for-july-starts-trading-at-13625mmbtu-
26790468?wt.mc_id=energybulletin_oilgaspetchemshipping_campaign_051614&wt.tsrc=eloqua&elq=5ad50112ec57
41c6ba5c65776eeead8f&elqcampaignid=5446.
214 James Melvin, “U.S. LNG exports likely capped at 6 Bcf/d due to price convergence: analyst,” Platts, May 13, 2014,
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/washington/us-lng-exports-likely-capped-at-6-bcfd-due-to-21616591.
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Although they are capital intensive, LNG projects represent relatively low risk215 for investors,
since they are typically developed based on long-term contracts for supply and demand. Of
course, the amount of risk to which buyers and sellers are exposed depends on the formula
used and the base price (Henry Hub versus oil-linked prices) as described in Section 2.1. The
nature of these long-term contracts supports investor confidence, given the amount of capital
necessary and the time commitment for development and use, typically measured in decades.
The strongest source of demand is from power generation, which features stable and
predictable characteristics. Future changes in this demand may emerge in the form of
alternative generating technologies, or changes in building design or use patterns that can shift
domestic heating loads.
Natural gas prices in particular have proven volatile over the last several decades, a reflection
of seasonal shifts in demand, changes in delivery capacity and storage, and declines in
production from conventional fields. The advent of new drilling techniques and the
identification and access to unconventional fields worldwide has dramatically changed this
dynamic, resulting in floors rather than ceilings in price, and much more stable supply
predictions. 
The result has been increased interest in natural gas export potential where neighbouring
countries have net demand increases over domestic capacity, and to countries with little
domestic capability and access to tidewater deliveries. The obvious current attraction for
exporting countries is a clear differential between production costs and the delivery port price.
The consequence is a unique suite of risks for an industry that historically has only expanded
with high confidence in growth in client-country demand and reliance on stable, renewable,
long-term contracts.
It is reasonable to view the existing LNG industry as relatively low risk given the stability
offered by existing long-term contracts. There is more uncertainty and corresponding risk for
the developing industry players, especially those operating from Canada, where the natural gas
industry is mature but the LNG industry is not. This is particularly true when dealing with
unconventional natural gas resources where production lifespans can be more limited than in
traditional vertical-well systems. Here, production from shale and tight-sand formations can
experience a more rapid production-decline rate than with conventional development,
suggesting more frequent re-drilling and stimulation on an annual basis and, ultimately, a steep
rate of decline as reserves are depleted. 
In sum then, the nature of risk involved is centred in five key areas:
1. Permits and permission, including rights of way, port development and access to adequate
electricity for liquefaction operations;
2. Political risk and public support for the industry;
3. The evolution of long-term contracts to include developers as counterparties and shifts in
demand characteristics in some receiving countries;
215
“Low risk” is a relative term and is dependent on individual contract terms or price points, such as the difference
between JCC or Henry Hub pricing, which may change dramatically during the contract period. As a consequence,
each arrangement is “at risk,” although once established, these contracts represent predictable supply and delivery
commitments.
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4. Potential surpluses in supply, as more and more countries take advantage of cheaper
conventional and unconventional gas plays216 and LNG facility developments;
5. Unpredictable shifts in carbon pricing and environmental standards.
Permission to develop energy facilities at every level becomes more uncertain in developed
countries each year. The combination of increased standards, public scrutiny and safety and
environmental indemnification has translated into higher costs, longer processing times and
more uncertainty about the nature of the ultimate project approval (capacity). Since every LNG
project is interlinked, from field development to processing and transfer prior to shipment, the
same type of risk is affecting all the support systems that must be in place for an LNG facility
to operate. As well, in Canada, the unique relationship of First Nation land tenure, ownership
and environmental standards must be taken into account, although these relationships are
imperfectly developed at present. The number and scope of proposed projects, with the
requisite pipelines and gas-well development, has and will raise concerns among First Nations
whose lands are affected by development. This has the potential to be a major obstacle to the
development of an LNG industry, and will require co-operation by all parties to appropriately
address concerns.
We translate this risk characteristic in two ways: project and delivered product cost, and time
needed to actually begin operations. In the LNG market, years of uncertainty regarding North
American gas supplies have shifted the potential near-term advantage to other Asia-Pacific
developers. There is a current attraction represented by a strong price premium at hubs such as
those in Japan. Over time however, there is a strong possibility of market saturation and a
compression of the existing price differentials. The collapse of this price differential could
occur in a relatively short period of time, depending on the speed at which new supplies such
as those from the U.S. Gulf Coast reach the market
The most difficult risk to evaluate in this context is that of political and public policy, coupled
with public opinion and reaction to project design. An example of this is B.C.’s proposed LNG
tax, which adds cost to projects that are potentially marginal, and uncertainty due to the fact
that little is known about its form. This sort of risk is unstable at the moment, and yet will
contribute both to the cost of financing and the ability to access the market in a timely fashion.
The associated risk categories here are: the designation and approval of future utility or
pipeline rights of way; environmental regulations on fuels and the enforcement of standards;
costs of construction and labour availability; and port construction and marine-safety standards.
Ultimately the market will determine levels of development by assessing risk premiums, which
will in turn dictate the required rates of return for investors. Much of the confidence of
investors will reflect the risk they perceive regarding the stability and reliability of the public
policy regime. Since, in financial markets, risk and uncertainty are closely related, the more
predictable the outcome to the market, the lower the risk. The policy issues and uncertainty
surrounding them that will affect investors’ decisions include: whether to allow LNG exports
and how much; environmental policy (emissions, waste disposal and reclamation); the fiscal
regime for royalties on gas produced; taxation policy (both corporate and LNG plant-specific);
as well as pipeline approval, construction timing, and tolls.
216 Substantial discoveries offshore in Mozambique and Tanzania are conventional, and projects in Papua New Guinea
are conventional, and there are still a lot of conventional supplies to come from Australia, Russia and the Middle
East. Unconventional natural gas is not always competitive in price. To date, it is only economical where the industry
has developed the technology and support industry to do it on a manufacturing scale — i.e., North America and
Eastern Australia.
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TABLE 7.1:  ILLUSTRATIVE RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN NATURAL GAS MARKETS SERVED BY LNG
Upsets from unforeseen forces, such as radical shifts in technology and access in the Northwest
Passage may change risk calculations fundamentally. Here, access to offshore resources, such
as those in the Northwest Passage, and emerging paradigm shifts and improvements in
technology (i.e., floating liquefaction and storage vessels) could ultimately displace the need
for domestic pipelines and port facilities. While the same safety concerns would still prevail,
the lower cost of acquiring and shipping products could be significantly lower than those in
place today, and fundamentally shift the market, potentially making existing investments
redundant and effectively stranding large capital investments.
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Planning 
Permits and
Permission
(Developer)
Permits and
Permission
(Public)
Development
and Mitigation
Operations
Environmental
Policy and
Assessment
Domestic
Supply and
Demand
Fiscal
Resources
Construction
and Labour
Low
Moderate
to High
Low to
Moderate
Moderate
to High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
to High
Size and design
mismatch
Project-denial mitigation-
cost; length of time
Failure to adequately
identify important
standards and issues
Construction cost;
unexpected terrain
Not competitive in
marketplace; loss of
supply
Changing standards and
policies
Shifts in both
characteristics can
change market dynamics
Flawed estimation of
volumes and impact of
taxes and royalties on
competitive position
Construction cost
increases; labour
availability
Mis-estimation of market
fundamentals;
misunderstanding of regulatory
process
Policy and regulatory standards
Weak policies; inconsistent or
restrictive regulatory standards;
failure to include some
stakeholders
Inadequate assessment;
control of construction process;
additional mitigation costs
Competition or supply-
replacement costs
Government, legislative and
regulatory uncertainty
Changes in market forces and
competition
Company operating
characteristics; market changes
State of economy; demand in
marketplace
Developer
Developer
Public
Developer
Developer
Public and
Developer
Developer
Public and
Developer
Developer
Success leads to
project submittal
Project denied or
too expensive to
finance
Environmental
damage; need for
public funding; loss
of support
Project
uncompetitive
Stranded assets;
diverted capital
resources
Public risk from
inadequate control;
private cost
increases
Price changes;
changed competitive
position
Lost public
revenues; project
failure
Project timeline
extended; project
cost increases
Phase Uncertainty Nature of risk Factor influencing Risk Outcome
characteristics uncertainty borne by or failure
8. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AN LNG INDUSTRY EXPANSION
Canadian energy resources are impressively large, from both conventional and unconventional
sources. However, the landlocked nature of the current resource base means that expansion and
capture of value-added opportunities in the future will depend on gaining access to tidewater
ports on the west and east coasts. If the objective is to build a future LNG export market, then
failure to gain port access will critically delay effective competition, especially in the Asia-
Pacific region. An emerging alternative is to use U.S. ports, such as Jordan Cove, and transfer
Canadian natural gas overland for export. This improves the prospects from more traditional
reliance on exports to U.S. domestic markets, with corresponding competition with U.S. shale
gas development in the near term. 
Most of the impediments to developing a new LNG industry are related to the difficulty in
gaining sufficient access across provinces and into tidewater port areas necessary to access new
markets. That is to say, most current difficulties are domestic in nature and reflect disagreement
over standards, process and compensation for affected parties and governments who would be
involved in approval, operation and monitoring of the systems involved over a very long term.
There is, for instance, little co-ordination on taxing and royalty charges between provinces, and
an apparent disconnect between the federal government, the province of British Columbia and
some First Nations regarding port facility siting and marine-safety standards. Currently, there is
no collaborative standard for dealing with the issue of access and rights to non-treaty lands, or
redistribution of economic benefits to landowners.
We believe that policy-makers and regulators provide the most obvious forum for addressing
these issues, and that resolution of jurisdiction and agreements for siting and environmental
standards will allow financing and private investment to follow — not the opposite.
LNG and natural gas market expansion is currently viable and has the potential to
demonstrably contribute economic benefits to Canada, both nationally and regionally. Given
the air quality and emissions performance from gas-fired electricity generation and as a
transportation fuel, natural gas represents a physical and policy bridge to a more sustainable
environmental pattern of living in the future; an important consideration when the large-scale
forecast growth in the Asia-Pacific marketplace is taken into account.
The Asia-Pacific marketplace will be attractive to a wide range of upstream suppliers from
many regions including Canada over the next 20 years. Since success there is so closely tied to
contractual arrangements between supplier and buyer, early commitments to development and
predictable supplies are paramount. This core precept is tied to predictable and consistent
policy development; literally, risk reduction through stable public policies and support.
The policy arena, then, is the key to developing this market — or not, if the majority of
Canadians are against it. The policies necessary are likely to transcend the historical
strongholds of Crown-controlled resources largely controlled and overseen by individual
provinces. In short, without a co-ordinated and comprehensive siting, review and permit
process at the provincial and federal level, there will always be a residual uncertainty regarding
establishment and operation of future LNG facilities. That uncertainty will translate to
increased costs of insurance and financing in a market where margins are likely to become
smaller and smaller over time.
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Time is critical in developing this market, and that suggests that the earlier that certainty with
regard to the permit process is achieved, the more successful the final process will be. Success
in this case will be measured in terms of fundamental agreement over the role and
compensation for First Nations, environmental assurance, and rights of way. We believe that
these areas should be addressed comprehensively before piecemeal consideration of projects
begins, even if that may involve a short-term moratorium to develop a comprehensive energy
plan for coastal access for energy projects.
This paper cannot comprehensively deal with the impacts or cost-benefit relationships implied
by accessing and serving these markets. However, we can suggest that the included (non-
exhaustive) list of policy concerns that should be addressed be based on a systematic and
comprehensive approach that includes political issues, safety and public licence, environmental
standards, and conflicting land use.
8.1 Political Issues
It cannot be emphasized enough that regional, provincial and federal political boundaries must
be respected; however, the potential to stymie overall public benefit by applying more narrow
regional standards of performance, tax and royalty standards and safety indemnification can
effectively defeat long-term energy system development. Developing a co-operative agreement,
for instance establishing a set of standard agreements or processes, which would serve as a
template for negotiations, would be an appropriate place to start, involving not only the
provinces and territories but the federal government as well.
There are precedents, albeit imperfect, where provincial governments have found it productive
to work together informally (e.g., the British Columbia and Alberta Deputy Ministers working
group),217 but without collaboration that brings federal representatives and authority to any
agreements, they will be ad hoc and potentially unenforceable at best. The uncertainty implied
by this process is not conducive to long-term finance and investment.
An important consideration in the political arena is the relationship between federal and
provincial governments and First Nations, many of whom have historical and/or treaty rights
that need to be considered. Fulfilling the duty to consult will require co-operation among
governments and with project proponents to ensure concerns are adequately addressed.
In the long-term view of developing future energy markets, there will be a convincing need to
establish energy corridors or rights of way for pipelines and wire systems. Adjudicating these
in a collective sense will be more effective if policy-makers anticipate project needs (ranging
from rights of way, environmental buffer zones, supporting community development, etc.)
rather than reacting to them on a project-by-project basis. This effectively puts the burden of
planning on the back of developers, and the burden of critical analysis primarily on
stakeholders, a process that invites disagreement, misunderstanding and court challenges,
ultimately disrupting a comprehensive and cohesive public policy environment as well as
decision making.
217 Alberta Department of Energy website, “Alberta and British Columbia Working Together,”
http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Initiatives/3707.asp.
80
8.2 Safety and Public Licence
The public is well represented in the regulatory arena, although standards and protocols may
differ by jurisdiction. Integrating and harmonizing these can provide added assurance to the
finance market, ultimately offering a standardized process for construction and inspection and
enforcement of standards in the future. Viewing projects on a collective basis can also bring
economies of scale into the market, for instance in the area of marine safety. A collective
response funded broadly can result in a safer and more productive industry (this pertains as
well to the pipeline industry and rail, as well as marine environment). For instance, modern
telemetry deployed in the coastal zone can substitute in part for higher coast guard presence,
and result in more effective monitoring of movement and guidance for vessel passage in
dangerous areas.
8.3 Environmental Standards
Ensuring environmental quality is a high priority for Canada, local populations and developers.
Mistakes in this category can be profound and persistent, often not revealing their impacts until
far into the future. The corresponding private and social costs can consequently be very high,
warranting a high level of concern, intervention and regulation, but do not necessarily mean the
cessation of development if the latter are undertaken in a responsible manner. 
Ultimately, changes in environmental policy, whether in terms of standards or enforcement, can
introduce high levels of uncertainty in the finance and development community. Policy-makers
can alter the current perception of uncertain, inconsistent and potentially ineffective
environmental policy by developing a comprehensive, unambiguous set of standards for the
review of energy projects and by taking discussion of these standards out of the regulatory
process, other than for the review of project applications. This policy change alone would
result in more consistent project definition and review over time.
8.4 Conflicting Land-Use Issues
LNG is not the only energy product that holds promise for export from Canada. The list
includes electricity, light- and heavy-oil products, refined chemical and gaseous products and
radioactive fuels. Many of these will compete for access to tidewater ports, often in geographic
conditions that limit or constrain the actual land area available for product delivery as well as
site development and location of support communities. Developing a process for allocating all
of these elements, including access corridors, will be critical and should be undertaken in a
comprehensive and anticipatory manner.
There are alternatives to traditional planning by government agencies that could range from
auctions or lotteries to comply with land-use permits to the evaluation of those projects with
the highest expected economic returns or the highest levels of environmental protection that
can give guidance while still ensuring compliance with public goals of development or land
conservation. The creation of a master strategy for development and adjudication that does not
rely on the courts as the ultimate arbiters is important. Creating this vision and the standards by
which it can be accessed will allow a more predictable system to be organized that involves a
disparate group of stakeholders to adjudicate their concerns on a collective rather than project-
by-project basis. With a key goal of creating predictable land-use and environmental standards,
it will be more reasonable to determine if pursuing future offshore energy markets is rational,
timely and cost effective.
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In sum, this is a critical market for the future of Canada's energy sector over the next two
decades. Success will only be achieved with co-operation, understanding and transparency of
rules and expectations between a myriad of stakeholders and the vital investment community
needed to support it.
8.5 Fiscal Policy
Provincial governments (with some exceptions) own mineral rights in Canada, and typically
auction these rights to firms as leases, and then levy taxes on production (royalties) to recoup
the value of the resource that the firms produce on behalf of the government. These royalties
are above and beyond corporate income taxes, and are designed to ensure the owner of the
resource — the government acting on behalf of the citizens — receives its “fair share” from
the development of the resource.
The B.C. government proposed a special LNG tax in its 2014 budget. It is a two-tier tax, with a
1.5 per cent tax applied to net proceeds (revenues less expenses) after production takes place,
and a second tier of up to seven per cent applied to net proceeds, with pre-production
investment expenditures fully written off until recovered.218 The first tier is credited against the
second-tier profit-based tax. A study from Ernst and Young for the B.C. government compares
expected government revenues across current and potential LNG-exporting countries, and finds
that the proposed B.C. fiscal framework, including the B.C. LNG income tax, is competitive
relative to existing fiscal frameworks in Australia and the United States.219
The proposed B.C. LNG income tax is in addition to corporate income taxes paid, and the
royalties paid by the producers of natural gas. This tax is, essentially, a special income tax
levied on a specific type of manufacturing — liquefied natural gas production. It would be
similar to applying special taxes to refining or automobile manufacturing. The effect of this tax
is to raise the effective tax rate on capital, but only for LNG projects, putting them at a
disadvantage relative to other forms of capital in B.C.220 Moreover, it disadvantages project
proponents in B.C. relative to projects in other jurisdictions. And, as shown above, additional
costs could make projects’ rates of return too low to make it a feasible investment.
The B.C. government claims it is introducing the tax to ensure British Columbians receive an
“appropriate return” for the natural gas produced in B.C.221 However, given that the province
already collects royalties on production, there is no need for an LNG income tax to ensure a
“fair share” to the province — unless royalties are “too low,” which is an entirely different 
218 Government of British Columbia website, “Backgrounder: LNG Income Tax Balances Competitiveness, Fair
Return,” February 18, 2014,
http://bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2014/backgrounders/2014_backgrounder_3_LNG_income_tax_competitiveness.pdf.
219 Ernst and Young, Analysis of the competitiveness of B.C.’s proposed fiscal framework for LNG Projects (February 18,
2014), http://www.empr.gov.bc.ca/OG/Documents/Summary%20Competitiveness%20Analysis%20Report%20-
%2018%20February%202014.pdf.
220 Jack M. Mintz, “B.C.’s LNG tax could bomb,” National Post, March 18, 2014,
http://opinion.financialpost.com/2014/03/18/jack-m-mintz-b-c-s-lng-tax-could-bomb/.
221 Government of British Columbia website, “Backgrounder: Proposed B.C. LNG Income Tax,” February 18, 2014,
http://bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2014/backgrounders/2014_backgrounder_2_proposed_LNG_income_tax.pdf.
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issue. The LNG income tax is a poor policy and appears to be solely a revenue grab.222 It may
be enough to prevent the development of the LNG industry in British Columbia, and continued
uncertainty about its form can only delay investment decisions, putting Canada further behind
in the race to supply Asia.
9. CONCLUSIONS
There are challenges in accessing any energy market, ranging from domestic supply and
collection infrastructure, export facilities and shipping, to market demand. All of these
elements are dynamic in nature, and ultimately none of them can be strictly controlled, but they
can be well managed. In developing a new market, a strong additional component must be the
co-operation between political and regulatory agencies, and in modern times, the role and
limits of so-called social licence.223
In this research, we have found that if Canadian natural gas is sold on the open market, its cost
and performance characteristics are economically competitive with projects elsewhere in the
world (based on a value-chain cost comparison). Taken further, if LNG facilities are built on
the Western Canadian coastline, with the cost structure for ports and liquefaction characteristics
employed by the current market, then natural gas exported by this method will be competitive
with other existing and foreseen projects over the next 20 years.
LNG markets operate largely on long-term contract relationships that are a function of high
confidence in supply volumes, gas thermal characteristics, and stable government or regulatory
relationships. In this case, Canada’s abundant gas resources, extensive gas infrastructure, deep
gas-industry experience, free-trade ethos and political stability are attractive to foreign
investors. If tidewater ports are developed, Canada is ideally located to become a significant
long-term LNG supplier to the Asia-Pacific region.
We believe the reported commitments that have already been made by major LNG project
developers and buyers highlight the fundamental attractiveness of Canadian LNG export
projects, and should give confidence to the policy and regulatory agencies that long-term
development of this market is viable and economically attractive. 
The Asia-Pacific market is dynamic and likely to be the fastest and most consistent source of
growth in demand worldwide. The higher rates of growth in Asia reflect rapid economic
growth, driven primarily by a need for electrical energy, and less so for heating loads, but also
reflect the use of natural gas in chemical and fertilizer production. Currently, the majority of
new natural gas demand has been driven by Japan and China, following the curtailment and
shutdown of its nuclear power plants, and their replacement with gas turbines. 
222 Mintz, “B.C.’s LNG.”
223 We do not deal at length with the concept of a social licence in this paper, largely because it is a concept, not a rule
or defined process in the regulatory lexicon. Nevertheless, it is a real concept and describes a tacit agreement by or
support from the public at large, with their representatives, that the process to grant approvals or permission
adequately represents the public good.
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While we have assumed competitive costs of production for this report (based on published
industry figures), timely access to this market is critical to the overall success of Canadian
firms. Long-term contracts for delivery, as well as confidence in supply capacity, are critical to
initiate entry into the market. Time is of the essence in this case. For instance, if the
development time for new projects lags the projected entry of new liquefaction facilities in the
U.S., then given the nature of contracts, critical market share will have been ceded to other
competitors. At some point this loss cannot be recovered outside extraordinary new demand
growth, and the Canadian facilities, with relatively high delivered-product costs, risk getting
shut out of the market.
There are obstacles that can slow or derail the success of a future Canadian LNG and natural
gas industry. We have grouped these into three main categories: finance and fiscal
relationships, political and regulatory uncertainty, and environmental and social-justice co-
operation.
9.1 Finance and Economic Relationships
Currently there are more proposed LNG export projects around the world than are required to
meet projected demand for the foreseeable future. While the growth period is likely to extend
as much as 20 years into the future, it becomes more uncertain as time goes by, and given the
contract nature of the buyer/seller relationships that are fundamental to this market, delays will
allow those contracts to be signed with other nations and/or companies, effectively reducing
the volume that can be shipped unless alternative buyers can be arranged.
However, there are already significant projects in the Middle East, Australia and the U.S. Gulf
Coast that are capable of capturing a significant fraction of current and near-term demand
increases. Some of these, such as Sabine Pass, are coming online to diversify and serve the
expanding Japanese market. Others, such as the Cameron LNG project in Louisiana, are
creating excess capacity to serve a market as far as 10 years in the future.
We expect that Asian demand for natural gas will grow steadily but will be differentiated by
country due to the timing of distribution-network growth coupled with a lack of
interconnection between countries, and the affordability of gas derived from LNG in
developing economies. Although the supply of Canadian gas is abundant, access to tidewater
ports is not. If access to ports is approved in the future, Canadian supplies can serve a
significant but not unlimited portion of the market demand. Since approvals for new export
capacity are likely to be completed in phases rather than all at once, we believe the staging will
allow a consistent penetration of the market at consistent rates (relative price levels), without
gaps or excess (surplus) supplies accumulating.224
224 This is an anomalous case, where not all suppliers will behave strictly rationally, and where current economic rules
on construction link long-term contracts with finance for liquefaction and electricity capacity at loading ports. If the
decision to build an export terminal is based primarily on contracts signed for its capacity, then there should be little
or no excess supply even in the unlikely event that all proposed terminals are built at once. Further, the substantial
Japanese market demand today is subject to changes in nuclear policy that could re-establish baseload capacity and
diminish the appetite for imported gas supplies. As well, the current price differential supported in a large measure by
purchases from Japan will face downward pressure over time, increasing shipper price risk. While this is not likely to
happen in a five-year period, it is not unreasonable for it to occur in a 10-year period, especially in the face of
continued high import prices.
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Canadian exports of natural gas in the form of LNG will primarily be sold under long-term
sales contracts to buyers who are also equity participants in the LNG export projects. We
believe that this will be the hallmark of the co-ordinated development of both port facilities
and the incremental improvements of the supply chain in both British Columbia and Alberta.
We expect the likely market supply from Canadian sources to be approximately two trains of
an average of 4.5 MMTPA each, every five years, based on construction and access limitations.
Oil price levels will be the primary determinant of Asian LNG prices, as prices for most of the
LNG sold in Asia is oil indexed.225 U.S. natural gas prices will start to have a marginal effect
on LNG prices as exports from U.S. and other countries, indexed to Henry Hub, begin growing
from 2015. Currently prices are attractive and represent a differential of about US$4.73/GJ
($5/MMBTU) if delivered to Japan.226 Spot prices have recently been higher due to winter and
higher Japanese demand, and are at $17.87/GJ ($18.85/MMBTU). That represents a differential
of up to $7.39/GJ ($7.80/MBTU) to the spot market in 2013.
This price differential could collapse over time if wellhead gas prices increase and margins
shrink for gas supplies. Near-term markets will be driven predominantly by Japanese demand;
if the nuclear facilities come back online, there will be a short-term oversupply of gas. It may
be at least five years before a Canadian LNG plant is operational, by which time the nuclear
situation in Japan should be clear.
9.2 Political and Regulatory Uncertainty
The ability of the natural gas system to expand and serve an international market will depend
entirely on the characteristics of land-use and permit approvals, both from the federal and
provincial governments as well as the landowner and public at large. For instance, one of the
ports may be developed with oil-supply pipes in the same right of way. This will complicate
the approval and port-management issues.
Lacking a co-ordinated and timely approval of projects (including pipeline rights of way,
agreements with First Nations and demonstrated safety and handling plans) will erode the
confidence and interest of the financial community. This will add costs to project finance
agreements. This “risk” characteristic is also known to the buyer community, which will see
additional offers as surplus supplies from unconventional gas projects begin to appear on the
market.
Uncertainty is difficult to price or evaluate in advance. However, the nature of regulatory
delays or project-mitigation costs can be serious enough to delay or impose excessive costs on
projects, potentially defeating them. Just as serious, though, are projects that are not burdened
with these reviews and requirements, later deemed by the financing community as likely to fail
and cause future unfunded liabilities.
225 The Haisla Nation/Golar B.C. LNG Project in Kitimat has reportedly signed contracts based on Henry Hub
indexation. “In fact, the sales contract, which will see some gas go to one of the world’s largest LNG ship owners,
values gas according to depressed U.S. and Canadian prices, rather than the far more lucrative international prices
that are tied to oil,” Nathan Vanderklippe, “BC LNG inks Asian sales contract,” The Globe and Mail, January 20,
2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/bc-lng-inks-asian-
sales-contract/article7563307/.
226 We calculate a representative price of Canadian LNG in current markets as US$11.05. This is only for current
comparison, since a $3.95/MMBTU price assumed for wellhead gas is not realistic over the long term.
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Finally, taxation and royalty concerns of all levels of government will be a key issue for
discussion, since success of the industry will depend on co-operation between governments for
siting, tax levies and support of employment needs for the projects. Ultimately, this can be a
deciding factor in project success, since excess levels of tax or inappropriate tax applications
can render projects unfeasible in the marketplace.
9.3 Environmental and Social-Justice Relationships
Environmental standards and compliance, and social approval of new coastal facilities, are
critical for the industry to develop. This will mean additional attention on the part of
developers and the public regulator to conditions and standards that will withstand scrutiny
from observers and indemnify all parties with regard to potential upsets or damage in the
future. While the LNG shipping industry has an extremely good track record, marine safety
will prove to be a significant regulatory concern; added costs here may demand collective or
novel approaches to guaranteeing a high standard of safety and oversight within Canadian
national waters and beyond.
The overriding environmental issues surround pipeline location and right-of-way impacts,
inspection and leak detection, and air quality issues associated with electric power operations
necessary to maintain liquefaction and port facilities. The ruggedness of the terrain and its
seismicity could add to costs and time for identifying suitable pipeline routes, securing right of
ways and permits, and constructing pipelines across the Coastal range. Electricity is likely to
be provided totally “onsite” with gas-fired power generation, with no grid support, for
economic performance and to satisfy likely regulatory and policy concerns. This will
potentially raise costs and make it difficult to meet the government’s greenhouse gas emissions
targets. The availability and cost of labour for remote project sites will be an issue, affecting
the cost and schedule of export projects.
Right-of-way and access challenges from landowners, First Nations and environmentalists are
likely to dominate decision forums as the projects are advanced, and the standards and
mitigation requirements are likely to impose additional project costs that may reduce the
profitability and incentive for any given project.
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED COUNTRY ANALYSIS (DEMAND)
Appendix A reviews the current and future natural gas demand and LNG demand by region
and/or country, beginning with traditional LNG buyers, followed by non-traditional buyers and
concluding with emerging LNG buyers.
A1 North Asian Traditional LNG Buyers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan
A1.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADITIONAL NORTH ASIAN MARKETS
LNG buyers in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are referred to in the LNG industry as
“traditional” buyers because of the characteristics they share: developed economies; regulated,
risk-averse utility buyers; long histories of buying LNG on similar, traditional commercial
terms; acceptance of oil-indexed pricing formulas; requirements for LNG with high heating
values (“rich” gas); and the financial capacities that have provided the contractual support to
launch most of the LNG projects in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. Traditional
LNG buyers represent low commercial risk, and buyers in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan
have been the buyers of choice for LNG suppliers to the Asia-Pacific region. The symbiotic
relationships between LNG suppliers and traditional LNG buyers, and the “rules of the game”
between them, are well established. Led by Japan, these North Asian LNG buyers have long
dominated the LNG market in the Asia-Pacific region, and indeed the world. In 2012, North
Asian LNG buyers accounted for 58 per cent of global LNG trade, and 83 per cent of LNG
imports in the Asia-Pacific region.1 Figure A1.1 shows LNG imports by supply country for
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; imports have almost tripled between 1993 and 2012.
FIGURE A1.1:  NORTH ASIA (JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN) LNG IMPORTS BY SUPPLY COUNTRY
Note: Africa includes Algeria, Brunei, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. “Other Middle East” includes Oman, the 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen. “Other” includes Belgium, France, Norway, Peru, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 
the United States, and “non-specified/other.”  
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi:
10.1787/data-00555-en. 
1 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports by origin”, IEA Natural Gas Information
Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en.
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The Asia-Pacific LNG market is predominantly based on long-term sale-and-purchase
agreements (SPAs), usually extending 20 years or longer. In 2012, the volume covered by
existing contracts in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan was equivalent to 80 per cent of imports;
for the Asia-Pacific region this figure is 85 per cent.2 In 2009, 86 per cent of LNG deliveries in
the region, and 89 per cent of deliveries to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, were under long-
term contracts.3 Long-term contracts satisfy buyers’ concerns about security of supply and
sellers’ needs for commercial revenue security. These contracts underpin project infrastructure
commitments; in the current market, new construction for liquefaction and regasification will
not proceed without them. Unlike in the Atlantic Basin (Europe and North America), there are
not extensive supplies of gas available from pipeline sources in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus,
expansion of gas supply is tied to new LNG facilities. Recent growth of the Asia-Pacific spot
and short-term trade — spot volumes imported increased 167 per cent between 2008 and 20124
— reflects the inability of buyers to commit to long-term purchases for several reasons,
including uncertain government policies, negotiating impasses over price indices, and uncertain
LNG demand. These in turn were compounded by a sudden 15.8 MMTPA increase in Japanese
consumption between 2010 and 2012 due to that country’s shift away from nuclear energy after
the Fukushima disaster.5
Historically, North Asian LNG buyers have had similar requirements when buying LNG:
• Security of supply (low political risk, strong project sponsors and low technical risk);
• Diversity of supply (enhancing security of supply);
• Nominal equity participation in supply projects to gain independent opinion and judgment; 
• LNG with high heating values to meet gas-utility specifications.
More recently, as national economic competitiveness has emerged as an issue and the
uncertainty about LNG demand has grown, North Asian buyers have sought:
• Lower rates of price changes, if LNG price is indexed to oil prices;6
• Alternative, and hopefully lower-cost pricing formulas (e.g., Henry Hub indexation);
• Quantity flexibility (to increase/decrease quantities in the face of uncertain demand);
• Destination flexibility (for short-term changes in demand and commercial trades);
• Mixtures of short-, medium- and long-term commitments (to manage uncertain demand);
• Increased participation in upstream resources (for security of supply and price hedging).
2 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports”; and Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners)
LNG contract database.
3 Based on calculating the difference between total volumes and spot volumes imported to Asia (China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand), as reported by the International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers (see: GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2009 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2009). According to Poten & Partners, in
2009 more than 95 per cent of LNG deliveries in the region were under long-term contracts, though they do not
provide a citation for their number (Poten & Partners, “2015 – 2035 LNG Market Assessment Outlook for the
Kitimat LNG Terminal,” October 2010). 
4 Authors’ calculations, from: GIIGNL, The LNG Industry … , 2008 through 2012 editions.
5 IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-
00482-en.
6 See Section 2.1 in main body of the report for a discussion of pricing mechanisms.
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In addition to their common commercial concerns, North Asia-Pacific buyers have similar
technical requirements for LNG with higher heating values (“rich” gas; see Appendix B for
details). Isolated from the rest of Asia, with limited domestic production, all three developed
their natural gas industries with distribution-system gas specifications based on LNG as their
primary source of natural gas. Gas utility companies control the high heating value (HHV) of
natural gas in their systems; LNG supplies that are lower in heating value (“lean” gas) are
“spiked” with liquified petroleum gas (LPG) to raise the heating value to the pipeline
specification.7 Japan’s LNG supplies historically originated from Indonesia, Malaysia,
Australia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, mostly sourced from gas containing higher
LPG content, with higher heating values, so for many years, spiking was not a significant
burden. An option for individual buyers, especially gas utilities, is to specify limits on the
portion of their LNG supplies that could come from suppliers of “lean” (low heating value)
LNG.
The situation with respect to high-heating-value gas specifications is similar in South Korea
and Taiwan. The pipeline high-heating-value specification in South Korea has been based on
available supply characteristics.8 An interconnected system of import facilities and pipelines
allows South Korea more flexibility to accommodate low-heating-value LNG supplies through
segregation of LNG from different sources, blending of LNG from different sources, and LPG
spiking.
However, as new LNG supplies with lower heating values come on the market, Japanese,
South Korean and Taiwanese buyers have found it increasingly more difficult to buy LNG that
does not require significant LPG spiking, which makes many new supplies less attractive from
an operational and economic perspective (depending on the price spread between LNG heat
value and LPG heat value). Examples of LNG supplies with low heating values being
marketed today include LNG from the Gorgon project in Western Australia, the coal-bed
methane projects in Eastern Australia, and all liquefaction projects in North America.9
Although Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have similar characteristics as LNG buyers, South
Korea stands apart in one key respect. Historically, and with only recent, minor exceptions, the
state-owned Korea Gas Corp. (KOGAS) has acted as South Korea’s monopsony LNG buyer,
while Japan has purchased LNG through dozens of electricity and gas utility companies.10 As a
consequence, South Korea has been able to commit to large, long-term LNG purchases, while
each Japanese buyer has typically made small, incremental long-term purchases (South Korea’s
average contract volume is over 50 per cent larger than Japan’s.). KOGAS’s ability to make
large purchase commitments has made South Korea a key target market for greenfield
liquefaction projects that are getting increasingly larger and in need of large “foundation
buyers” to underpin the project. A rule of thumb suggested by industry experts is that
liquefaction projects are not sanctioned until at least 80 per cent of the project’s capacity is
committed under long-term contracts.
7 International Gas Union and BP, Guidebook to Gas Interchangeability and Gas Quality (2011).
8 South Korea has one of the highest heating value specifications in consumed gas (see Appendix B, Table B1).
9 See Appendix B, Table B2 for a comparison of LNG by heating value from various export terminals around the
world.
10 Of South Korea’s 33 contracts currently in force, KOGAS is the buyer for 31. In contrast, Japan has 26 different
buyers with 137 contracts currently in force. Source: Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG Contract Database.
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Japanese buyers once acted collectively in one of two “buyers’ clubs” (the Eastern Buyers or
the Western Buyers).11 Negotiating together, they secured the small quantities that each needed,
while leveraging the buying power of a larger buyer. Long-term purchase commitments with
LNG suppliers would typically include multiple Japanese buyers under the same commercial
terms. This approach fell away as the Japanese government liberalized the utility industry to
encourage competition across, and between, the electric and gas utility sectors.12 Now, each
Japanese buyer acts individually and, as a consequence, Japanese buyers are not as critical to
the launch of new liquefaction projects as they once were. Project sponsors have been forced to
look to South Korea and China for large-scale foundation customers to underpin project
economics.
Japan and South Korea have both suffered from regulatory uncertainty. Both have sought to
liberalize their gas and power industries. While achieving only limited success in lowering
market prices through increased competition, Japan and South Korea have created uncertainties
that have resulted in all players delaying firm LNG-procurement decisions. In a recent press
release, Wood Mackenzie stated that “policy and regulatory uncertainty in Japan and South
Korea could result in less new Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) supply being developed, forcing
continued tightness in the Pacific LNG market beyond 2020 and perpetuating high spot
prices.”13
A1.2 JAPAN
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) started importing LNG into Japan from Kenai LNG
in Alaska in 1969.14 Japan played an indispensable role in launching and growing the LNG
industry, serving as the sole buyer for many exporting countries. The demand for gas in Japan
has underpinned a large and growing LNG market in the Asia-Pacific region. In 1993, Japan
accounted for 66 per cent of global LNG imports, importing LNG from Brunei, the United
Arab Emirates, Oman, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia, as well as Alaska. However, as other
buyers entered the market and the growth of Japan’s LNG imports leveled off, Japan’s share of
global LNG imports declined to 54 per cent by 2000 and to 33 per cent in 2010, despite the
total imported volume growing 2.8 per cent per year during this period (Figure A1.2).15
11 Little detail is available on the exact nature of these consortiums, however, Jonathan Stern notes the existence of a
Western Buyers consortium; see: J. Stern, “The Pricing of Gas in International Trade,” in The Pricing of
Internationally Traded Gas, ed. J. Stern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Chapter 2. LNG Japan Corporation
was part of a buyers’ consortium. Source: LNG Japan Corporation website, “Indonesia LNG Project,”
http://www.lngjapan.com/english/work/.
12 Tetsuo Morikawa and Hiroshi Hashimoto, “Japan’s new challenge and possible solutions in LNG procurement
activities in the wake of less availability of nuclear power capacity,” Working Paper (Japan: The Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan, August 2012), https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/4436.pdf.
13 Wood Mackenzie, “Uncertainty in Japan and Korea’s LNG Markets Will Prolong Tight Asian Market Beyond 2020,”
September 9, 2013.
14 EIA website, “Japan,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ja.
15 Authors’ calculations, based on IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports.”
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FIGURE A1.2:  JAPAN’S LNG IMPORTS BY SOURCE COUNTRY
Note: “Other” includes Algeria, Belgium, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, Nigeria, Norway, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Yemen and “non-specified/other.” 
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi:
10.1787/data-00555-en. 
Japan’s 30 receiving terminals have a combined capacity of 192 MMTPA (261 BCM), and are
owned mainly by electricity and gas utilities.16 Regasification capacity continues to grow
through expansion of existing terminals and the construction of new terminals. By the end of
2015, regas projects that are currently under construction will increase the country’s LNG
import capacity to 265 BCM per year (194 MMTPA).17 Between 1993 and 2012, the utilization
rate for Japan’s import terminals averaged 34 per cent, and utilization only increased above 40
per cent in 2011 and 2012.18 Japan’s import capacity is well above demand, but total import
volume is constrained by infrastructure and port size.19 Each terminal serves a relatively small
geographic area around the terminal; hence, each terminal has storage and send-out capacities
to ensure very high service reliability.20 Some terminals have separate tanks to store LNG
supplies with different heating values.21
Historically, natural gas has supplied about 12 per cent of Japan’s energy needs, and almost all
of that natural gas is imported as LNG.22 Between 1980 and 2000, approximately 74 per cent
of Japan’s natural gas use supplied electricity generation; this fell to 63 per cent in 2010, and
increased to 68 per cent in 2011.23 Government efforts to liberalize Japanese energy markets 
16 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2012 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2012), http://www.giignl.org/publications/lng-industry-2012.
17 CERI, “Global LNG: Now, Never, or Later?”, Study No. 13 (Calgary, Alta.: Canadian Energy Research Institute,
January 2013).
18 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports” and GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2012.
19 EIA website, “Japan.”
20 ibid.
21 KBR, a consulting firm, notes: “one source of LNG to Japan is Kenai, Alaska where the LNG is nearly pure
methane. This LNG must have LPG injection for interchangeability purposes.” KBR, “Natural Gas Specification
Challenges in the LNG Industry,” January 2007.
22 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013 (2013), http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-
review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf.
23 Authors’ calculations, from: IEA, “Electricity Information 2013.”
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have led to more competition between Japanese LNG buyers.24 Gas utility companies have
ventured into power generation, and electric utilities have been marketing gas to gas-utility
customers. In addition to putting pressure on historical collaborative relationships between
LNG buyers in Japan, this increased competition has made the utilities more sensitive to price
differences in LNG delivery. 
This price sensitivity has been heightened by Japan’s struggle to remain economically
competitive with countries with lower energy costs (e.g., China). Gas prices and electricity
prices in Japan are amongst the highest in the world, as shown in Figure 2.2 (main document).
In 2013, Japan paid an average price of $16.02/MMBTU ($15.18/GJ) for LNG, compared to
$14.94/MMBTU ($14.16/GJ) in South Korea.25 Correctly or not, the political establishment
believes that Japan would pay less for LNG if it could buy LNG at “world market prices” (e.g.,
indexed to Henry Hub instead of oil prices). The first LNG export contracts from Sabine Pass
in the U.S. Gulf Coast were priced on a “Henry Hub-plus” basis; however, whether or not
Henry Hub-indexed prices are lower than traditional oil-linked contracts will depend on both
North American supply and demand forces and the price of oil.26 As LNG suppliers outside of
the U.S. have been hesitant to consider price formulas that do not include oil-price indexation,
there have been negotiating stalemates between many LNG suppliers and buyers for several
years.
A shrinking population and de-industrialization in the face of foreign competition are real
concerns in Japan and they have contributed to the uncertainty regarding future LNG demand,
even before the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011. With 50 reactors, Japan has 49 GW
of nuclear power plants, representing about 17 per cent of Japan’s installed generation
capacity.27 Prior to the Fukushima-Daiichi event, nuclear power supplied about 27 per cent of
Japan’s electricity supply (see Figure A1.3). The government’s 2010 electricity supply plan
showed nuclear capacity growing to about 41 per cent of installed capacity by 2019, and
eventually to over half of Japan’s electricity supply.28
In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, Japan quickly ramped up electricity production
from non-nuclear power plants in 2011 and 2012. Japan increased LNG imports from 73 MMT
(98.7 BCM) in 2010 to 90 MMT (121.6 BCM) in 2012 as all 50 nuclear reactors in the country
were shut down.29 With imports from 21 countries in 2012, Japan remains the largest LNG
importer in the world, accounting for 38 per cent of global LNG imports, up from 33 per cent
in 2010.30
24 For a brief overview of the liberalization of gas markets in Japan, see: Osaka Gas website, “Japanese Gas Business,”
http://www.osakagas.co.jp/en/ir/library/ar/pdf/2010/10_12.pdf.
25 For Japan: World Bank, “World Bank Historical Commodity Price Data,”
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21574907~menu
PK:7859231~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html; For Korea: Korea Energy Economics
Institute, “Monthly Energy Statistics,” April 2014, http://www.keei.re.kr/keei/download/MES1404.pdf.
26 Jonathan Stern, “International gas pricing in Europe and Asia: A crisis of fundamentals,” Energy Policy 64, 1 (2014):
43-48. For more discussion of pricing, see Section 2.1.
27 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Japan”, world-nuclear.org, updated October 16, 2013; and EIA
website, “Japan.”
28 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power.”
29 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
30 ibid.
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FIGURE A1.3:  JAPAN’S ELECTRICITY SUPPLY BY FUEL SOURCE, BEFORE AND AFTER FUKUSHIMA
Source: IEA Statistics, “Electricity Information 2013,” ISBN 978-92-64-20308-2. 
Percentages based on gross electricity production.
The outlook for LNG demand in Japan has become even more uncertain, given a lack of clarity
regarding the future of nuclear power in the country. Japan’s 2010 energy plan planned for
nuclear’s share of energy generation to increase to 50 per cent by 2030; the Fukushima disaster
prompted differing opinions on the future role of nuclear, with the current prime minister being
pro-nuclear, and the previous prime minister being anti-nuclear.31 Not surprisingly, views in
Japan range from those who want to permanently decommission all nuclear plants to those who
call for the return of all but a handful of “unsafe” plants to operation and the building of new
nuclear plants. The current political establishment is generally supportive of returning “safe”
plants to service. However, in seismically active post-Fukushima Japan there is much
apprehension regarding the safety of all nuclear power plants. Many will not be deemed safe
enough to return to operation.
A new energy plan has not yet been released, though the draft plan indicates that nuclear will
continue to play an important role.32 The process of regulatory clearance for restarting Japan’s
50 reactors is slow and will take some years. The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, has
recently stated that Japan may have only four nuclear reactors back online by March 2015.33
But, even if some nuclear power plants come back online, others will be permanently retired as
they reach the end of their 40-year lives. There are no firm plans in place now to construct new
nuclear plants.34
31 EIA website, “Japan.”
32 Norihisa Hoshino et al., “Energy policy revised but intent remains same: Restart nuke reactors,” The Asahi Shimbun,
February 20, 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201402200063.
33 Osamu Tsukimori and Rebekah Kebede, “Japan on gas, coal power building spree to fill nuclear void,” Reuters,
October 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/16/us-japan-power-outlook-idUSBRE99F02A20131016.
34 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power.”
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A paper written by the planning and LNG-trading departments of Osaka Gas Co. Ltd., and
published by The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, methodically address the impact of
Fukushima on Japan’s energy complex and describe how, through increased utilization of fossil
fuel plants and demand-conservation measures — both enforced and voluntary — Japan has
coped with the reduction in nuclear electricity generation.35 The authors forecast Japan’s future
LNG requirements based on a range of scenarios regarding the future use of nuclear power
facilities. They show a range of LNG demand for 2015 from 75.5 to 84.8 MMT and for 2020,
78.1 to 88.7 MMT, depending on decisions regarding nuclear power.
Despite the Japanese government’s strong commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, the country has
been forced to rely more on fossil fuels, including oil and spot and short-term purchases of
LNG, to generate electricity in the last two years. Japan is expected to start up 12 new gas-
fired power plants and two coal-fired plants by the end of 2014 with the goals of reducing
consumption of oil in power generation and providing additional reserve margin.36 As growth
in non-power demand for natural gas is expected to be small, the main uncertainty regarding
the forecast of Japan’s LNG demand is the power sector.37
The cumulative effect of Japan’s LNG demand uncertainties — domestic competition; the
tantalizing possibility of buying lower cost, Henry Hub-indexed LNG from North America;
feared de-industrialization; and nuclear power policies — have made it very difficult for
Japanese LNG buyers to make long-term LNG purchase commitments. Hence, Japan has been
relying on high-cost spot and short-term LNG purchases to help it traverse this period of
uncertainty; in 2012, Japan’s imports were 90 MMT while LNG contracts in force only
covered 68.5 MMT.38 An unintended consequence of Japan’s inability to commit to new long-
term LNG supplies has been a delay in the launch of liquefaction projects that could provide
the long-term, secure LNG supplies that Japanese LNG buyers seek.
In the meantime, Japan remains uncomfortably dependent on LNG supplies from the Middle
East. In 2012, Qatar alone met almost 18 per cent of Japan’s LNG demand, while the rest of
the Middle East and Africa supplied almost 28 per cent.39 Japan’s biggest source of short-term
LNG purchases in 2011 and 2012 was Qatar, which supplied an additional 5.7 MMT in 2011
and 5.2 MMT in 2012.40 Figure A1.4 demonstrates the changes in Japan’s LNG supply mix
post-Fukushima; supplies from Indonesia declined, while Qatar, Australia and the Middle East
and North Africa increased their sales to Japan.
35 Akira Miyamoto et al., “A Realistic Perspective on Japan’s LNG Demand after Fukushima,” Working Paper N62
(The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, June 2012)
36 Osamu Tsukimori and Rebekah Kebede, “Japan on gas.” 
37 Sixty-eight per cent of Japan’s 2011 primary demand for natural gas is accounted for by the power sector; the share
for natural gas in total final consumption in 2011 was only 11 per cent. Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013
(Paris: OECD/IEA, 2013).
38 IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics”; and Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG Contract Database.
39 EIA, “World — Natural Gas imports.”
40 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2011 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2011), http://www.giignl.org/publications/lng-industry-2011;
The LNG Industry in 2012.
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Situated halfway between North America and North Asia, and with flexible supply contracts
and shipping capacity, Qatar has the unique ability to redirect LNG cargoes from one continent
to the other in pursuit of the highest LNG prices in North America, Europe and Asia. Qatar has
been a reliable LNG supplier to Japan, but it sits inside the Strait of Hormuz and supply from
Qatar could be easily interrupted in the event of hostilities in the Middle East. Japan’s supply
of LNG and oil from the Middle East could be severely curtailed at the same time, a significant
risk to security-conscious Japan. This sentiment can be traced directly to Japan’s dependence
(with limited domestic production) on a range of critical energy products from nuclear fuels to
oil and natural gas.
FIGURE A1.4:  JAPAN’S LNG IMPORTS BY SUPPLY COUNTRY (2010 – 2012)
Note: Middle East/Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Yemen. “Other” includes Belgium, 
France, Norway, Peru, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States and “non-specified/other.”
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi:
10.1787/data-00555-en. 
Despite the great uncertainty regarding Japan’s future LNG requirements, analysts have
attempted to project Japan’s future supply-demand balance. PFC Energy concluded that Japan
faces a minor supply-demand gap through 2020, assuming that preliminary contracts with
sanctioned supply projects are transformed to binding contracts, which has historically been the
case with Japanese buyers.41 It should be noted that PFC has assumed that Japan’s LNG
demand will drop between 2012 and 2015, as some nuclear plants are returned to operation,
before increasing again starting in 2015. 
Figure A1.5 shows Japan’s forecast demand for natural gas and sources of supply between
2015 and 2035. Based on a conservative growth-rate estimate of 0.1 per cent annually, there is
little room for new sources of supply until 2025, unless the preliminary contracted sources
(Freeport LNG and Cameron LNG from the United States) fail to deliver. 
41 PFC Energy, Global LNG Supply and Demand Study, May 2013.
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FIGURE A1.5:  JAPAN’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: Production is assumed to stay constant at 2012 volume. Demand is forecast to increase at 0.1 per cent per 
year (from: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013, central scenario, the New Policies Scenario). Production, imports 
and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas 
Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. Contract volumes from: Bloomberg POTN 
(Poten & Partners) LNG contract database. Contracts defined as preliminary are with projects where no final 
investment decision has been made for the supplier.
A1.3 SOUTH KOREA
The LNG industry in South Korea started with the formation of the state-owned Korea Gas
Corp. (KOGAS) in 1983. KOGAS started importing LNG and supplying gas to South Korean
power plants in 1986, and commenced city gas supplies to Seoul the following year.42 In 1990,
the government announced a master plan for a nationwide natural gas distribution system.43
KOGAS’s system has expanded to three LNG import terminals and a 3,562-kilometre
nationwide pipeline network, the most expansive system of integrated gas infrastructure in the
Asia-Pacific.44 A fourth KOGAS import terminal is under construction, with an expected in-
service date of 2014 or 2015, increasing KOGAS’s import capacity from 89.7 MMTPA to
about 96.6 MMTPA.45 As South Korea’s sole LNG wholesale gas distributor, KOGAS
purchases LNG and supplies natural gas to power plants, gas-utility companies, and city gas
companies.46
With very limited indigenous hydrocarbon resources, South Korea quickly became the second-
largest LNG importer in the world. South Korea’s share of global LNG imports were 6.8 per
cent in 1993, growing to 13.6 per cent in 2000 and 14.9 per cent in 2012.47 South Korea’s
natural gas consumption has grown on average 14 per cent per year since 1987, and 45 per cent 
42 KOGAS website, “Our History – 1980’s,” http://www.kogas.or.kr/en/who/history/history_4.action.
43 KOGAS website, “Our History – 1990’s,” http://www.kogas.or.kr/en/who/history/history_3.action.
44 KOGAS website, “Our Profile,” http://www.kogas.or.kr/en/who/profile/profile.action.
45 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2012.
46 KOGAS website, “Business System,” http://www.kogas.or.kr/en/what/business/system.action.
47 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
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in the last three years, from 34 BCM (25.3 MMT) in 2009 to 50 BCM (36.8 MMT) in 2012
(Figure A1.6).48 Domestic production of natural gas started in 2005, but has averaged only one
per cent of annual domestic consumption.49
FIGURE A1.6:  SOUTH KOREA’S LNG IMPORTS BY SOURCE COUNTRY
Note: Africa includes Algeria, Brunei, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria. “Other Middle East” includes the United 
Arab Emirates and Yemen. “Other” includes Belgium, Japan, Peru, Norway, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, the United
States and “other Asia and Pacific.”
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en. 
As South Korea grew to become the second-largest LNG importer in the world, KOGAS grew
to become the largest individual LNG buyer, making KOGAS a major force in the industry.50
The government has made several attempts to break up South Korea’s natural gas industry,
eliminating KOGAS’s monopsony position as South Korea’s only LNG buyer, but these
reforms have proceeded slowly.51 As a result, private companies have the right to import LNG
for their own use. Pohang Iron and Steel Corp. (POSCO) and Mitsubishi Japan own the only
private LNG import terminal in South Korea.52 The 1.7-MMTPA terminal is used by POSCO
and SK Corporation to import LNG for their own use.53 No other companies have succeeded in
building import terminals; KOGAS has retained its role as the dominant LNG importer in
South Korea. However, the uncertainty caused by the government’s repeated attempts to
restructure the industry has led to delays in securing new long-term LNG supplies for the
South Korean market.54
48 IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics.”
49 ibid.
50 EIA website, “Korea, South,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=KS.
51 IEA, Developing a Natural Gas Trading Hub in Asia (Paris: 2013), 55-56.
52 EIA website, “Korea, South.”
53 The Korea Gas Union, “Completion of LNG Terminal in Gwangyang Works,” press release, August 11, 2005,
http://www.kgu.or.kr/eng/news/industry.html?md=view&tb=bbs_029&no=2088&refer=/eng/news/industry.html?page
=24.
54 An Tae-Hoon, “Supply and demand trends and plans for natural gas in South Korea,” Research Paper (The Institute
of Energy Economics, Japan, March 2009), http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/report_detail.php?article_info__id=2480.
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Natural gas supplies about 16 per cent of South Korea’s energy needs, and almost all of that
natural gas is imported as LNG.55 Whereas two-thirds of Japan’s natural gas is consumed for
power generation, natural gas use in South Korea is split almost equally between electricity
generation (48 per cent in 2011) and residential, commercial and industrial consumers (52 per
cent in 2011).56 Winters on the Korean peninsula are particularly harsh; as a result, natural gas
is an important fuel in the residential and commercial heating market. The demand for natural
gas for heating causes very seasonal demand in South Korea, with natural gas demand peaking
in winter months. The monthly demand for natural gas is twice as high during the winter
months of November through March as it is during the rest of the year. KOGAS has managed
this seasonality by constructing additional LNG storage capacity and by purchasing spot
cargoes for winter consumption.57
With 23 reactors, South Korea has 20.7 GW of nuclear power plants, representing about 22 per
cent of South Korea’s installed electricity generation capacity, and supplying 29 per cent of
total electricity consumption.58 Although South Korea was not physically impacted by
Fukushima, the nuclear disaster has had repercussions there. Growing concerns over nuclear
safety, compounded by the indictment of 100 officials after a probe into the South Korean
nuclear industry found widespread use of faked safety documents, has led to calls for a
pullback from nuclear power.59 In May 2013, the government shut down two reactors found to
be using substandard parts and ordered two new reactors to remain off-line pending the
completion of parts replacements.60
Prior to Fukushima, the government expected LNG consumption for power generation to fall
5.5 per cent per year through 2027 as nuclear power and coal replaced LNG in electricity
generation, offsetting an expected 2.7 per cent per year increase in LNG consumption in other
sectors.61 The government’s plans called for nuclear power’s contribution to grow to 59 per
cent of electricity generated in 2030, from 40 reactors totaling 43 GW, accounting for 41 per
cent of installed capacity.62 In October 2013, the South Korean government proposed that
nuclear should account for only 22 to 29 per cent of power generation capacity by 2035.63
“‘The new long-term energy policy is heavily focused on expanding the use of LNG,’ said Jang
Gil Soo, a special adviser for Korea Electric Power Corp.”64 As with Japan, the outlook for
LNG demand in South Korea is highly dependent on the future of nuclear power in the
country.
55 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
56 IEA, Natural Gas Information (2013), Table 3A.
57 IEA, Developing a Natural, 55.
58 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Korea.”
59 ibid.
60 ibid.
61 Charles Lee, “S Korea’s LNG Demand to fall 1.5% to 38.29 mil mt by 2027: energy ministry,” Platts, April 20, 2013,
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/seoul/s-koreas-lng-demand-to-fall-15-to-3829-mil-mt-27927622.
62 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Korea.”
63 Jacob Adelman and James Paton, “Gas Buyers Poised to Commit on South Korea Atomic Shift,” Bloomberg,
October 16, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-15/gas-buyers-poised-to-commit-on-south-korea-
atomic-shift.html.
64 ibid.
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Also, like Japan, South Korea is increasingly dependent on LNG supplies from the Middle
East, as supplies from other regions have remained stable or declined; in 2012, 47 per cent of
South Korea’s imports were from the Middle East.65 South Korea does not share Japan’s
historical sensitivities regarding its dependence on imported energy, but it does seek energy
security through supply diversity. In 2012, Qatar met almost 29 per cent of South Korea’s LNG
demand, while the rest of the Middle East and Africa supplied another 28 per cent (Figure
A1.7).66 KOGAS has equity interests in seven LNG export projects around the world: Oman
LNG; Yemen LNG; Qatar LNG; GLNG and Prelude in Australia; DSLNG in Indonesia; and
LNG Canada.67 KOGAS’s foreign investments are part of a corporate growth strategy, but
more importantly they represent South Korea’s desire to secure resources for the home market.
FIGURE A1.7:  SOUTH KOREA’S LNG IMPORTS BY SUPPLY COUNTRY AND REGIONS (2010 – 2012)
Note: Africa includes Algeria, Brunei, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria. “Other Middle East” includes the United 
Arab Emirates and Yemen. “Other” includes Belgium, Peru, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States.
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en. 
South Korea is one of the fastest-growing OECD countries, supported by manufacturing, which
is fairly energy intensive.68 Consumption of natural gas increased 45 per cent between 2009
and 2012, driven in part by economic growth and policies that keep electricity prices low.69
PFC Energy expects current growth in natural gas consumption to moderate due to market
maturation, lower growth in demand from the power sector, demographics, and improved
energy efficiencies.70 It should be noted that PFC has not assumed that South Korea’s nuclear
power expansion plans will be curtailed, which would create additional LNG demand in the
longer term.
65 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
66 ibid.
67 KOGAS website, “LNG Projects,” http://www.kogas.or.kr/en/what/production/lng.action; and LNG Canada website,
“LNG Canada,” http://lngcanada.ca/lng-canada/.
68 IEA, World Energy Outlook.
69 IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics”; and IEA, World Energy Outlook, 266.
70 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
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The EIA, in its South Korea country analysis, notes that the South Korean government expects
natural gas demand to grow at 1.7 per cent per year through 2035.71 Current contracts in force
mean that the gap between supply and forecast demand does not open up until 2025, at 26.5
BCM or 19.5 MMT (Figure A1.8). The expiry of current long-term contracts will continue,
with a gap of 56.6 BCM (41 MMT) in 2035.
FIGURE A1.8:  SOUTH KOREA’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: Production, imports and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA 
Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en.
The EIA country analysis for South Korea notes that domestic production will continue until 2018. An annual 
growth rate of 1.7 per cent for natural gas demand was used (EIA website, “Korea, South,” 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=KS). Contract volumes from Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) 
LNG contract database. Contracts defined as preliminary are with projects where no final investment decision 
has been made for the supplier.
A1.4 TAIWAN
In many respects, Taiwan is similar to Japan and South Korea, albeit on a much smaller scale.
With a population of 23 million, compared to 126 million in Japan and 50 million in South
Korea, Taiwan’s economy is smaller and its demand for energy is commensurately less.
Taiwan’s state-owned company, CPC Corp., first imported LNG in 1990.72 Since then,
Taiwan’s LNG imports have grown an average of 17 per cent per year (Figure A1.9).
Consumption has grown on average at 12 per cent per year,73 driven by the power sector.74
71 EIA website, “Korea, South.”
72 CPC Corp. website, “Downstream Operations,” http://en.cpc.com.tw/global_content.aspx?ID=2.
73 IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics.”
74 The power sector’s share of natural gas demand has risen from 18 per cent in 1990 to 79 per cent in 2011. Authors’
calculations from: IEA, Natural Gas Information.
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FIGURE A1.9:  TAIWAN’S LNG IMPORTS BY SOURCE COUNTRY AND REGION
Note: Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria. “Other Middle East” includes Oman, the United 
Arab Emirates and Yemen. “Other” includes Norway, Peru, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and “non-specified/other.”
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en. 
Following a similar path as Japan and South Korea, Taiwan had plans to increase its nuclear
power generation in preference to additional fossil fuel power plants.75 However, in the
aftermath of the Fukushima incident, nuclear power has emerged as a contentious issue. Active
seismic faults run across the island, and some argue that Taiwan is unsuited for nuclear plants.
Protesters have demonstrated for an immediate halt to the use of nuclear power in Taiwan.76
The public’s faith in the safety of nuclear power was shaken after leaks were found in pools of
used nuclear fuel at an operating plant.77 As noted in a report from Bloomberg, “President Ma
Ying-jeou has said that atomic energy will be abandoned as soon as economically and
environmentally viable alternatives are found.”78
However, given the low cost of nuclear power (US$0.019/kWh in 2008), it is unlikely that
existing nuclear plants will be shut down before the end of their 40-year operating lives in the
absence of a significant incident.79 In the absence of a change in energy policy, Taiwan’s LNG
demand can be expected to continue to grow steadily. Taiwan will remain an attractive target
market for LNG sellers, but as a buyer of relatively small incremental quantities it is unlikely
to play a major role in the launch of new projects.
75 Taiwan has six reactors currently operating, with two additional reactors under construction. World Nuclear
Association website, “Nuclear Power in Taiwan,” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-
Profiles/Others/Nuclear-Power-in-Taiwan/.
76 Lee I-chia, “More than 100,000 protest over nuclear power plants,” Taipei Times, March 9, 2014,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/03/09/2003585210.
77 Faith Hung, “Taiwan says nuclear plant may have leaked toxic water,” Reuters, August 9, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/09/us-taiwan-nuclear-idUSBRE97803Y20130809.
78 Adelman and Paton, “Gas Buyers”
79 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Taiwan.”
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Taiwan’s sole importer, CPC, has long-term contracts in place with Australia, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Qatar, totaling 15.04 MMTPA.80 Additional contracts with Australia, Papua New
Guinea and the United States will begin in 2017, 2015 and 2016, respectively. In 2012 Qatar
met over 47 per cent of Taiwan’s LNG demand, while Malaysia contributed almost 22 per cent
and Indonesia almost 15 per cent.81
FIGURE A1.10:  TAIWAN’S LNG IMPORTS BY SUPPLY COUNTRY AND REGION (2010 – 2012)
Note: Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria. “Other Middle East” includes Oman, the United 
Arab Emirates and Yemen. “Other” includes Norway, Peru, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and “non-specified/other.”
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi:
10.1787/data-00555-en. 
PFC Energy expects LNG demand to grow to meet increasing electricity demand and to offset
declining nuclear power output as plants are taken off-line at the end of their 40-year operating
lives.82 This would leave only Taiwan’s newest nuclear plant, scheduled to start up in 2014, in
operation in 2030. PFC Energy forecasts Taiwan’s demand for natural gas to reach 20 MMT
(27.2 BCM) by 2030, equivalent to a compound annual growth rate of 2.7 per cent. The lack of
official forecast from the IEA or the EIA for Taiwan’s natural gas demand makes determining a
supply-demand balance somewhat difficult. We use a slightly more conservative forecast of
two per cent per year demand growth in Figure A1.11.
Taiwan has secured at least 13 MMTPA of LNG from 2015 to 2030, providing the market with
a base supply until contracts begin expiring in 2033.83 Taiwan will need to turn to the spot
market, as it has in the past, for a large share of LNG, or sign new long-term contracts (Figure
A1.11). In 2020, the gap between contracted supply and demand will reach 6 MMTPA, by
2025 it will reach 8 MMTPA, and by 2030 it will grow to 11 MMTPA. Long-term agreements
with Indonesia and Qatar may be extended, but this would still leave Taiwan with a sizable
supply-demand gap that would need to be met.84
80 Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG Contract Database.
81 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
82 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
83 Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG Contract Database.
84 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
102
Other 
Africa 
Other Middle 
East 
Australia 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Qatar 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
2010 2011 2012 
M
ill
io
n
 T
o
n
n
es
 
FIGURE A1.11:  TAIWAN’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: Production, imports and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA 
Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. Production assumed to 
continue at 2012 volumes. An annual growth rate of two per cent for natural gas demand was used. Contract 
volumes from Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG contract database. Contracts defined as preliminary are 
with projects where no final investment decision has been made for the supplier.
A2 Non-traditional LNG Buyers: China and India
A2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-TRADITIONAL LNG BUYERS
Globally, the centre of natural gas demand has been shifting from developed economies toward
developing, or emerging economies. This is also true of the Asia-Pacific region. China and
India, and other recent entrants to the LNG market, are often referred to as “non-traditional” or
“emerging” LNG markets. These are typically less-developed economies with low gas-market
penetration, less affluent, more price-sensitive consumers, and a short and untested history of
importing LNG. The presence of greater domestic production and regulation of internal gas
prices, combined with the potential for overland pipeline imports, make China and India very
different buyers.85 LNG suppliers and financiers view the commercial risk profile of non-
traditional buyers to be greater, but recognize that continued growth of the industry is
dependent on these buyers.
However, the rapid economic development in non-traditional markets, particularly in China, is
blurring the distinction between traditional and non-traditional LNG buyers. China, by virtue of
its size, high economic growth rate, and virtually insatiable demand for energy to feed its
economic growth, stands apart from other non-traditional LNG buyers. India, already an
important buyer of LNG, has struggled to deal with recent unexpected domestic production
declines resulting in increased reliance on LNG, as well as the inherently high cost of LNG.86
85 For details on price regulation, see: Stern, The Pricing, Chapters 9 and 10.
86 EIA website, “Country Analysis – India,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IN.
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A2.2 CHINA
The dominance of the Japanese-South Korean-Taiwanese troika in the Asia-Pacific LNG
market started to erode when China entered the LNG market with the signing of its first LNG
contract for 3.7 MMTPA with Australia’s North West Shelf (NWS) LNG Project.87 China
subsequently signed a contract with the Tangguh LNG Project in Indonesia for 2.6 MMTPA.
China did not import any natural gas until 2006, when it imported 1.0 MMT of LNG into its
Guangdong-Dapeng import terminal under its contract with Australia’s NWS (Figure A2.1). In
only six years, China’s LNG imports have grown to just over 14 MMTPA (almost 20 BCM per
year).  
FIGURE A2.1:  CHINA’S LNG IMPORTS BY SOURCE COUNTRY
Note: “Other” includes Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Oman, Peru, the United States, and “non-specified/other.”
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en. 
China has six receiving terminals with a combined capacity of about 24 MMTPA.88 In addition,
China has six new terminals under construction, with a combined import capacity of 17.5
MMTPA, that will become operational by the end of 2017.89 Planned expansions of existing
terminals and terminals under construction will add about 30 MMTPA of capacity. Three state-
controlled companies have been charged with constructing import terminals and importing
LNG: China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC); PetroChina Company Ltd. (PetroChina),
the listed arm of state-owned China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC); and Sinopec Ltd.
(Sinopec), the listed arm of China Petroleum and Chemical Corp.90
87 Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG Contract Database.
88 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2013 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2013); Bloomberg, “China’s Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals,”
August 16, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-16/china-s-liquefied-natural-gas-terminals-table-.html;
Song Yen Ling, “China’s CNOOC receives first LNG cargo at Tianjin FSRU,” Platts, November 26, 2013,
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/singapore/chinas-cnooc-receives-first-lng-cargo-at-tianjin-27666510.
89 For sources, see: Appendix F.
90 Petroleum Economist, World LNG Factbook (London: Euromoney, 2013).
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When China opened to foreign investment in the oil and gas industry, CNOOC was
incorporated and given overall responsibility for the exploitation of China’s offshore resources
in co-operation with foreign partners.91 When China decided to start importing LNG, the
government turned to CNOOC, with its experience with foreign joint ventures, to lead China
into this unfamiliar area of international trade. As a consequence, CNOOC was the first to
construct an import terminal in China, in a joint venture with a foreign partner, and continues
to lead China in the construction of new terminals and in the purchase of LNG.92
FIGURE A2.2:  CHINA’S LNG IMPORT TERMINAL CAPACITY BY OPERATOR
Source: Petroleum Economist, World LNG Factbook (London: Euromoney, 2013).
China features certain characteristics that make it unique among Asia-Pacific LNG buyers:
• With a population of 1.3 billion, and high economic growth rates,93 China’s potential
demand for energy, and LNG, dwarfs that of other LNG buyers in the Asia-Pacific region.
• China has significant, indigenous natural gas resources. China has conventional gas
resources, coal-bed methane (CBM) and, potentially, the largest resources of shale gas in
the world.94
• As China’s gas market is based on domestic pipeline gas, rather than on rich LNG, China
has no need for LNG with high heating values.95 China is, therefore, a prime target market
for LNG exported from North America and Australia.
• China has significant gas-on-gas competition. Within the Asia-Pacific region, only China
has the potential to import significant new supplies of natural gas via pipelines from
multiple suppliers.96 China can use its gas supply options as negotiating leverage with
pipeline gas and LNG sellers.
91 CNOOC website, “Our History,” http://en.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/english/channel_114.html.
92 EIA website, “China,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch.
93 CIA World Factbook, “China,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.
94 EIA website, “China.”
95 For a discussion of natural gas characteristics, see: Appendix B; Table B1 reports calorific values for produced,
imported and consumed gas for each country.
96 EIA website, “China.”
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• China has three large state-owned oil and gas companies, each of which can buy
foundation-buyer quantities of LNG.97 This gives China significant negotiating leverage
with sellers.
• While notionally independent and in commercial competition with each other, CNOOC,
Petrochina, and Sinopec each operate within the sphere of government direction, control
and support.
• China can buy LNG “opportunistically.” While other LNG buyers go to the market when
they have demand for LNG, China’s supply options mean it can buy LNG when it is able to
negotiate favourable commercial terms. 
In 2012, China imported LNG from nine countries, which contributed 50 per cent of China’s
natural gas imports, and met 27 per cent of China’s natural gas demand.98 Qatar supplied 34
per cent of China’s LNG, while 29.7 per cent came from Southeast Asia, and over 25 per cent
came from Australia.99
FIGURE A2.3:  CHINA’S LNG IMPORTS BY SUPPLY COUNTRY (2010 – 2012)
Note: Africa and Middle East includes Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Yemen. “Other” includes Peru and the United States.
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en. 
Fortuitously, or perhaps by design, China entered the LNG market during a “buyer’s market” in
the early 2000s.100 China was also able to achieve other state goals, including technology transfer
in the construction and operation of import terminals and LNG ships, mandates to use Chinese-
built LNG ships, and significant equity participation in upstream projects. As a legacy of securing
very low prices in its first two LNG contracts, the average price China paid for LNG has been
substantially lower than prices in Japan.101 It remains to be seen whether past success and the
significant negotiating leverage wielded by “China Inc.” will allow CNOOC, PetroChina and
Sinopec to continue to secure LNG supplies on “better-than-market” commercial terms.
97 Based on Bloomberg’s LNG Contract Database, the three SOEs currently hold the only long-term contracts for
delivery to China.
98 IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports.”
99 ibid.
100 Andy Flower and June Liao, “LNG Pricing in Asia,” in The Pricing ed. Stern, Chapter 11.
101 ibid.
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China’s natural gas resources are mostly onshore, but distant from large population and
industrial centres on the East Coast. LNG imports primarily serve the developed provinces
along the coast, from Guangdong in the south to Liaoning in the north. China has historically
been a net exporter of natural gas, though in 2007, domestic consumption exceeded production
for the first time.102
In 2012 China produced 107.2 BCM of natural gas (a 55 per cent increase from 2007), and
imported 38.4 BCM, of which 50 per cent was imported through the 1,833-kilometre
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan pipeline or Central Asian Gas Pipeline (CAGP).103
Virtually all of the gas imported through the CAGP pipeline comes from Turkmenistan, making
Turkmenistan China’s largest natural gas supplier. In 2012, China’s natural gas imports from
Turkmenistan were almost three times as much as imports from Qatar in the form of LNG.104
China’s pipeline gas imports are set to increase significantly when additional phases of the
CAGP begin operations, and as the China-Myanmar pipeline ramps up to full capacity.105
China started importing natural gas from Myanmar in 2013 through a 793-kilometre pipeline
with a capacity of 12 BCM per year.106 China’s CNPC has also signed a “framework
agreement” with Russia’s Gazprom for the import of 36.8 BCM per year of natural gas from
Russia through the proposed East Siberia pipeline.107 The deal was recently concluded and is
reported to be a 30-year contract to supply 38 BCM of natural gas per year via pipeline, with
deliveries starting in 2018, and a price of US$353/MCM (US$10/MCF).108
CNOOC, PetroChina and Sinopec have sought participation in LNG projects around the world.
CNOOC leveraged its LNG purchases from Australia’s NWS project and Indonesia’s Tangguh
project to acquire equity interests in those projects.109 CNOOC also leveraged its LNG
purchase from the Queensland Curtis LNG coal-bed methane (CBM) projects to acquire an
equity stake.110 CNOOC is developing at least two Canadian LNG projects through its wholly
owned subsidiaries, Nexen Energy ULC111 and CNOOC Gas and Power Group.112
102 IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics.”
103 Ibid.; and IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports.”
104 ibid.
105 EIA website, “China.”
106 EIA website, “China.”
107 ibid.
108 Yadullah Hussain, “China and Russia’s US$400-billion natural gas deal ‘complicates’ new LNG projects,” National
Post, May 21, 2014.
109 Australia LNG, “CNOOC Equity Agreement,” news release, December 20, 2004,
http://www.nwsalng.com.au/news/2004/CNOOC-EQUITY-AGREEMENT; and CNOOC, “CNOOC Limited
Acquires Additional Equity Interest in the Tangguh LNG Project,” news release, February 2, 2004,
http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/newszx/news/2004/793.shtml.
110 CNOOC, “CNOOC and BG Group Sign Agreements for New LNG Supply and Purchase of QCLNG Stake,” news
release, May 6, 2013, http://en.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/news/2013-05-06/english/338442.html.
111 Brent Jang, “CNOOC heads group seeking to export B.C. liquefied natural gas,” The Globe and Mail, November 29,
2013.
112 Jeff Lewis, “CNOOC subsidiary to partner with U.K. firm on Prince Rupert LNG Terminal,” National Post, April 23,
2014.
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Similarly, Sinopec leveraged its LNG purchase from Australia Pacific LNG (APLNG), a CBM-
to-LNG project.113 Sinopec also recently joined Petronas with a stake in the Pacific Northwest
LNG project in Canada.114 PetroChina is a partner with Shell in Arrow LNG, another
Australian CBM joint-venture project.115 PetroChina is also a participant in the LNG Canada
joint venture with Shell, KOGAS and Mitsubishi.116
Natural gas is consumed in almost every sector in China. Economic growth has driven energy
demand: natural gas consumption has increased 3,693 per cent since 1971, and 745 per cent
since 1993.117 Despite these immense increases, natural gas still contributes less than five per
cent of China’s primary energy consumption.118 The power sector has only recently become a
major component of natural gas demand, but new gas-fired power plants are the anchor
customers for imported LNG.119
Despite growing domestic production of natural gas and increasing pipeline gas imports, PFC
Energy expects that China will become one of the world’s largest LNG markets. PFC indicates
that China’s LNG demand could grow to 50 MMTPA (68 BCM) by 2020.120 The EIA predicts
that China’s natural gas demand will increase at four per cent per year, reaching 220.7 BCM in
2020. The IEA forecast is a little more optimistic, predicting natural gas demand to grow at six
per cent per year under the New Policies Scenario, reaching 307 BCM in 2020.121
Figure A2.4 shows China’s projected supply-demand balance to 2035. Existing LNG contracts
will provide China with 47.8 MMT (65 BCM) of LNG in 2020.122 PFC Energy projects a natural
gas supply-demand gap of 15 BCM in 2020, which will be met by LNG and/or pipeline
imports.123 However, pipeline capacity into China in 2020 is projected to be 139.5 BCM, with the
completion of the Central Asian Gas Pipeline’s Line C and Line D,124 and the addition of the
Russia-China pipeline.125 With these pipeline capacity additions and currently existing contract
volumes, supply to China is greater than demand until 2030. However, if supply contracts for
pipeline gas are less than capacity, there is potential for a supply-demand gap after 2020.
113 ConocoPhillips, “Australia Pacific LNG & Sinopec Sign Binding Agreements for LNG Supply & 15% Equity
Interest,” news release, April 21, 2011, http://www.conocophillips.com.cn/EN/newsroom/news-
releases/Pages/Articles/australia-pacific-lng-sinopec-sign-binding-agreements-for-lng-supply-15-percent-equity-
interest.aspx.
114 Brent Jang, “China’s Sinopec to become fourth partner in B.C. LNG project,” The Globe and Mail, April 29, 2014.
115 James Paton and Aibing Guo, “PetroChina Looks to Add to $3.7 Billion in Australian Deals,” March 10, 2013,
Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-10/petrochina-looks-to-add-to-3-7-billion-in-australian-
deals.html.
116 LNG Canada website, “The Companies Behind LNG Canada,” http://lngcanada.ca/the-project/the-companies-behind-
lng-canada/.
117 IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics.” 
118 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
119 EIA website, “China.”
120 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
121 IEA, World Energy Outlook.
122 Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG Contract Database.
123 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
124 EIA website, “China.”
125 Hussain, “China and Russia’s.”
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FIGURE A2.4:  CHINA’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: Production, imports and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA 
Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. Production and consumption 
forecasts from IEA, World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2013). Natural gas exports assumed to continue at 
2012 volumes. Contract volumes from Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG contract database. Pipeline 
capacity from EIA website, “China,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch.
A2.2 INDIA
India has the 10th-largest economy in the world126 and is the third-largest energy consumer
after the U.S. and China, and ahead of Russia.127 India’s economy has grown (on average) 12.7
per cent per year between 2000 and 2011, while primary energy consumption has grown about
4.4 per cent per year.128 Natural gas consumption grew 117 per cent between 2000 and 2011, an
average of seven per cent per year.129 In 2011, the natural gas share of primary energy demand
was only seven per cent, and only five per cent of total final consumption.130 The country was
self-sufficient in natural gas until 2003, when it began to import LNG from Qatar. LNG has
become steadily more important in supporting domestic consumption, increasing from a share
of one per cent in 2003 to 30 per cent of consumption in 2012.131
126 Based on 2011 and 2012 GDP, in current U.S. dollars. World Bank, “GDP (current US$),”
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
127 Based on 2011 energy use (KT of oil equivalent). World Bank, “Energy use (kt of oil equivalent),”
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.COMM.KT.OE/countries.
128 Authors’ calculations, from: World Bank, ““GDP”; and World Bank, “Energy use.”
129 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics.” 
130 IEA, World Energy Outlook, Appendix A, 624.
131 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics”;  and IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
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FIGURE A2.5:  INDIA’S LNG IMPORTS BY SOURCE COUNTRY
Note: “Other” includes Australia, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Norway, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, the 
United Arab Emirates, the United States and “non-specified/other.”
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en. 
The focus of India’s energy policy is securing energy sources to meet the needs of its growing
economy.132 Inconsistent energy-sector reform combined with domestic fuel subsidies and
import dependency compromise the ability of the government to secure supplies; however, the
government has announced a plan to make India energy independent by 2030.133 India is a
price-sensitive buyer of LNG, which cannot compete in price-controlled sectors of India’s
natural gas economy. Price reforms are underway, which, if implemented, could allow for
greater penetration of natural gas into sectors other than power generation.134
India’s path to LNG imports has been long and tortuous — a cautionary tale for LNG sellers. The
country’s first LNG import terminal was to be constructed by Enron in the early 2000s to supply
fuel to the second phase of the Dabhol power plant project.135 The project was shut down until
July 2005, at which time it was taken over by Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Ltd.136 The first-
phase power plant restarted operations in May 2006, after a hiatus of over five years, but was
shut down two months later due to a lack of naphtha.137 The Dabhol import terminal (rechristened
Ratnagiri) received its first cargo in January 2013.138 Ratnagiri now supplies the largest gas-fired
power plant in the country (1,967 MW) with LNG imported from Nigeria.139
132 EIA website, “India,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=IN 
133 ibid. 
134 ibid.
135 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, “Fact Sheet: Background on Enron’s Dabhol
Power Project,” February 22, 2002, http://finance-mba.com/Dabhol_fact_sheet.pdf.
136 Ratnagiri Gas and Power Pvt. Ltd. website, “Welcome to Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited,”
http://www.rgppl.com/.
137 LNG Journal, “Indian LNG import terminal caught up in Enron collapse heads for February start-up,” October 29,
2012.
138 LNG World News, “Gazprom Delivers Commissioning Cargo to Dabhol LNG Terminal in India,” January 21, 2013,
http://www.lngworldnews.com/gazprom-delivers-commissioning-cargo-to-dabhol-lng-terminal-in-india/.
139 LNG Journal, “Indian LNG.”
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Petronet LNG Ltd. (Petronet) was the first to successfully import LNG into India, and is the
largest importer of LNG in the country.140 India’s government formed Petronet to construct and
operate LNG terminals and import LNG. Four state-controlled companies each own 12.5 per
cent of Petronet: GAIL; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC); Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd. (IOCL); and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL).141 GDF SUEZ, a strategic
partner, owns 10 per cent equity in Petronet, the Asian Development Bank holds 5.2 per cent,
and the balance is publicly traded. Petronet commenced commercial operations at its Dahej
terminal in April 2004. Petronet supplies Dahej through a long-term contract with Qatar’s
RasGas for 7.5 MMTPA, and supplies the new Kochi terminal with a contract for 1.44
MMTPA with the Gorgon project in Australia.142
The Hazira import terminal, owned by Shell (74 per cent) and Total (26 per cent), was
commissioned in April 2005 and started commercial operations in 2006.143 The Hazira LNG
terminal was the first to introduce spot LNG supplies into India.144 India has a total of three
receiving terminals with a combined import capacity of 25 MMTPA.145 Under-construction and
planned or proposed new terminals will add 19.5 MMTPA of capacity, if all are completed.
FIGURE A2.6:  INDIA’S LNG IMPORT TERMINAL CAPACITY BY OPERATOR
Source: GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2013 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2013), http://www.giignl.org/publications/lng-industry-2013 
and Appendix F.
140 Petronet LNG Ltd. website, “Dahej LNG Terminal,” http://www.petronetlng.com/Dahej_LNG_Terminal.aspx.
141 Petronet LNG Ltd. website, “Corporate Presentation,” May 20, 2014, http://www.petronetlng.com/PDF/USD-
Corporate%20Presentation-May-2014-20.pdf.
142 Petronet LNG Ltd. website, “LNG Sources,” http://www.petronetlng.com/lng-source.aspx.
143 Hazira LNG and Port website, “Company History,” http://www.haziralngandport.com/company_history.htm.
144 Hazira LNG and Port website, “Additional Information on Hazira,”
http://www.haziralngandport.com/brief_write_up.htm.
145 See Appendix F for sources.
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India’s primary energy consumption in 2012 was only about one-fifth of China’s.146 On a per-
capita basis, in 2011 India’s energy use was 30 per cent of China’s and 45 per cent of
Brazil’s.147 Growth in natural gas demand will come from a combination of rising energy
consumption and an increase in the share of natural gas in India’s fuel mix. The natural gas
supply scenario in India has improved due to increased domestic gas production and the
importation of LNG. However, a lack of pipeline infrastructure throughout India has limited its
ability to use domestic supplies to meet domestic demand.148
FIGURE A2.7:  INDIA’S NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION (1971 – 2012)
Source: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 
10.1787/data-00482-en.
In 2012 India produced 40.4 BCM of natural gas, compared to its consumption of 56.3 BCM
(Figure A2.7). The gap between consumption and domestic production was met through importing
12.4 MMT of LNG from six countries, of which 80 per cent came from Qatar (Figure A2.8).
146 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
147 World Bank, “Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita),” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE.
148 EIA website, “India.”
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FIGURE A2.8:  INDIA’S LNG IMPORTS BY SUPPLY COUNTRY (2010 – 2012)
Note: “Other” includes Australia, Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia, Norway, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab 
Emirates, the United States and “non-specified/other.”
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00555-en. 
India had 1.241 TCM of proved natural gas reserves at the start of 2013, representing a
reserves/production ratio of 30 years.149 About 30 per cent of these reserves are onshore, while
70 per cent are offshore.150 India’s upstream gas (and oil) sectors are dominated by ONGC and
Oil India Ltd.151 ONGC provides a large amount of India’s natural gas supply through its
operation of the offshore Mumbai High Field.152 The government has encouraged private
Indian companies and foreign companies to enter the upstream sector, and Reliance Industries,
in partnership with BP, has been successful in entering, though there is limited activity from
other major international oil companies.153
In 2002, a number of large gas discoveries were made in the Krishna-Godavari basin off of
India’s eastern coast.154 Much of India’s recent increase in gas production came from the D6
fields in this basin. The D6 fields came online in early 2009, producing about 85 MMCM per
day in March 2009, which increased to almost 169 MMCM/d a year later.155 However,
production fell to about 28.3 MCM/d in mid-2012, contributing to a two-year decline in India’s
domestic gas production. The operator cut the reserves of the major D6 field from 491.5 BCM
in 2006 to 96.2 BCM in 2012, because of the declines, and is considering shutting down the
field.156 Not only would this have a significant impact on India’s gas production, but it also
raises concerns about the reliability of India’s domestic gas supplies. Other potential fields are
currently being explored and developed, but little is known about potential (or proven) reserves.
149 CIA World Factbook, “India,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html.
150 EIA website, “India.”
151 ibid.
152 ibid.
153 ibid.
154 ibid.
155 ibid.
156 ibid.
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Despite prospects for increasing domestic natural gas production, PFC Energy expects that
India will become one of the largest LNG markets.157 PFC suggests imports could be at 30
MMTPA (40.8 BCM) by 2020, and the gap between supply and demand for natural gas is
projected to grow to the equivalent of 55.7 BCM (41 MMTPA) by 2030.158 The IEA predicts
India’s demand for natural gas will be 87 BCM in 2020, and reach 140 BCM by 2030.159 The
EIA’s prediction is more conservative, with natural gas demand reaching 76.4 BCM in 2020
and 96.2 BCM in 2030.160 With a four per cent per year growth in natural gas demand, Figure
A2.9 shows that production and contracted volumes are sufficient to supply demand up to
2025. The gap between supply and demand reaches 12 BCM in 2030 as existing LNG supply
contracts expire. If India’s demand growth slows, the gap will be less severe; however, if gas
production falls, then the gap could open up as early as 2020.
FIGURE A2.9:  INDIA’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: Production, imports, exports and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from IEA, “World – Natural Gas 
statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. An annual 
growth rate of four per cent for natural gas demand was used. Production forecast from IEA, World Energy 
Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2013). LNG contracted volume from Bloomberg LNG Contract Database. Contracts 
defined as preliminary are with projects where no final investment decision has been made for the supplier.
Like their counterparts in China, Indian companies have been pursuing international upstream
and LNG ventures to secure natural resources for the home market. ONGC and Oil India Ltd.
have equity interests in the Mozambique LNG project.161 GAIL has secured LNG under long-
term agreements from Cheniere’s Sabine Pass (3.5 MMTPA) and Dominion Cove Point (2.3
MMTPA) in the U.S., as well as from Gazprom’s Shtokman LNG project (2.5 MMTPA).162
Supplies from these projects are expected to commence between 2018 and 2020.
157 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
158 ibid.
159 IEA, World Energy Outlook.
160 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2013 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 2013).
161 Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., “Mozambique Minister for Mineral Resources promises early LNG deals with
Indian companies,” news release, January 15, 2014,
http://www.ongcindia.com/wps/wcm/connect/ongcindia/home/press_release/mozambique-minister-lngdeals-
indiancompanies.
162 GAIL (India) Ltd. website, “LNG,” http://www.gail.nic.in/final_site/lng.html.
114
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
B
ill
io
n
 C
u
b
ic
 M
et
re
s 
Gap 
Preliminary 
Contracted LNG 
Contracted 
LNG Volume 
Imports 
Production 
Demand 
A3 Emerging LNG Buyers of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam
A3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF EMERGING LNG BUYERS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
The emerging LNG buyers of Southeast Asia have just started importing LNG, or are poised to
become LNG buyers in the next decade. A characteristic that Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam share is that they have established natural gas markets
and infrastructure based on pipeline gas supplies, but will be forced to import LNG to
supplement or replace pipeline gas supplies as these pipeline gas resources are depleted. As a
group, these six countries consume a substantial quantity of natural gas in their domestic
markets while, at the same time, they are significant exporters of natural gas through pipelines
and as LNG. Collectively, they consumed 141.5 BCM of natural gas in 2012, ranging from
51.2 BCM in Thailand to 3.4 BCM in the Philippines.163
Figure A3.1 shows natural gas supply and demand by country in 2012. The Philippines and
Vietnam rely solely on domestic production to supply their consumption. Thailand supplements
domestic production with pipeline and LNG imports. Singapore supplies demand with pipeline
imports alone. Malaysia and Indonesia are both net exporters, though Malaysia supplements
domestic production with pipeline imports.
FIGURE A3.1:  SOUTHEAST ASIA’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY IN 2012
Source: IEA, “World — Natural Gas imports by origin,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi:
10.1787/data-00555-en; and IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics
(database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en.
163 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
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Southeast Asia is experiencing rapid economic growth, with demand for energy growing at
commensurate rates. Coal and liquid fuels are consumed throughout the region, although
concerns about air quality are driving the region toward increased natural gas consumption. With
growth in demand for natural gas, and an increasing role for LNG imports in meeting the
demand, Southeast Asia will emerge as a significant market for LNG in the next several decades.
In Southeast Asia, pipeline gas supplies are much less expensive than LNG and, with the
exception of Singapore, pipeline gas is the preferred option for meeting natural gas demand,
particularly when pipeline gas is sourced from domestic resources. The inherent uncertainty of
future pipeline gas supplies and resistance to LNG prices, which are much higher than historic
pipeline gas prices, makes it difficult for Southeast Asian LNG buyers to commit to long-term
commitments for substantial LNG imports, with Singapore being the notable exception.
Singapore, a less price-sensitive market, has started importing LNG to supplement and replace
its pipeline gas supplies, to provide energy security, and to help establish Singapore as a
regional natural gas trading hub.
A3.4 INDONESIA
Indonesia is an archipelago of 17,500 islands, of which 6,000 are inhabited.164 It is the most
populous country in Southeast Asia and the fourth most populous country in the world (behind
China, India, and the United States).165 The island of Java is the centre of government, business
and industry, and home to the majority of Indonesia’s 253 million people. 
Indonesia’s oil and gas resources are spread from Aceh province at the western extreme of
Indonesia to Papua province at the eastern end of the archipelago.166 Indonesia has three LNG
export plants: Arun LNG in Aceh province on the island of Sumatra; Bontang LNG in East
Kalimantan on the island of Borneo; and Tangguh LNG in Papua province on the island of
New Guinea. A small, 2-MMTPA export plant is under construction on the island of Sulawesi,
with expected start up in 2014.167
Indonesia is self-sufficient in natural gas resources (Figure A3.2). Natural gas production
offshore Java and onshore Sumatra serves most of the domestic market, while most of the
natural gas produced in the rest of the country is exported as LNG or consumed by industries
co-located with the liquefaction plants (e.g., fertilizer). In 2012, Indonesia produced 76.7 BCM
of natural gas, consumed 39.3 BCM, exported 24.2 BCM as LNG, and exported 15.1 BCM
through pipelines to Singapore and Malaysia.168
164 CIA World Factbook, “Indonesia,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html.
165 CIA World Factbook, “Country Comparison: Population,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html.
166 EIA website, “Indonesia,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ID.
167 Mitsubishi Corp., “Final Investment Decision on Donggi-Senoro LNG Project in Indonesia,” news release, January
24, 2011, http://www.mitsubishicorp.com/jp/en/pr/archive/2011/html/0000011637.html.
168 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports; and IEA, “World – Natural gas statistics.”
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Indonesia had proved natural gas reserves of 3.069 TCM at the start of 2013,169 which
translates to a reserves-to-production ratio of 40 years based on 2012 production reported by
the IEA. Indonesia’s reserves have been steady or slightly increasing for the last 10 years.170
Indonesia’s natural gas production has risen steadily in the past decade, keeping pace with the
growth in domestic consumption and slowly declining LNG exports. While production is
declining in more mature producing fields, new deep-water developments have the potential to
offset this decline.171 The IEA forecasts that Indonesia’s production will continue to increase,
reaching 108 BCM in 2020 and 129 BCM in 2030.172
FIGURE A3.2:  INDONESIA’S NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION (1971 – 2012)
IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en.
However, there is a growing mismatch between the geographic distribution of the country’s gas
reserves and the resources available to serve the largest domestic markets in Java and Sumatra.
As a consequence, Indonesia has been preparing for LNG imports into Java and Sumatra to
meet domestic natural gas demand.173 However, domestic distribution infrastructure is almost
non-existent outside of Java and North Sumatra.174
Indonesia has been an LNG exporter for four decades. However, increasing domestic demand
for natural gas, combined with a decline in natural gas production feeding its liquefaction
plants at Arun and Bontang, have led to speculation that Indonesia might become an importer
of LNG before the end of the decade.175
169 CIA World Factbook, “Indonesia.”
170 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
171 EIA website, “Indonesia.”
172 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013.
173 EIA website, “Indonesia.”
174 ibid.
175 ibid.
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Arun LNG has been gradually mothballing trains since 2000 as the gas feed to the plant
declined. The website for Arun LNG notes that new gas fields will ensure sufficient gas supply
to meet contractual LNG demand until 2015.176 The Arun facility will likely be converted into
an import terminal.177 The Bontang plant (19.6 MMTPA), of the same vintage as Arun, will
eventually share the same fate, or have a significant portion of its LNG output diverted to
domestic markets as contracts, primarily with North Asian buyers, expire.
A floating import terminal was commissioned offshore West Java, Indonesia in mid-2012.178
Indonesia can import LNG, or can ship LNG from its export plants in East Kalimantan and
Papua provinces to West Java. In 2012, 0.7 MMT of LNG was delivered from Bontang to West
Java.179 Indonesia has signed its first import contract with Cheniere Energy in the United
States, with delivery starting in 2018.180
Neither the EIA nor the IEA have official forecasts for natural gas demand growth in
Indonesia. PFC Energy forecasts that Indonesian demand will reach approximately 54 BCM by
2020 and over 68 BCM by 2030, but will remain self-sufficient in natural gas for the
foreseeable future, with a supply-demand gap possibly opening up by 2035.181 Based on IEA
production forecasts, a demand growth rate of six per cent per year is required for demand to
surpass domestic production by 2035. However, it is likely that Indonesia’s LNG exports will
continue to decline as Indonesia’s natural gas production is diverted to domestic markets.
FIGURE A3.3:  INDONESIA’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: Production, imports and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA 
Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. Production forecast from IEA,
World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2013). Contract volumes from Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG 
contract database.
176 PT Arun NGL website, “Our Profile,” http://www.arunlng.co.id/profile.php.
177 Pertamina, “Repositioning Arun LNG Plant – 1st Time in LNG History, From Liquefaction Become Ragasification
Terminal,” presentation by Daniel Purba at LNG 17 conference, April 16, 2013,
http://www.gastechnology.org/Training/Documents/LNG17-proceedings/03_05-Daniel-Purba-Presentation.pdf.
178 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2013.
179 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2012.
180 EIA website, “Indonesia.”
181 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
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A3.3 MALAYSIA
Malaysia consists of two distinct geographic regions: Western, or Peninsular, Malaysia, where
the majority of approximately 28 million Malaysians live, and the states of Sabah and Sarawak
on the island of Borneo in Eastern Malaysia.182 Natural gas production offshore Peninsular
Malaysia serves the domestic market, while most of the natural gas produced in Eastern
Malaysia is exported as LNG.183
In 2012, Malaysia produced 55.6 BCM of natural gas, consumed 36.8 BCM, and exported 31.5
BCM as LNG. Malaysia is self-sufficient in natural gas resources. However, Malaysia
imported 7.4 BCM in 2012 into Peninsular Malaysia via pipeline from fields in Indonesian
territorial waters.184 Malaysia exports a similar quantity of gas from Peninsular Malaysia to
Singapore under two pipeline contracts, each for 118 BCM, that expire in 2017 and 2022,
respectively.185
Malaysia had proved natural gas reserves of 2.35 TCM, with a reserves-to-production ratio of
42 years based on the IEA’s reported 2012 production.186 Malaysia’s reserves have been in
general decline since 2007, after plateauing at about 2.5 TCM for the 10-year period from 1997
to 2006.187 Recent discoveries offshore Sarawak and Sabah are expected to reverse the decline
in reserves.188 Malaysia’s natural gas production has risen steadily in the past decade, keeping
pace with the growth in domestic consumption and increased LNG exports (Figure A3.4).
182 Department of Statistics Malaysia, “Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics,” 2010,
http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/census2010/Taburan_Penduduk_dan_Ciri-
ciri_Asas_Demografi.pdf.
183 EIA website, “Malaysia,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=MY.
184 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
185 EIA website, “Singapore,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SN.
186 CIA World Factbook, “Malaysia,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html.
187 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
188 Florence Tan, “Malaysia’s $30 bln drive reverses oil decline, boosts gas,” Reuters, June 14, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/malaysia-oil-idUSL3N0EM2UQ20130614.
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FIGURE A3.4:  MALAYSIA’S NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION (1971 – 2012)
Source: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, 
doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en.
Malaysia’s gas production is about equally split between the domestic market and LNG
exports, though the share for domestic use has been above sixty per cent since 2006.189
However, there is a growing mismatch between the geographic distribution of the country’s gas
resources, which are concentrated in Eastern Malaysia, and the resources available to serve the
domestic market in Peninsular Malaysia. The power sector accounts for about 74 per cent of
natural gas demand, and demand for power, especially in Peninsular Malaysia, is expected to
continuing growing.190 Gas production offshore Peninsular Malaysia is expected to decline  
after 2015, creating a supply-demand gap in the domestic market.191 As a consequence,
Malaysia has been preparing for LNG imports into Peninsular Malaysia to meet domestic
natural gas demand.192
Malaysia’s first LNG import terminal, a floating storage and regasification unit, with a capacity
of 3.8 MMTPA, became operational in 2013.193 Petronas has access to LNG from several LNG
export projects in which it participates in Malaysia, Egypt and Australia.194
PFC Energy predicts that by 2020 there will be a growing natural gas supply-demand gap in
Peninsular Malaysia, and that the gap is expected to grow to the equivalent of 8 MMTPA in
2025 and 11 MMTPA by 2030.195 Figure A3.5 shows two scenarios for Malaysia, both with
two per cent per year increases in natural gas demand. In Panel A, expiry of export contracts
for pipeline gas and LNG increase the availability of domestically produced gas for domestic
consumption. Only the elimination of all imported pipeline gas would create a gap between
supply and demand. In Panel B, the assumption is that the availability of domestically
produced gas stays constant at 2012 volumes, as do pipeline imports. In this case, a gap opens
up between contracted volumes and demand in 2020.
189 IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics.”
190 EIA website, “Malaysia.”
191 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
192 EIA website, “Malaysia.”
193 GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2013.
194 Petronas website, “LNG,” http://www.petronas.com.my/our-business/gas-power/lng/Pages/default.aspx.
195 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
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FIGURE A3.5:  MALAYSIA’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
PANEL A PANEL B
Notes: Production, imports, exports and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from IEA, “World – Natural Gas 
statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. An annual 
growth rate of two per cent for natural gas demand was used. Production is assumed to continue at 2012 
levels. Pipeline imports are assumed to continue at 2012 volumes. LNG contracted volume from Bloomberg LNG
Contract Database. Panel A shows the supply-demand balance when domestically available production increases
due to expiry of pipeline and LNG export contracts. Panel B shows the supply-demand balance assuming that 
pipeline and LNG exports stay at 2012 levels, decreasing production available for domestic use. 
A3.6 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands.196 The island of Luzon is the most populous
and is the centre of government. The Philippines is the 12th most populous country in the
world, and the second most populous in Southeast Asia,197 with a per capita GDP of $4,700.198
The country’s sole source of natural gas is the offshore Malampaya field,199 which produces
about 3.8 BCM of natural gas per year.200 Production from the field started in 2001. The field is
owned by Shell, Chevron, and the Philippines National Oil Corporation (PNOC).201 Gas is
transported from Malampaya to Southern Luzon through a 505-kilometre subsea pipeline.202
196 CIA World Factbook, “Philippines,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html.
197 CIA World Factbook, “Country Comparison: Population.” 
198 CIA World Factbook, “Philippines.”
199 Republic of the Philippines Department of Energy website, “Natural Gas,” https://www.doe.gov.ph/fossil-
fuels/natural-gas.
200 IEA, “World – Natural gas statistics.”
201 Shell website, “Malampaya,” http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/major-projects-2/malampaya.html.
202 Chevron website, “Philippines Business Portfolio,” http://www.chevron.com/countries/philippines/businessportfolio/.
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Gas from Malampaya supplies three combined-cycle, gas-fired power plants with a combined
generating capacity of 2,700 MW.203 The three plants were constructed to monetize the
Malampaya discovery,204 and provide 40 to 45 per cent of Luzon’s power generation
requirements.205 Prior to the development of the Malampaya field, small amounts of gas were
produced from the Cagayan Valley in Northern Luzon.206
FIGURE A3.6:  PHILIPPINES’ NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION (1990 – 2012)
Source: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, 
doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en.
Exploration has thus far been unsuccessful in extending the Philippines’ commercial-gas
resource base beyond the Malampaya area.207 The government is attempting to expand the use
of natural gas in the power, industrial and transport sectors,208 but due to a lack of domestic gas
resources, and no current infrastructure for LNG imports, attempts to expand gas penetration
have failed. 
PFC Energy estimates that Malampaya’s gas production, and gas supply to the Luzon power
plants, will be maintained at current levels through 2020, and additional gas resources will be
required to maintain this level of output beyond 2020.209 The initial reserve estimate for the
Malampaya field was 76.4 BCM,210 of which 36.5 BCM has been produced.211 At 2012 production
levels, the reserves-to-production ratio is 10 years, slightly longer than the PFC estimate.
203 ibid.
204 Republic of the Philippines Department of Energy, “Natural Gas.”
205 Malampaya website, “Power from the Deep,” http://malampaya.com/.
206 Guillermo R. Balce and Eric F. Pablico, Report on Philippine Natural Gas Resources: Maximizing Their Potential
(Taguig, Phillippines: Republic of the Philippines Department of Energy, 1998), https://www.doe.gov.ph/fossil-
fuels/natural-gas/356-reports-natgas-01.
207 Republic of the Philippines Department of Energy website, “Oil & Gas,” https://www.doe.gov.ph/fossil-fuels/oil-gas.
208 Republic of the Philippines Department of Energy website, “Downstream Natural Gas Sector Plans & Programs,”
https://www.doe.gov.ph/microsites/ngmd%20website/gas_plans_programs.html.
209 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
210 Malampaya website, “Overview of Malampaya,” http://malampaya.com/about/.
211 Authors’ calculations, based on initial reserve estimates and production (2001 to 2012) from: IEA, “World – Natural
gas statistics.” 
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Current natural gas reserves in the Philippines were at 98.5 BCM in 2013 and, based on 2012
production, the reserves-to-production ratio is 25 years.212 However, this relies on current
demand remaining constant, an unlikely occurrence, as well as these additional reserves being
developed. The Philippines Department of Energy estimates recoverable discovered and
undiscovered natural gas reserves of 292.9 BCM.213
PFC Energy estimates that the Philippines will develop a natural gas supply-demand gap
equivalent to 2 MMTPA (2.7 BCM) by 2025 and 3 MMTPA (4 BCM) by 2030.214 Based on
demand growth of 1.5 per cent per year from 2012, and constant production at 2012 volumes, a
gap will open immediately (Figure A3.7). If production increases to meet demand, the
Malampaya field will be exhausted in 2022; a greater rate of demand growth will mean
exhaustion occurs sooner. In the absence of additional domestic production, imports (via
pipeline or LNG) will be required to continue providing fuel to installed gas-fired power plants
once production from Malampaya starts to decline. 
FIGURE A3.7:  PHILIPPINES’ NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: Production, imports and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA 
Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. Production is assumed to 
continue at 2012 volumes. An annual growth rate of 1.5 per cent for natural gas demand was used. Reserve 
estimates for Malampaya field are used to forecast production until the field is exhausted. Production from 
exploration assumes that other available reserves are developed.
212 CIA World Factbook, “Philippines.”
213 Republic of the Philippines Department of Energy website, “Oil & Gas.”
214 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
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A3.2 THAILAND
Thailand was the first country in Southeast Asia to import LNG. Thailand entered the ranks of
LNG buyers in 2011, receiving deliveries from Indonesia, Nigeria, Peru, Qatar, and Russia.215
In 2012, Thailand imported 1.1 MMT of LNG in spot purchases from Yemen, Peru, Qatar,
Nigeria and Trinidad.216 Thailand was unable to agree on the terms for long-term LNG
purchases with an LNG supplier until December 2012, when it executed an agreement with
Qatar.217 Under the terms of the agreement, Qatar will deliver 2 MMTPA to Thailand starting in
2015. 218
In 2012, Thailand consumed 43 BCM of natural gas. Most of the natural gas was supplied by
domestic producing fields in the Gulf of Thailand (31.3 BCM) and pipeline gas imports from
Myanmar (9.7 BCM).219 Only three per cent of the natural gas consumed in 2012 came from
LNG imports. However, if Thailand met all of its natural gas demand through LNG imports
(the equivalent of 31.6 MMTPA) it would be the third-largest LNG importer in the world, just
behind South Korea.220 Thailand anticipates importing increasing volumes of LNG to
supplement and replace depleting domestic gas resources in the Gulf of Thailand and pipeline
gas imports from Myanmar.221
Thailand has one LNG import terminal at Map Ta Phut, with capacity of 5 MMTPA. The Map Ta
Phut terminal is operated by PTTLNG Company Ltd., which was established in 2004 and is
wholly owned by PTT Public Company Ltd., Thailand’s national oil and gas company.222 A
doubling of its capacity and a second terminal are being planned.223 Thailand’s LNG imports can
be expected to grow to a substantial level, but the pace at which Thailand’s LNG demand grows is
highly dependent on how much pipeline gas will be available from the Gulf of Thailand, Myanmar
and future imports that might become available from neighbouring Cambodia.
Domestic natural gas production has risen steadily in the past decade, although not enough to
keep up with the growth in domestic consumption (Figure A3.4). Thailand had proved natural
gas reserves of 284.9 BCM at the start of 2013,224 but these reserves have been in decline the
last few years.225 Thailand’s reserves-to-production ratio is nine years based on production
volumes from 2012. Domestic production is expected to peak in 2017 and will be depleted by
2030 if there are no reserve additions.226
215 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.”
216 Petroleum Economist, World LNG.
217 Qatargas, “Qatargas 3 signs long-term agreement with PTT of Thailand,” press release, December 12, 2012,
http://www.qatargas.com/English/MediaCenter/PressReleases/2012/Pages/12DecSPAwithPTT-PR.aspx.
218 Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG Contract Database.
219 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports”; and IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics.” 
220 Authors’ calculations, based on: IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports”; and IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics.”
221 EIA website, “Thailand,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TH.
222 PTT LNG website, “Welcome,” http://www.pttlng.com/en/Default.aspx.
223 PTT LNG website, “Company Information” http://www.pttlng.com/en/pj_composition.aspx.
224 CIA World Factbook, “Thailand,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html.
225 EIA website, “Thailand,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TH.
226 ibid.
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FIGURE A3.8:  THAILAND’S NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION (1970 – 2012)
IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. 
The power sector accounts for about 60 per cent of natural gas demand in Thailand, although
this share has declined since 2000 as other sectors have increased their use of natural gas.227
Gas-fired facilities supplied 71 per cent of Thailand’s domestic electricity supply in 2011, and
coal- and lignite-fueled plants supplied a 21 per cent share.228 The government’s power-
development plan aims to diversify the fuel mix by building nuclear power plants and more
renewable power plants.229
However, post-Fukushima, construction of nuclear plants seems unlikely, as the first proposed
nuclear facility was scaled back in size and has been delayed until at least 2026.230 Even with
optimistic projections for nuclear and renewables, the government projects that natural gas
demand will increase 1.5 per cent per year to 72.3 BCM per year by 2022.231
Thailand is seeking to secure additional gas supplies through increased domestic production
and additional pipeline gas imports. However, the Gulf of Thailand is a very mature producing
region with limited remaining potential. Thailand’s natural gas imports from Myanmar peaked
in 2010 at 10.5 BCM.232 There are two pipelines supplying gas from Myanmar’s Yadana and
Yetagun fields, and PTT Exploration and Production Company Ltd. is producing from an
additional field, but construction for the pipeline link to Thailand is not yet complete.233 The
EIA notes that Myanmar’s own domestic gas needs are increasing, which may affect future
exports to Thailand.234 In addition, China began importing pipeline gas from Myanmar in 2013,
so additional imports from Myanmar are not assured.235
227 ibid.
228 ibid.
229 Thailand Energy Policy and Planning Office, Summary of Thailand Power Development Plan 2012 – 2030
(Bangkok: Thailand Ministry of Energy, June 2012).
230 EIA website, “Thailand.”
231 ibid.
232 IEA, “World – Natural Gas imports.” 
233 PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Ltd., “International,”
http://www.pttep.com/en/ourBusiness_EAndPprojectsDetail.aspx?ContentID=18.
234 EIA, “Thailand.”
235 EIA website, “China.”
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Despite this increase in pipeline gas imports, PFC Energy believes that additional LNG imports
will be required to meet Thailand’s natural gas demand.236 PFC expects that Thailand will need
an additional 11 MMTPA (15 BCM) of natural gas by 2020. We calculate the gap to be 4.3
BCM (3.1 MMT) in 2020, and the gap opens up substantially in 2025 due to the assumed
exhaustion of reserves. 
FIGURE A3.9:  THAILAND’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: Production, imports and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA 
Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. Production is assumed to 
continue at 2012 volumes until reserves are exhausted. Pipeline supplies post-2012 are based on the maximum
imports in 2010. Exploration data come from the EIA’s description of Ubon field (EIA website, “Thailand,” 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TH). An annual growth rate of 1.5 per cent for natural gas demand 
was used. Contract volumes are from Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG contract database. 
A3.5 SINGAPORE
Singapore is a small, prosperous, island city-state located at the southern tip of Peninsular
Malaysia, across the Malacca Strait from the Indonesian island of Sumatra. Singapore has no
oil or gas resources. For its natural gas supply, Singapore is entirely reliant on imported
pipeline gas from Sumatra, Indonesian territorial waters in the Natuna Sea, and Peninsular
Malaysia.237 In 2012, Singapore consumed 9.4 BCM of imported natural gas.238
236 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
237 EIA website, “Singapore,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SN.
238 IEA, “World – Natural gas statistics.”
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FIGURE A3.10:  SINGAPORE’S NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION (1971 – 2012)
Source: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 
10.1787/data-00482-en.
The government of Singapore promotes the use of natural gas through vehicle rebates and
targets for power generation.239 In 2001, the government also set a target to generate 60 per
cent of the country’s electricity from gas-fired power plants by 2012; Singapore met this target
in 2003.240 The share of natural gas in power generation reached 78 per cent in 2011.241
Singapore shifted abruptly from not using natural gas as an electricity source at all in 1990, to
91 per cent of natural gas going to power generation in 2000.242 The share of natural gas going
to power generation has decreased since then, with only 85 per cent of natural gas going to the
power sector in 2011.243 Installed generation capacity was 10.5 gigawatts (GW) in 2012, with
plans to add 3 GW by 2017.244 The additional capacity will be supplied by imported LNG.245
In 2006, the government of Singapore announced its decision to build an LNG import terminal
to diversify its sources of natural gas and meet its rising future demand.246 BG Asia-Pacific Pte
Ltd. was granted an exclusive license to import, regasify and market up to 3.1 MMTPA (4.2
BCM) of LNG into Singapore.247 Singapore LNG, a subsidiary of the Energy Market Authority,
was assigned to develop and operate the terminal.248 Construction of the terminal began in
2010, and the terminal received its first cargo in March 2013, with commercial operations
starting in May 2013.249
239 EIA website, “Singapore.”
240 ibid.
241 ibid.
242 IEA, Natural Gas Information.
243 ibid.
244 EIA website, “Singapore.”
245 ibid.
246 Government of Singapore, Energy Market Authority website, “Liquefied Natural Gas,” http://www.ema.gov.sg/LNG/.
247 EIA website, “Singapore.”
248 ibid.
249 Singapore LNG Corp. website, “Key Milestones,” http://www.slng.com.sg/about-us-key-milestones.html.
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The terminal had an initial capacity of 3.5 MMTPA, increasing to 6 MMTPA with the addition
of a third tank and additional regasification facilities.250 Plans for a fourth tank and additional
regasification facilities were announced in October 2012, which would raise its capacity to 9
MMTPA.251 A second LNG terminal is also being considered.252 Current pipeline contracts with
Malaysia and Indonesia supply up to 9.4 BCM of natural gas per year.253 The first of these will
expire in 2017, with the others continuing until 2021, 2022 and 2023.254
According to PFC Energy, Singapore’s natural gas demand can be met in the near term with its
existing pipeline gas and LNG contracts.255 PFC forecasts that the supply-demand gap will
reach 6 MMTPA by 2025, and 8 MMTPA by 2030. As seen in Figure A3.11, the existing
pipeline and LNG contracts are more than sufficient until 2020; this would be the case even
with two per cent annual demand growth. With the expiry of the pipeline contracts, the supply
gap is 7.2 BCM in 2025. However, if the pipeline contracts with Indonesia are renewed, this
would provide 7 BCM of natural gas supply. Combined with existing LNG contracts, the
supply gap would be relatively minor.
FIGURE A3.11:  SINGAPORE’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: Production, imports and consumption (demand) data for 2012 from IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA 
Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en. Pipeline supplies post-2012 
are based on the contracts described in the EIA’s Singapore country analysis (EIA website, “Singapore,” 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SN). An annual growth rate of one per cent for natural gas demand 
was used. Contract volumes are from Bloomberg POTN (Poten & Partners) LNG contract database. 
250 Government of Singapore, Energy Market Authority website, “Liquefied Natural.”
251 Singapore LNG Corp. website, “Key Milestones.”
252 Chou Hui Hong and Ramsey Al-Rikabi, “Singapore Bids for Role as LNG Hub With Second Terminal,” Bloomberg,
February 25, 2014.
253 EIA website, “Singapore.”
254 ibid.
255 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
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A3.7 VIETNAM
According to the EIA, Vietnam has become an important oil and natural gas producer in
Southeast Asia.256 Increased domestic energy consumption was spurred by Vietnam’s rapid
economic growth and industrialization, as well as expanded export markets.257 The power sector
is the largest gas consumer in Vietnam, accounting for 94 per cent of gas demand in 2011.258
Vietnam produced 9.9 BCM of natural gas in 2012, all of which was consumed domestically.259
Vietnam’s proved natural gas reserves increased threefold in the last 10 years, from 200 BCM
in 2003 to 600 BCM in 2012.260 The CIA World Factbook reports Vietnam’s reserves at 699
BCM at the start of 2013.261 Based on 2012 production, the reserves-to-production ratio is 70
years. However, as shown in Figure A3.12, consumption has recently overshot production, and
as consumption continues to increase, production must as well, reducing the expected lifetime
of current reserves. According to the EIA, the state-owned Vietnam Oil and Gas Corp.
(PetroVietnam) expects a natural gas supply gap of 13.4 BCM per year by 2025.262
FIGURE A3.12:  VIETNAM’S NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION (1980 – 2012)
Source: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 
2013, doi: 10.1787/data-00482-en.
PFC Energy expects domestic gas production to increase until 2020; development of
exploration successes will be required to continue production growth rates beyond this
period.263 Ongoing exploration activities could increase Vietnam’s reserves as offshore areas
have been relatively underexplored.264
256 EIA website, “Vietnam,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=VM.
257 EIA website, “Vietnam.”
258 IEA, Natural Gas Information.
259 IEA, “World — Natural gas statistics.”
260 BP, BP Statistical Review (2013).
261 CIA World Factbook, “Vietnam,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vm.html.
262 EIA website, “Vietnam.”
263 PFC Energy, Global LNG. 
264 EIA website, “Vietnam.”
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Importing LNG to meet growing natural gas demand is an option being considered by
Vietnam’s government.265 Royal Haskoning, a Vietnamese consulting firm, was selected to
complete a site-selection study for an LNG import terminal, comparing four potential sites:
Phu Long Island, Soai Rap, Son My and Vinh Tan.266 PetroVietnam has signed an agreement
with Gazprom to supply the 1-MMTPA Thi Vai facility, which is expected to be operational in
2017.267 In addition, PV Gas is planning to build a second terminal at Son My, with initial
capacity of 1.8 MMTPA in 2020.268 Planned capacity increases are an additional 1.8 MMTPA
by 2020, with total capacity reaching 6 MMTPA in 2023 and 9.6 MMTPA by 2030.269
Whether either terminal is ever constructed will depend to a large extent on the success of
Vietnam’s ongoing exploration and development activities.
PFC Energy finds that prospects for LNG imports into Vietnam are fairly minor before 2025, at
2 to 3 MMTPA, with the potential to increase this amount to 5 to 8 MMTPA by 2030.270
Figure A3.13 shows that the gap opens slightly in 2015, assuming production is slightly below
demand. A gap of 1.8 BCM occurs in 2025 as production levels off.
FIGURE A3.13:  VIETNAM’S NATURAL GAS SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE
Notes: IEA, “World – Natural Gas statistics,” IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics (database), 2013, doi: 
10.1787/data-00482-en. Forecast production volumes from IEA, Southeast Asia Energy Outlook: World Energy 
Outlook Special Report (Washington, D.C.: EIA, September 2013). An annual growth rate of two per cent for 
natural gas demand was used.
265 ibid.
266 Royal Haskoning website, “Vietnam LNG Receiving Terminal,” http://www.royalhaskoning.com.vn/en-
gb/fields/InfrastructureAndPorts/Pages/VietnamLNGReceivingTerminal.aspx.
267 Dao Dang Toan, “Vietnam’s PV Gas inks deal to buy LNG from Gazprom’s Singapore unit,” Platts, March 7, 2014,
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/hanoi/vietnams-pv-gas-inks-deal-to-buy-lng-from-gazproms-27006980.
268 ibid.
269 ibid.
270 PFC Energy, Global LNG.
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APPENDIX B: NATURAL GAS CHARACTERISTICS
This report deals with LNG as a market-changing phenomenon, but it is important to note that
LNG is a way to transport natural gas, and not a product unto itself. The demand for and the
nature of LNG markets are rooted in the demand for natural gas as a fuel or feedstock. In this
capacity, natural gas is used as a fuel for power generation, residential and commercial heating,
and in the form of compressed natural gas (CNG) and LNG for commercial vehicles and light
or passenger vehicles. 
In addition to fuel uses, there are a variety of demands for natural gas in the chemical industry
where it can be reformed and used in compounds from plastics to hydrogen production (for
hydrocracking, hydro-desulfurization, and ammonia) and for syngas (for methanol, and its
derivatives, such as methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), formaldehyde, and acetic acid). 
Natural Gas and Derivatives
Natural gas is a naturally occurring hydrocarbon-gas mixture consisting primarily of methane,
but commonly includes varying amounts of other higher alkanes and even a lesser percentage
of carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and hydrogen sulfide. The natural gas transportation systems —
pipelines and LNG — require that the produced gas be processed to remove water, hydrogen
sulfide, carbon dioxide and other impurities. 
Gas obtained from field wells can range from “dry” to “wet,” depending on the field. Dry
natural gas is primarily methane with only small amounts of heavier hydrocarbons, and thus
lacking condensate or liquid hydrocarbons. Wet gas is natural gas that flows from the well
containing less methane and heavier hydrocarbons. These heavier hydrocarbons are classified
as natural gas liquids (NGLs) and condensate. NGLs include propane, butane, pentane, hexane
and heptane. NGLs do not include methane and ethane, since these hydrocarbons must be
chilled substantially and continuously to become liquefied. The other byproduct of natural gas
production is condensate, a low-density mixture of C5+ hydrocarbon liquids that condense out
of the raw gas if temperature and pressure are reduced to below the hydrocarbon dew-point
temperature of the raw gas. 
Natural Gas Liquids and Condensate
NGLs comprise a portion of the petroleum market that occupies a space between oil and gas
products, with values and market characteristics that are similar but still distinct from these two
commodities. The majority of NGLs are derived from gas production, whether associated with
crude oil production, or solely on its own non-associated gas production.1 Primarily, NGLs
reflect gas characteristics and need special containment to remain in a liquid state. As noted
above, NGLs are ethane (C2), propane (C3), normal butane (NC4), isobutane (IC4) and natural
gasoline (C5+). Generally, when at least 90 per cent of the NGL stream has only one type of
carbon molecule, it is defined as a purity product. Propane and butane, either as purity products
or “in mix,” are also called liquid petroleum gas (LPG) and are usually marketed as LPG. LPG
is also produced by petroleum refineries. 
1 All natural gas contains some NGLs. Sometimes there are enough NGLs to be recovered economically, sometimes
not. Sometimes NGLs must be removed (whether economical or not) for the “residue” natural gas to meet heat-
content and other specifications for the takeaway natural gas pipeline or LNG liquefaction facility.
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As with all products meeting the literal, international definition of natural gas liquids,
condensate consists of “wet” or liquid hydrocarbon molecules suspended in natural gas at
subsurface temperature and pressure. Unlike ethane or LPG, a substantial volume of
condensate naturally precipitates or falls out of the gas stream immediately after exiting the
wellhead, usually into a stabilizer vessel, while the remaining condensate is typically recovered
through NGL processing.
Condensate is a very light form of hydrocarbon that condenses in liquid form at the wellhead
and has a high range of API gravity of 55 degrees or higher. Once it becomes a liquid,
condensate remains a liquid at atmospheric temperatures. It is usually quite low in sulphur and
typically produces a 50 per cent or greater naphtha yield, as well as distillate. 
Importance of The Heating Value of Natural Gas
The heating value of natural gas is the amount of heat generated per unit of gas volume when
the gas is burned. In using natural gas as a fuel, from gas turbines to home heating to internal
combustion engines, the application is designed for a specific heating value of natural gas.
Proper and stable combustion of natural gas requires that the correct heating-value gas be used.
The reason is that, as gas becomes richer (higher heating value), more air per unit volume of
natural gas is required for proper combustion; as the gas gets leaner (lower heating value), less
air per unit of gas is required. Applications that use gas for fuel utilize fixed ratios of air to gas
at the point of combustion, and using the wrong gas will cause poor or even dangerous
combustion of the gas.
Table B1 reports average calorific values of natural gas produced, imported, exported and
consumed by country. Calorific value is another term used to describe energy per volume, or
the heat value. Based on consumption, there is quite a range in gas quality, with a minimum of
32 MJ/m³ (Pakistan) to a maximum of 48 MJ/m³ (Ecuador). The range of heating values across
regions, however, is remarkably similar.
It is important to note however, that a country’s total consumption includes required heating
values that can differ across uses (home heating versus electricity generation, for example).
The average calorific value based on different uses will depend on the share of natural gas
consumed by each source of demand, as well as the required heating value for each use.
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TABLE B1:  AVERAGE GROSS CALORIFIC VALUE OF NATURAL GAS (MJ/M³)
Note: Average for each country calculated for values from 2006 through 2011.
Source: IEA, Natural Gas Information (2013), xxix-xxx.
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World Average 38.24 38.63 38.09 38.65
Asia-Pacific
Australia 40.68 40.00 40.00 39.31
Brunei Darussalam 40.07 40.07 40.07
China, People’s Republic 38.93 38.93 38.93 38.93
Hong Kong (China) 38.00 38.00
Indonesia 40.60 40.60 40.60
Japan 44.51 38.98 39.34
Korea 41.70 41.69 41.90
Malaysia 39.25 39.25 39.25 39.25
Myanmar 39.27 39.27 39.27
New Zealand 37.72 37.72
Philippines 38.36 38.36
Singapore 38.00 38.00
Taiwan 37.26 41.45 41.19
Thailand 36.40 36.40 36.40
Vietnam 38.61 38.61 38.61
Other Asia-Pacific 38.00 38.00 38.00 38.00
Average 39.38 39.07 39.34 39.06
The Americas
Canada 38.39 38.39 38.39 38.43
Argentina 38.95 38.95 38.95 38.95
Bolivia 38.94 38.94 38.94
Brazil 39.43 39.43 39.43
Chile 39.10 39.10 0.00 39.10
Colombia 34.60 34.60 34.60
Cuba 36.96 36.96
Dominican Republic 38.00 38.00
Ecuador 48.44 48.44
Mexico 38.44 38.50 39.25 38.43
Peru 44.92 44.92 44.92
Trinidad and Tobago 38.94 38.94 38.94
Venezuela 44.38 44.38 44.38
United States 38.22 38.15 37.64 38.22
Uruguay 38.00 38.00
Other Non-OECD Americas 38.00 38.00 38.00
Average 39.83 39.09 34.63 39.61
Production Imports Exports Consumption
TABLE B1:  AVERAGE GROSS CALORIFIC VALUE OF NATURAL GAS (MJ/M³) (cont’d)
Note: Average for each country calculated for values from 2006 through 2011.
Source: IEA, Natural Gas Information (2013), xxix-xxx.
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Europe
Albania 38.89 38.89
Austria 38.00 38.02 38.00 38.02
Belarus 38.62 38.62 38.62
Belgium 39.69 39.43 39.69
Bosnia-Herzegovina 37.86 37.86
Bulgaria 36.19 38.04 37.88
Croatia 3.79 37.79 37.78 37.79
Czech Republic 37.63 38.05 38.05 38.04
Denmark 41.61 41.59 41.61 41.61
Estonia 37.85 37.85
Finland 37.89 37.89
France 38.65 40.33 40.30 40.34
Germany 34.22 38.99 38.99 38.08
Greece 49.36 38.71 38.79
Hungary 35.68 38.12 38.56 37.59
Ireland 37.81 39.91 40.11
Italy 38.10 38.10 38.10 38.10
Republic of Macedonia 37.58 37.55
Latvia 37.30 37.30
Lithuania 37.21 37.21
Luxembourg 40.71 40.71
Moldova, Republic 35.79 35.78
Netherlands 33.34 33.34 33.34 33.34
Norway 39.71 39.71 39.71
Poland 29.35 38.08 37.75 35.20
Serbia 36.92 37.38 37.33
Slovak Republic 40.03 38.14 39.11 38.15
Slovenia 39.92 37.86 37.87
Spain 40.18 40.37 40.39 40.34
Sweden 41.86 41.86
Switzerland 38.09 38.09
Portugal 40.55 40.55
Romania 37.03 37.07 36.90
Russian Federation 38.23 38.23 38.23 38.23
United Kingdom 39.86 39.55 39.55 39.75
Ukraine 36.99 38.49 37.26 37.97
Average 36.67 38.45 38.60 38.36
Production Imports Exports Consumption
TABLE B1:  AVERAGE GROSS CALORIFIC VALUE OF NATURAL GAS (MJ/M³) (cont’d)
Note: Average for each country calculated for values from 2006 through 2011.
Source: IEA, Natural Gas Information (2013), xxix-xxx.
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Africa
Algeria 42.00 42.00 42.00
Angola 38.00 38.00
Cameroon 38.00 38.00
Congo 38.00 38.00
Congo, Democratic Republic 38.00 38.00
Cote d'Ivoire 37.28 37.28
Egypt 38.00 38.00 38.00
Gabon 37.70 37.70
Ghana 38.00 38.00
Libya 38.00 38.00 38.00
Morocco 39.17 39.17 39.17
Mozambique 38.00 38.00 38.00
Nigeria 38.00 38.00 38.00
Senegal 33.49 33.49
South Africa 38.00 38.00 38.00
Tanzania, United Republic 38.00 38.00
Tunisia 43.73 39.75 42.60
Other Africa 38.00 38.00 38.00 38.00
Average 38.32 38.58 38.67 38.24
Western Asia 
Armenia 37.70 37.70 37.70
Azerbaijan 38.99 39.02 38.99 38.99
Bahrain 38.00 38.00
Georgia 35.53 39.66 39.61
Iran, Islamic Republic 39.36 39.36 39.36 39.36
Iraq 38.00 38.00
Israel 37.97 38.43 37.95
Jordan 36.82 38.06 38.00
Kuwait 38.00 38.00 38.00
Lebanon 38.90 38.90
Qatar 41.40 41.40 41.40
Oman 38.00 38.00 38.00 38.00
Saudi Arabia 38.00 38.00
Syrian Arab Republic 37.70 37.70 37.70
Turkey 38.30 38.45 38.33 38.48
Yemen 40.60 40.60 40.60
United Arab Emirates 39.00 38.00 39.00 39.00
Average 38.38 38.44 39.17 38.69
Production Imports Exports Consumption
TABLE B1:  AVERAGE GROSS CALORIFIC VALUE OF NATURAL GAS (MJ/M³) (cont’d)
Note: Average for each country calculated for values from 2006 through 2011.
Source: IEA, Natural Gas Information (2013), xxix-xxx.
Table B2 shows the calorific value of gas supplied from various LNG terminals around the
world. Note that even the driest gas, from Alaska, has a calorific value greater than gas from
Canada (shown above in Table B1).
TABLE B2: LNG CALORIFIC VALUE BY TERMINAL
Note: (n): Normal cubic metre: calorific values calculated at 0ºC and 1.01325 bar of atmosphere. (s): standard cubic 
metre: calorific values calculated at 15ºC and 1.01325 bar of atmosphere. See Appendix D for conversion rates.
Source: GIIGNL, The LNG Industry in 2013 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2013), 10.
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Australia - NWS 45.32 47.81
Australia - Darwin 44.39 46.83
Algeria - Skikda 42.3 44.63
Algeria - Bethioua 43.22 45.60
Algeria - Arzew 43.48 45.87
Brunei 44.68 47.14
Egypt - Idku 41.76 44.06
Egypt - Damietta 40.87 43.12
Equatorial Guinea 41.95 44.26
Indonesia - Arun 43.29 45.67
Indonesia - Badak 44.63 47.08
Indonesia - Tangguh 41 43.26
Libya 46.24 48.78
Malaysia 43.67 46.07
Nigeria 43.41 45.80
Norway 42.69 45.04
Oman 43.99 46.41
Peru 42.9 45.26
Qatar 43.43 45.82
Russia - Sakhalin 43.3 45.68
Trinidad and Tobago 41.05 43.31
U.S. - Alaska 39.91 42.11
Yemen 42.29 44.62
Average 43.03 45.40
Origin Gas GCV MJ/m3(n) Gas GCV MJ/m3(s)
Central Asia 
Kazakhstan 40.11 39.02 39.02 42.07
Kyrgyzstan 39.02 39.02 39.02
Tajikistan 38.00 38.00 38.00
Turkmenistan 37.70 37.70 37.70
Uzbekistan 37.89 37.89 37.89 37.89
Average 38.54 38.48 38.20 38.94
South Asia
Bangladesh 38.64 38.64
India 38.54 38.78 38.76
Pakistan 32.31 32.31
Average 36.49 38.78 - 36.57
Production Imports Exports Consumption
APPENDIX C: PROPOSED LNG EXPORT FACILITIES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE
NORTHWEST UNITED STATES
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Kitimat, B.C.
Kitimat, B.C.
Kitsault, B.C.
Woodfibre, B.C.
Kitimat or Prince
Rupert, B.C. (19)
Lelu Island, Port
Edward, B.C.
Coos Bay, Ore.
Astoria, Ore.
Campbell River,
B.C.
Kitimat, B.C.
Kitimat or Prince
Rupert, B.C. (32)
Ridley Island,
Prince Rupert, B.C.
Grassy Point, B.C.
Stewart, B.C.
Grassy Point, B.C.
Vancouver, B.C.
(42)
Douglas
Channel
Energy Project
Kitimat LNG
Terminal
Kitsault
Woodfibre LNG
Triton LNG
Pacific
Northwest LNG
Jordan Cove
LNG
Oregon LNG
Discovery LNG
LNG Canada
Terminal
WCC LNG
Prince Rupert
LNG
Aurora LNG
Stewart Energy
LNG
TBA
Tilbury LNG
Haisla Nation/LNG
Partners (50%), Golar
LNG (25%), Unnamed
Asian Investor (25%) (10)
Apache Canada Ltd.
(50%), Chevron Corp.
(50%) (8)
Kitsault Energy, and a
signed Memorandum of
Understanding “with an
Asian Oil and Gas Major”
(18)
Woodfibre (Pacific Oil &
Gas Group) 
AltaGas Ltd. (50%),
Idemitsu Kosan Co.
(50%) (11)
Petronas (62%), SINOPEC
(15%), Indian Oil Corp.
(10%), Japex (10%),
Petroleum Brunei (3%)
(14)
Versen Inc. (16)
Oregon LNG
Quicksilver Resources
Canada, and a “to be
determined third party”
(15)
Shell Canada Ltd. (40%),
Mitsubishi Corp. (20%),
Korea Gas Corp. (20%),
PetroChina (20%) (9)
Imperial Oil Ltd. (50%),
ExxonMobil Canada
(50%) (12)
BG Group
Nexen (60%), Inpex Corp.
& JGC Corp. (40%) (13)
Canada Stewart Energy
Group Ltd. (34)
Woodside Petroleum (35)
WesPac Midstream-
Vancouver LLC
1.8 (10)
5 (17)
5 (18)
2.1 (23)
2.3 (19)
12 (22)
6 (24)
9.74 (26)
12 (9)
10-15 (12)
14 (20)
24 (39)
5 - 30 (34)
3 (41)
Approved; 20
years
Approved; 20
years
Under review;
25 years
Approved; 25
years
Approved; 25
years
Approved; 25
years
Approved; 25
years
Approved; 25
years
None
Approved; 25
years
Approved; 25
years
Approved; 25
years
Approved; 25
years
Under review;
25 years (33)
None
Under review;
25 years (40)
1.98 (2)
11 (1)
2.53 (7)
2.645 (37)
24.13 (6)
13.63 (36)
11.20 (38)
27.6 (4)
35.23 (3)
25.6 (5)
27.6 (39)
3.5 (41)
2015 (29)
2017 (31)
2017 (18)
2017 (23)
2017 (19)
2018 (22)
2018 (25)
2019 (27)
2019 (30)
2020 (28)
2021-2022
(12)
2021 (21)
2021-2023
(13)
2017 (34)
2016 (41)
Location Asset Name Ownership Capacity
(MTPA)
NEB Export
Application
Status and
Length
NEB Maximum
Annual Export
Allowance
(MTPA)
Expected
Start Date
NEB Export Allowance Sources:
(1) Source: National Energy Board, “Reasons for Decision, KM LNG Operating General
Partnership, GH-1-2011,” October 2011, 33, Appendix II, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/657379/657474/735753/728336/A2F3D2_
-_RfD_GH-1-2011_KM_LNG.pdf?nodeid=728337&vernum=-2.
(2) Source: National Energy Board, “Reasons for Decision, BC LNG Export Co-operative
LLC, GH-003-2011,” February 2012, 20, Appendix II, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/674445/674203/787318/787451/A2L8I2_-
_BC_LNG_Export_Co-operative_LLC-_GH-003-
2011_Reasons_for_Decision.pdf?nodeid=787452&vernum=-2.
(3) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision, File OF-EI-Gas-GL-W156-2013-01
01,” December 16, 2013, 9, Appendix I, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/963926/977286/2392685/Letter_Decision_
WCC_LNG_Ltd._-_A3S0X4.pdf?nodeid=2393161&vernum=-2. Conversion from 47.61
109m3 /y to 35.23MTPA using 1 109m3 = 0.74mt LNG (BP Conversion Factors).
(4) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision, File OF-EI-Gas-GL-L384-2012-01 01,”
February 4, 2013, 12, Appendix I, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/834773/834774/915307/A3F2D6_-
_LNG_Canada_Development_Inc._Application_for_a_Licence_to_Export_Liquefied_Nat
ural_Gas_-
_National_Energy_Board_Reasons_for_Decision.pdf?nodeid=915693&vernum=-2.
(5) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision, File OF-EI-Gas-GL-P756-2013-01 01,”
December 16, 2013, 8, Appendix I, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/963869/977381/2385390/Letter_Decision_
Prince_Rupert_LNG_Exports_Limited_-_A3S0X1.pdf?nodeid=2385281&vernum=-2.
Conversion from 34.60 109m3 /y to 25.6MTPA using 1 109m3 = 0.74mt LNG (BP
Conversion Factors).
(6) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision, File OF-EI-Gas-GL-P757-2013-01 01,”
December 16, 2013, 8, Appendix I, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/971020/971021/2385392/Letter_Decision_
Pacific_NorthWest_LNG_Ltd._-_A3S0X9.pdf?nodeid=2385393&vernum=-2. Conversion
from 32.61 109m3 /y to 24.13MTPA using 1 109m3 = 0.74mt LNG (BP Conversion
Factors).
(7) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision, File OF-EI-Gas-GL-W157-2013-01
01,” December 16, 2013, 7, Appendix I, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/977416/977417/2385283/Letter_Decision_
Woodfibre_LNG_Export_Pte._Ltd._-_A3S0Y4.pdf?nodeid=2385061&vernum=-2.
Conversion from 3.42 109m3 /y to 2.53MTPA using 1 109m3 = 0.74mt LNG (BP
Conversion Factors).
(33) Source: National Energy Board, “Incomplete Application, File OF-EI-Gas-GL-C964-
2014-01 01.”
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(36) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision, File OF-EI-Gas-GL-J705-2013-01 01,”
December 16, 2013, 11, Appendix I, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/977416/977417/2385283/Letter_Decision_
Woodfibre_LNG_Export_Pte._Ltd._-_A3S0Y4.pdf?nodeid=2385061&vernum=-2.
Conversion from 18.43 109m3 /y to 2.53MTPA using 1 109m3 = 0.74mt LNG (BP
Conversion Factors).
(37) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision File OF-EI-Gas_GL-T293-2013-01-01,”
April 16, 2014, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/1057161/1057402/2450590/Letter_Decisio
n_to_Triton_LNG_Limited_Partnership_re_application_dated_29_October_2013_for_a_li
cence_to_export_Liquefied_Natural_Gas_-_A3V9C2.pdf?nodeid=2450792&vernum=-2.
(38) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision, File OF-EI-Gas-GI-O113-2014-01 01,”
May 1, 2014, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/2397958/2397738/2452611/Letter_Decision_-
_Oregon_LNG_Marketing_Company_LLC_-_A3W3R6.pdf?nodeid=2452176&vernum=-2.
(39) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision, File OF-EI-Gas-GL-A777-2013-01 01,”
May 1, 2014, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/2381180/2381500/2452793/Letter_Decisio
n_-_Aurora_LNG_Ltd._-_A3W3R3.pdf?nodeid=2452698&vernum=-2.
(40) Source: National Energy Board website, “LNG Export License Applications,”
http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rthnb/pplctnsbfrthnb/lngxprtlcncpplctns/lngxprtlcncpplctns-eng.html
Ownership Sources:
(8) Source: Kitimat LNG Facility Website, “Ownership,”
http://www.kitimatlngfacility.com/Project/project_ownership.aspx.
(9) Source: Shell, “Shell and partners announce LNG project in Canada,” News Release, May
15, 2012, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/media/news-and-media-
releases/2012/lng-canada-15052012.html.
(10) Source: Gordon Hamilton, “Golar LNG joins Douglas Channel liquefied natural gas
project,” Vancouver Sun, May 30, 2013,
http://www.vancouversun.com/Golar+joins+Douglas+Channel+liquefied+natural+project/
8456519/story.html.
(11) Source: Triton LNG Limited Partnership via National Energy Board, “Application of
Triton LNG Limited Partnership,” October 29, 2013, 3, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/1057161/1057402/1057148/A3Q3C5_-
_Application_for_Licence_to_Export_Natural_Gas.pdf?nodeid=1057149&vernum=-2.
(12) Source: Warren True, “ExxonMobil affiliates plan Canadian LNG export,” Oil and Gas
Journal, July 10, 2013, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/07/exxonmobil-affiliates-plan-
canadian-lng-export.html.
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(13) Source: Bret Jang, “CNOOC heads group seeking to export liquefied natural gas,” The
Globe and Mail, November 29, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/cnooc-heads-group-seeking-to-export-bc-
liquefied-natural-gas/article15687702/.
(14) Source: Canadian Newsire, “Progress Energy Canada and Pacific NorthWest LNG
welcome fourth buyer to British Columbia LNG export project,” April 29, 2014,
http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/1345961/progress-energy-canada-and-pacific-northwest-
lng-welcome-fourth-buyer-to-british-columbia-lng-export-project.
(16) Source: Jordan Cove Energy Project Website, “About Us,”
http://www.jordancoveenergy.com/about.htm.
(35) Source: Bret Jang, “Australia’s Woodside wins B.C. approval for LNG project,” The
Globe and Mail, January 16, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/australias-woodside-wins-bc-approval-for-
lng-project/article16371320/.
Capacity Sources:
(17) Source: Kitimat LNG Facility Website, “Project Description,”
http://www.kitimatlngfacility.com/Project/project_description.aspx.
(18) Source: PRWeb.com, “Kitsault Energy has signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) to partner with an Asian Oil and Gas Major,” Kitsault Energy News Release,
August 19, 2013, http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/8/prweb11039379.htm.
(19) Source: Shaun Thomas, “Floating LNG export terminal proposed for the North Coast,”
The Northern View, October 31, 2013,
http://www.thenorthernview.com/news/230061721.html.
(20) Source: Prince Rupert LNG Website, www.princerupertlng.ca.
(22) Source: Pacific NorthWest LNG, “Summary Sheet,” 2. http://pacificnorthwestlng.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/PNW_fs-Pacific-NorthWest-LNG-Feb-22.pdf.
(23) Source: Woodfibre LNG, “Project Overview,” 2, http://www.woodfibrelngproject.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/LNGProjectOverview.pdf.
(24) Source: Jordan Cove Energy Project Website, “Project Overview,”
http://www.jordancoveenergy.com/project.htm.
(26) Source: Oregon LNG Website, “Terminal,” http://www.oregonlng.com/terminal/.
Calculated capacity: (1.3bcf/d * 365)/48.7 = 9.74MTPA. 
(34) Source: Bret Jang, “Vancouver energy company applies for LNG export license,” The
Globe and Mail, March 5, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/vancouver-energy-company-applies-for-lng-
export-licence/article17337247/. Note: The initial 2017 capacity of 5mtpa is achieved
using a floating liquefaction unit. The possibility of total plant capacity of 30mtpa is
based on a land-based facility to be constructed in the future.
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(41) Source: National Energy Board website, “Application of WesPac Midstream - Vancouver
LLC,” https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/2482343/2482959/2483502/Application_f
or_Licence_to_Export_Natural_Gas_-_A3Y4Q6.pdf?nodeid=2483305&vernum=-2.
Expected Start Date Sources:
(21) Source: AECOM, “Summary of Project Description: Prince Rupert LNG,” 9,
http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/documents/p80042/88546E.pdf.
(25) Source:  ECONorthwest, “Effect of the Jordan Cove Energy Project’s LNG Exports on
United States Balance of Trade 2018 - 2045,” 1,
http://www.jordancoveenergy.com/pdf/Trade_Balance.pdf.
(27) Source: Oregon LNG Website, http://www.oregonlng.com/.
(28) Source: Kitimat City Website, “Major Projects,”
http://www.kitimat.ca/EN/main/business/invest-in-kitimat/major-projects.html.
(29) Source: Invest in Northwest British Columbia Website, “Douglas Channel Energy
Partnership,” http://investnorthwestbc.ca/major-projects-and-investment-
opportunities/map-view/kitimat/douglas-channel-energy-project-2.
(30) Source: Discovery LNG Website, http://www.discoverylng.com/.
(31) Source: The Globe and Mail, “China’s Sinopec in talks to invest in Kitimat LNG project
in B.C.:Source,” November 27, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/sinopec-in-talks-to-invest-in-kitimat-lng-
project-in-bc-source/article15625726/.
Location Sources:
(32) Source: National Energy Board, “Letter Decision, File OF-EI-Gas-GL-W156-2013-01
01,” December 16, 2013, 2, https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90466/94153/552726/963926/977286/2392685/Letter_Decision_
WCC_LNG_Ltd._-_A3S0X4.pdf?nodeid=2393161&vernum=-2.
(42) Source: WesPac Midstream website, “NEB Application to Export LNG from Canada,”
http://wespac.com/business/irvine-ca-june-24-2014-wespac-midstream-vancouver-llc-
wpmv-a-subsidiary-of-wespac-midstream-llc-wespac-has-submitted-an-application.
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APPENDIX D: DEFINITIONS AND GLOSSARY
Definitions
Term Definition
British thermal unit (BTU) A unit of energy equal to about 1,055 joules. It is the amount of 
energy needed to cool or heat 1 lb. of water by one degree Fahrenheit.
Conventional oil and gas Crude oil and natural gas that is produced by a well drilled into
production1 a geologic formation in which the reservoir and fluid 
characteristics permit the oil and natural gas to readily flow to the 
wellbore. That is, geopressure is sufficient for fluid to flow to the 
surface.
Joule (J) The metre-kilogram-second unit of work or energy, equal to the work 
done by a force of one newton when its point of application moves 
through a distance of one metre in the direction of the force; 
equivalent to 107 ergs and one watt-second.
Liquefied LNG is natural gas (predominantly methane) that is converted to 
natural gas (LNG) liquid form via cooling to -162°C.
Liquefied LPG is a flammable mix of hydrocarbon gases, usually containing 
petroleum gas (LPG) primarily propane or butane.
Natural gas liquid (NGL) NGLs comprise the light ends (ethane, propane, butanes) of the 
hydrocarbon family.
Normal cubic metre (NCM) Volume measured at 0°C and a pressure of 760 mmHg, or 1.01325 bar
of atmosphere.
Sales and purchase A long-term (15-30 year) contract between LNG buyers and sellers.
agreement (SPA)
Standard cubic metre (SCM) Volume measured at 15°C and a pressure of 760 mmHg, or 1.01325 
bar of atmosphere.
Unconventional oil An umbrella term for oil and natural gas that is produced by means 
and gas production2 that do not meet the criteria for conventional production. Note: What 
has qualified as “unconventional” at any particular time is a complex 
interactive function of resource characteristics, the available 
exploration and production technologies, the current economic 
environment, and the scale, frequency, and duration of production 
from the resource. Perceptions of these factors inevitably change over 
time and they often differ among users of the term.
1 Quote of definition from: EIA, “Glossary,”
http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=C#conv_oil_nat_gas_prod.
2 Quote of definition from: EIA, “Glossary,” http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=U#.
142
Abbreviations
BP British Petroleum
CAPP Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
EIA U.S. Energy Information Administration
GIIGNL International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers
IEA International Energy Agency
IGU International Gas Union
NEB National Energy Board of Canada
Units
Abbreviation Unit Use
T Tonne(s) Mass
MMT Million tonnes Mass
TPA Tonnes per annum Capacity
MMTPA Million tonnes per annum Capacity
MMCM Million cubic metres Volume
BCM Billion cubic metres Volume
TCM Trillion cubic metres Volume
MMCF Million cubic feet Volume
BCF Billion cubic feet Volume
TCF Trillion cubic feet Volume
J Joule Energy content
GJ Gigajoule Energy content
PJ Petajoule Energy content
BTU British thermal units Energy content
MMBTU Million British thermal units Energy content
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Conversions
Source for conversions: IEA, Natural Gas Information 2013 (2013).
GENERAL CONVERSION FACTORS FOR ENERGY
To: TJ Gcal Mtoe MBtu GWh
From: Multiply by:
TJ 1 238.8 2.388 x 10e-5 947.8 0.2778
Gcal 4.1868 x 10e-3 1 10e-7 3.968 1.163 x 10e-3
Mtoe 4.1868 x 10e4 10e7 1 3.968 x 10e7 11630
MBtu 1.0551 x 10e-3 0.252 2.52 x 10e-7 1 2.931 x 10e-4
GWh 3.6 860 8.6 x 10e-5 3412 1
CONVERSION FACTORS FOR VOLUME
To: U.S. gallon U.K. gallon Barrel Cubic Litre Cubic 
foot metre
From: Multiply by:
U.S. gallon 1 0.8327 0.02381 0.1337 3.785 0.0038
U.K. gallon 1.201 1 0.02859 0.1605 4.546 0.0045
Barrel 42.0 34.97 1 5.615 159.0 0.159
Cubic foot 7.48 6.229 0.1781 1 28.3 0.0283
Litre 0.2642 0.220 0.0063 0.0353 1 0.001
Cubic metre 264.2 220.0 6.289 35.3147 1000.0 1
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CONVERSION FACTORS FROM MASS OR VOLUME TO HEAT (GROSS CALORIFIC VALUE)
LNG** Gas
Norway Netherlands Russia Algeria
To: MJ Btu MJ Btu MJ Btu MJ Btu MJ Btu
From: Multiply by:
cm* 40.00 37,660 40.00 37,913 33.32 31,581 38.23 36,235 39.19 37,145
Kg 54.25 51,417 52.22 49,495 42.07 39,875 55.25 52,363 52.46 49,726
* at 15°C.
** in gaseous state – average OECD imports.
CONVERSION FACTORS FOR NATURAL GAS
SCM versus NCM
To: Standard cubic metre Normal cubic metre
From: Multiply by:
Standard cubic metre* 1 0.948
Normal cubic metre** 1.055 1
*1 Scm measured at 15°C and 760mm Hg.
**1 Ncm measured at 0°C and 760 mm Hg.
LNG Versus Gas
To: Metric tonne LNG CM of LNG SCM*
From:      Multiply by:
Metric tonne LNG 1 2.22 1,360
CM LNG 0.45 1 615
SCM* 7.35 x 10e-4 1.626 x 10e-3 1
*1 SCM = 40 MJ
CONVERSION FACTORS FOR NATURAL GAS FLOW RATES (*)
To: BCM Million BCF TCF PJ MMBTU
per year tonnes per day per year per year per year
From:       Multiply by:
BCM per year 1 0.7350 0.09681 0.03534 40.00 3.79 x 10e7
Million tonnes per year 1.360 1 0.1317 0.04808 54.40 5.16 x 10e7
BCF per day 10.33 7.595 1 0.3650 413.2 3.91 x 10e8
TCF per year 28.30 20.81 2.740 1 1,132 1.07 x 10e9
PJ per year 0.02500 0.01838 0.002420 8.834 x 1 9.47 x 10e5
10e-4
MMBTU per year 2.638 x 1.939 x 2.554 x 9.32 x 1.055 x 1
10e-8 10e-8 10e-9 10e-10 10e-6
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APPENDIX E: SOURCES FOR EXISTING AND PLANNED LIQUEFACTION TERMINALS
I. Algeria
A. OPERATIONAL
Arzew GL 1Z: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2012).
Arzew GL 2Z: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry.
Skikda Train 1-6: Year and capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Sonatrach Skikda LNG
Project, Algeria,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/sonatrach.
Skikda Rebuild: Year and capacity from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49,
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf. Cost information from Hydrocarbons
Technology, “Sonatrach Skikda.”
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Arzew GL 3Z: Year, capacity and construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG
Report (2013), Appendix 2, http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
II. Angola
A. OPERATIONAL
Angola Soyo LNG Terminal: Year and capacity from Angola LNG Website, “About Us,”
http://www.angolalng.com/project/aboutLNG.htm. Cost from Benoit Faucon, “Chevron
Confirms Angola LNG Plant To Cost $9B,” Downstream Today, December 24, 2009,
http://downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=20145&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1.
III. Australia
A. OPERATIONAL
Darwin LNG: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry. Cost information from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Darwin LNG Project,
Darwin Harbour, Australia,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/darwin/.
Pluto LNG: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry. Cost information from Woodside, “Pluto Cost and Schedule Update,” News
Release, June 17, 2011, http://www.woodside.com.au/Investors-
Media/Announcements/Pages/Pluto-Cost-and-Schedule-Update.aspx. 
Northwest Shelf Train 1-4: Year and capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Northwest Shelf
Venture, Australia,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/northwestshelf/.
Northwest Shelf Train 5: Year and capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Northwest Shelf
Venture.” Cost information from Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News, “Woodside set to go
ahead on fifth LNG train at Withnell Bay,” January 10, 2005,
http://www.lloydslistdcn.com.au/archive/2005/jan/10/woodside-set-to-go-ahead-on-fifth-lng-
train-at-withnell-bay.
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B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Queensland Curtis Train 1-2: Year and cost from QGC Website, “QCLNG Project,”
http://www.qgc.com.au/qclng-project.aspx. Capacity from QGC, “2013 QCLNG Project Fact
Sheet,” 2013, 1, http://www.qgc.com.au/media/100578/20121023_2013-qclng-project_fs.pdf.
Construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49,
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
Australian Pacific: Year and cost from EPC Engineer, “Australia Pacific LNG Review Confirms
Accelerated Schedule And Earlier Revenues – Costs Revised To $24.7 Billion,” February 21,
2013, http://www.epcengineer.com/news/post/9713/australia-pacific-lng-review-confirms-
accelerated-schedule-and-earlier-revenues-costs-revised-to-247. Capacity from Hydrocarbons
Technology, “Queensland Pacific LNG Project, Gladstone, Queensland, Australia,”
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/australia-pacific-lng-queensland/.
Construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49,
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
Fisherman’s Landing Train 1: Year from PFC Energy, Global LNG Supply and Demand Study
(May 2013), 49. Cost and capacity from James McGrath, “LNG project short of gas as big
players snap up supply,” The Observer, January 8, 2014,
http://www.gladstoneobserver.com.au/news/project-short-of-gas-for-start-up/2133489/.
Construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49,
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
Gladstone Santos: Year, capacity, and cost from the International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry, 17. Construction status from International Gas Union, World
LNG Report (2013), 49, http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
Gorgon Train 1-3: Year and capacity from International Gas Union, World LNG Report, Appendix
2. Cost from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The LNG Industry,
17. Construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49,
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
Ichthys Train 1-2: Year, capacity, and cost from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry, 17. Construction status from International Gas Union, World
LNG Report (2013), 49, http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
Prelude FLNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from Andrew Burrell, “$12bn Prelude floating plant has
Shell fired for LNG,” The Australian, May 21, 2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/bn-
prelude-floating-plant-has-shell-fired-for-lng/story-e6frg6n6-1226059923612. Construction
status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49, http://www.igu.org/gas-
knowhow/publications/igu-publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
Wheatstone LNG Train 1-2: Year, capacity, and cost from Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Chevron targets
Australia LNG expansion despite cost pressure,” May 27, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/28/chevron-australia-idUSL3N0E90GT20130528.
Construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49,
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
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C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Arrow T1-T2: Year from PFC Energy, Global LNG Supply, May 2013, 49. Capacity from Arrow
Energy Website, “Arrow LNG Plant,” March 28, 2014,
http://www.arrowenergy.com.au/projects/arrow-lng-plant. Cost from Ben Creagh, “Arrow LNG
Project moves forward with environmental approval,” Rigzone, September 11, 2013,
http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/128973/Arrow_LNG_Project_Moves_Forward_with_E
nvironmental_Approval.
Bonaparte FLNG: Year and capacity from Christine Forster, “Australia’s Bonaparte floating LNG
project to start up in 2019,” Platts, September 11, 2013, http://www.platts.com/latest-
news/natural-gas/darwin-australia/australias-bonaparte-floating-lng-project-to-27399343. Cost
from Marc Castro, “GDF Suez and Santos May Seek New Partner for Bonaparte LNG,”
Venture Capital Post, May 1, 2013, http://www.vcpost.com/articles/8253/20130501/gdf-suez-
santos-seek-new-partner-bonaparte-lng.htm.
Cash Maple LNG: Year from PTTEP Australasia website, “Proposed Projects,”
http://www.au.pttep.com/projects/proposed.
Fisherman’s Landing Train 2: Cost and capacity from LNG Ltd website, “Australia,”
http://www.lnglimited.com.au/irm/content/australia1.aspx?RID=262&RedirectCount=1. 
Scarborough FLNG: Year, capacity, and cost from Rebekah Kebede, “Exxon, BHP plan world’s
largest floating LNG plant off Australia,” Reuters, April 2, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/us-exxon-bhp-lng-idUSBRE9310C920130402.
Sunrise – Timor Leste: Year and capacity from PFC Energy, Global LNG Supply, May 2013, 51.
Cost from International Business Times, “Woodside Petroleum firm on floating LNG for East
Timor Sunrise proj,” June 4, 2010, http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/26734/20100604/woodside-
petroleum-floating-lng-greater-sunrise-gas-field-east-timor-xanana-gusmao-don-
voelte.htm#.U2zz_61dWuq.
IV. Brunei
A. OPERATIONAL
Lumut: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry.
V. Cameroon
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Cameroon LNG: Capacity from Cameron LNG website, “Cameroon LNG Project,”
http://www.cameroonlngproject.com/documents/cameroon-lng-project-en.pdf.
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VI. Canada (excluding those described in Appendix C)
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Canaport LNG: Capacity from Ashok Dutta, “Canada’s Canaport LNG import terminal keeps re-
export option open,” Platts, November 29, 2013, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-
gas/calgary/canadas-canaport-lng-import-terminal-keeps-re-27681324. Cost from Esteban
Duarte and Rebecca Penty, “Repsol eyes US$2B LNG export plant at Canaport site in New
Brunswick,” National Post, May 20, 2014,
http://business.financialpost.com/2014/05/20/repsol-eyes-us2b-lng-export-plant-at-canaport-
site-in-new-brunswick/?__lsa=f044-2735.
Goldboro LNG: Year, capacity and cost from Goldboro LNG website, “Project Overview,”
http://goldborolng.com/project/project-overview/. 
VII. Colombia
A. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Exmar LNG FLNG: Year, capacity, and cost from Gurdip Singh, “EXMAR launches FLRSU to
exploit stranded gas offshore Colombia,” Offshore Magazine, August 1, 2012,
http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-72/issue-8/engineering-construction-
installation1/exmar-launches-flrsu-to-exploit-stranded-gas-offshore-colombia.html.
Construction status from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The LNG
Industry, 17.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Pacific Rubiales: Year and capacity from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013),
49, http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
VIII. Cyprus
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Cyprus LNG: Year and cost from Karen Ayat, “Total, Noble, Delek and Avner Interested in
Participating in Cyprus’ LNG,” Natural Gas Europe, June 28, 2013,
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/total-noble-delek-and-avner-interested-in-participating-in-
cyprus-lng. Capacity from Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry, and Tourism, “Vasilikos
Energy Centre,”
http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/b1d9808b11a79c45c2256e6600488e3a/02b6e904de1dc82
2c2257b2100257b20?OpenDocument.
IX. Egypt
A. OPERATIONAL
Damietta: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “SEGAS Liquefied Natural Gas Complex,
Damietta, Egypt,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/seagas/.
Idku Train 1-2: Year, capacity, and cost from Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Petroleum,
“Egyption LNG Project in Idku,”
http://www.petroleum.gov.eg/en/ProjectsandActivities/StrategicProjects/Pages/Idku.aspx.
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B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Damietta Train 2-3: Capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “SEGAS Liquefied Natural Gas
Complex, Damietta, Egypt,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/seagas/.
X. Equatorial Guinea
A. OPERATIONAL
Bioko Island: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Equatorial Guinea LNG Project,
Bioko Island, Punta Europa, Equatorial Guinea,” http://www.hydrocarbons-
technology.com/projects/bioko-lng/.
XI. Indonesia
A. OPERATIONAL
Tangguh: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry. Cost from Bambang Djanuarto and Yoga Rusmana, “BP Shuts Indonesia’s
Tangguh LNG Plant Unit for Maintenance,” Bloomberg, May 27, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-27/bp-shuts-down-indonesia-s-tangguh-lng-plant-
unit-for-maintenance.html.
Blang Lancang – Arun Train 1-6, Expansion 1-2: Year and capacity from PT Arun NGL Website,
“Our Profile,” http://www.arunlng.co.id/profile.php.
Badak (Bontang) A-H: Year and capacity from Michael D. Tusiani and Gordon Shearer, LNG: A
Nontechnical Guide, 286 (Tulsa, Ok.: PennWell, 2007).
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Donggi Senoro: Year, capacity, and cost from Mitsubishi Corp., “Final Investment Decision on
Donggi-Senoro LNG Project in Indonesia,” News Release, January 24, 2011,
http://www.mitsubishicorp.com/jp/en/pr/archive/2011/html/0000011637.html. Construction
status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49, http://www.igu.org/gas-
knowhow/publications/igu-publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
SengKang LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry, 18. Cost from Pak Alfian, “BPMigas rejects development plan
for Sengkang LNG project,” The Jakarta Post, January 29, 2010,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/29/bpmigas-rejects-development-plan-sengkang-
lng-project.html. Construction status from Proactive Investors website, “Energy World
Corporation advances construction of LNG projects in Indonesia, Philippines,” November 6,
2013, http://www.proactiveinvestors.com.au/companies/news/49877/energy-world-corporation-
advances-construction-of-lng-projects-in-indonesia-philippines--49877.html.
C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Abadi FLNG: Year from London South East, “Inpex delays Indonesia Abadi LNG project startup
to 2019 –media,” June 25, 2013,
http://www.lse.co.uk/FinanceNews.asp?code=kvkqidfa&headline=Inpex_delays_Indonesia_Ab
adi_LNG_project_startup_to_2019_media. Capacity and cost from Subsea IQ Website, “Abadi,”
http://www.subseaiq.com/(X(1)S(elrpu2qai1w1dp55lwvwux55))/data/PrintProject.aspx?project
_id=874&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1.
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XII. Iran
A. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Iran LNG: Capacity from Iran Liquefied Natural Gas Co. website, “Process Units Summary,”
http://www.iranlng.ir/en/our-project/process-units-summary. Cost and construction status Iran
Liquefied Natural Gas Co. website, “Current Status,” http://www.iranlng.ir/en/our-
project/current-status.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Pars LNG: Capacity from WorleyParsons website, “CNOOC North Pars LNG Project,”
http://www.worleyparsons.com/Projects/Pages/CNOOCNorth.aspx.
Persian LNG: Capacity from Iran LNG Center website, “Persian LNG,”
http://iranlngcenter.com/Persianlng.aspx.
XIII. Israel
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Eilat LNG: Year, capacity, and cost from Amiram Barkat, “Gov’t cos want to build $6b Eilat
LNG facility,” Globes, October 1, 2012, http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-1000714303.
Tamar FLNG: Capacity from Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Gazprom Seeks to Export All LNG From
Israeli Tamar Project,” Bloomberg, February 26, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
02-26/gazprom-holds-talks-to-export-all-lng-from-israeli-tamar-project.html.
XIV. Libya
A. OPERATIONAL
Marsa-el-Brega: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry.
XV. Malaysia 
A. OPERATIONAL
Bintulu MLNG 1 (Satu) Train 1-3: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry.
Bintulu MLNG 2 (Dua) Train 1-3 and Debottleneck: Year and capacity from International Group of
Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The LNG Industry.
Bintulu MLNG 3 (Tiga) Train 1-2: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry.
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Bintulu MLNG Mini-expansion: Year, capacity and construction status from Construction status
from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49, http://www.igu.org/gas-
knowhow/publications/igu-publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
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Petronas FLNG 1: Year, Capacity, and cost from Nina Rach, “Petronas’ Kanowit field FLNG
facility under construction,” OE Digital, August 19, 2013,
http://www.oedigital.com/component/k2/item/3760-petronas-kanowit-field-flng-facility-under-
construction. Construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49,
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
Petronas LNG 9: Year, capacity and construction status from International Gas Union, World
LNG Report (2013), 49, http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf. Cost from 2 b 1st Consulting website,
“Petronas to invest $61 billion in Malaysia on next five years,” March 13, 2013,
http://www.2b1stconsulting.com/petronas-to-invest-61-billion-in-malaysia-on-next-five-years/.
C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Petronas FLNG 2: Year and capacity from Florence Tan, “TABLE-Petronas to expand global
LNG capacity by 2020,” Reuters, June 14, 2013,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/malaysia-oil-gas-idUKL3N0EO09720130614.
XVI. Mozambique
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Anadarko Eni: Year, capacity, and cost from Franz Wild, “Mozambique Seeks Bigger Stake in
Anadarko, Eni Gas Fields,” Bloomberg, November 11, 2013,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-11/mozambique-seeks-bigger-stake-in-anadarko-eni-
gas-fields.html.
XVII. Nigeria
A. OPERATIONAL
Bonny Island NLNG Train 1-6: Year from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Bonny Island, Nigeria,”
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/bonny/. Capacity from ICIS, “Nigeria LNG
Output climbs to 83% as Train 1 returns,”
http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2011/01/24/9428874/nigeria-lng-output-climbs-to-83-as-
train-1-returns/ and Technip website, “Gas Monetization Key References,”
http://www.technip.com/sites/default/files/technip/field_activity/key_contracts_attachment/gas_
monetization_key_V2.pdf. Cost from Nigeria LNG Ltd., “Facts and Figures on NLNG 2013,”
2013, 37, http://www.nlng.com/publications/Facts_Figures_on_NLNG_2013.pdf.
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Bonny Island NLNG Train 7: Capacity and construction status from Hydrocarbons Technology,
“Bonny Island.” 
C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Bonny Island NLNG Train 8: Capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Bonny Island.” 
Brass LNG: Year and capacity from PFC Energy, Global LNG Supply, 49. Cost from Martin
Ayankola, “Brass LNG Project may cost over $15BN,” The Punch Newspaper, January 30,
2010, http://www.ijawmonitor.org/news.php?article=641&ct=3.
153
Olokola LNG: Capacity from Energy Mix Report website, “Planned LNG projects to generate
$15bn,” April 1, 2014, http://energymixreport.com/planned-lng-projects-to-generate-15b/. Year
from Energy Mix Report website, “OK LNG requires new investors,” March 26, 2014,
http://energymixreport.com/ok-lng-requires-new-investors/.
XVIII. Norway
A. OPERATIONAL
Hammerfest: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry. Cost information from Subsea IQ Website, “Snohvit,”
http://www.subseaiq.com/data/PrintProject.aspx?project_id=223.
Skangass: Year and cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Linde to build LNG import terminal
for Skangass in Sweden,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/news/newslinde-lng-
terminal-skangass. Capacity from Skangass AS, “About Skangass,”
http://www.skangass.com/index.cfm?id=352980.
XIX. Oman
A. OPERATIONAL
Qalhat/Oman LNG Train 1-2: Year from Chiyoda Corp. Website, “Oman,” http://www.chiyoda-
corp.com/project/en/area/middle-east/oman.html. Capacity from Oman LNG Website, “In
Brief,” http://www.omanlng.com/tabid/158/Default.aspx. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology,
“Qalhat LNG Plant, Oman,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/qalhat/.
Qalhat/Oman LNG Train 3: Year, capacity, and cost from Qalhat LNG Website, “QLNG Project,”
http://www.qalhatlng.com/_Project.html#_Project_PR.
XX. Papua New Guinea
A. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
PNG LNG Train 1-2: Year, capacity, and cost from Jane Wardell and James Regan, “Exxon’s PNG
LNG project costs balloon to $19 billion,” Reuters, November 11, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/12/us-exxon-png-idUSBRE8AA0GR20121112.
Construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report (2013), 49,
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-
publications/IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Gulf LNG: Year, capacity, and cost from InterOil, “Economics and Financing of Gulf Integrated
LNG Project,” September 2012, 7,
http://www.interoil.com/iocfiles/documents/investorrelations/presentationanddocuments/2012/L
NG%20Project%20Update%20Investor%20Presentation%20September%2029%202012.pdf.
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XXI. Peru
A. OPERATIONAL
Peru LNG: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry. Cost from PR Newswire, “PERU LNG Inaugurates the First Natural Gas
Liquefaction (LNG) Plant in South America,” Peru LNG News Release, June 10, 2010,
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/peru-lng-inaugurates-the-first-natural-gas-
liquefaction-lng-plant-in-south-america-96065044.html.
XXII. Qatar
A. OPERATIONAL
Ras Laffan (Qatargas 1 Train 1-3): Year from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Capacity from Qatargas Website, “Qatargas 1,”
http://www.qatargas.com/English/QGVentures/Pages/Qatargas1.aspx. Cost from Hydrocarbons
Technology, “Qatar Gas I LNG Plant, Ras Laffan, Qatar,” http://www.hydrocarbons-
technology.com/projects/raslaffanlng/.
Ras Laffan (Qatargas 1 Train 1-3) Debottleneck: Year and capacity from Qatargas Website,
“Qatargas 1,” http://www.qatargas.com/English/QGVentures/Pages/Qatargas1.aspx. Cost from
Hydrocarbons Technology, “Qatar Gas I LNG Plant, Ras Laffan, Qatar,”
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/raslaffanlng/.
Ras Laffan (Qatargas 2 Train 1-2): Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied
Natural Gas Importers, The LNG Industry.
Ras Laffan (Qatargas 3 Train 1): Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry.
Ras Laffan (Qatargas 4 Train 1): Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry.
Ras Laffan (Rasgas 1 Train 1-2): Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry.
Ras Laffan (Rasgas 2 Train 1-3): Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry.
Ras Laffan (Rasgas 3 Train 1-2): Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry.
XXIII. Russia
A. OPERATIONAL
Sakhalin 2: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Russia Far East: Capacity from Rosneft website, “Rosneft and ExxonMobil Selects Contractors
for Initial Phase Engineering and Design for Russian Far East LNG Project,” news release,
September 27, 2013, http://www.rosneft.com/news/pressrelease/27092013.html.
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Vladivostok: Year and capacity from Gazprom Website, “Vladivostok-LNG Project,”
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/vladivostok-lng/. Cost from Vladimir
Soldatkin, “Gazprom’s investment in Vladivostok LNG plant seen at $13.5 bln,” Reuters,
November 21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/gazprom-lng-investment-
idUSL5N0J60UD20131121.
Yamal: Year, cost, and capacity from Oil and Gas Journal, “Yamal LNG owners issue FID,”
December 18, 2013, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/12/yamal-lng-owners-issue-fid.html.
XXIV. Tanzania
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Tanzania LNG: Year and Capacity from Karolin Schaps, “UPDATE 1-Ophir Energy says
Tanzania LNG project could be expanded,” Reuters, March 20, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/20/lng-tanzania-ophir-idUSL6N0MH1G620140320.
Cost from Gwladys Fouche and Balazs Koranyi, “Statoil plans LNG plant after Tanzania gas
find,” The Globe and Mail, March 18, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/international-business/african-and-mideast-business/statoil-plans-lng-plant-after-
tanzania-gas-find/article9881045/.
XXV. Trinidad and Tobago
A. OPERATIONAL
Atlantic LNG Train 1-4: Year and capacity from Atlantic LNG Website, “Our Trains,”
http://www.atlanticlng.com/our-business/our-trains. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology,
“Point Fortin Refinery / LNG Liquefaction Plant, Trinidad and Tobago,”
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/pointfortin/.
XXVI. United Arab Emirates
A. OPERATIONAL
Das Island: Year and capacity from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry.
XXVII.U.S.A
A. OPERATIONAL
Kenai: Year and capacity from ConocoPhillips Website, “ConocoPhillips LNG Projects,”
http://lnglicensing.conocophillips.com/EN/lngprojects/Pages/index.aspx. Mothball year from
Tim Bradner, “State asks ConocoPhillips to reopen idle Kenai LNG plant,” Alaska Journal of
Commerce, September 12, 2013, http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-
Commerce/September-Issue-3-2013/State-asks-ConocoPhillips-to-reopen-idle-Kenai-LNG-
plant/. Reactivation from ConocoPhillips website, “ConocoPhillips Announces Resumption of
Exports from the Kenai LNG Facility,” news release, April 14, 2014,
http://alaska.conocophillips.com/newsroom/news-releases/Pages/Kenai-LNG-Plant-to-Resume-
Exports-This-Spring.aspx.
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B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Sabine Pass Train 1-4: Year, cost, capacity and construction status from Cheniere Website,
“Sabine Pass Liquefication Project,”
http://www.cheniere.com/lng_industry/sabine_pass_liquefaction.shtml.
C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Alaska LNG: Year, capacity and cost from Bradley Olson and Rebecca Penty, “Alaska to Pay
$5.75 Billion for Exxon LNG Project Stake,” Bloomberg, January 15, 2014,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-15/alaska-to-pay-5-75-billion-for-exxon-lng-export-
project-stake.html.
Cameron LNG: Year, capacity, and cost from Cameron LNG Website, “Expansion Update,”
http://cameronlng.com/expansion-update.html.
Corpus Christi LNG: Year, capacity, and cost from Bechtel Website, “Bechtel enters into contract
with Cheniere for Corpus Christi Liquefication Project,” December 13, 2013,
http://www.bechtel.com/2013-12-13.html.
Cove Point LNG: Year, cost, and capacity from Dominion Website, “Dominion Cove Point,”
https://www.dom.com/business/gas-transmission/cove-point/.
Elba Island LNG Phase 1 and 2: Year and capacity from International Gas Union, World LNG
Report, 36. Cost from Siana Mishkova, “Shell share price: Shell, Kinder Morgan start $500m
expansion of US LNG project,” Invezz, December 20, 2013,
http://invezz.com/news/equities/7753-shell-share-price-shell-kinder-morgan-start-dollar-500m-
expansion-of-us-lng-project.
Freeport Expansion: Cost and capacity from Freeport LNG Website, “Liquefication Project,”
http://www.freeportlng.com/Liquefaction_Project.asp. Year from Freeport LNG, “Project
Status,” http://www.freeportlng.com/Project_Status.asp.
Gasfin LNG: Year from U.S. Office of Fossil Energy, Natural Gas Regulatory Activities, “Semi-
Annual Project Progress Report,” April 1, 2014,
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/semi-
annual_reports/Gasfin_-_Semi-Annual_Report_-_2014_Apr_1.pdf. Capacity from International
Gas Union, World LNG Report, 36. Cost from Carla Bridglal, “Gasfin hoping to build US
$400m LNG plant at La Brea,” Trinidad Express Newspapers, February 12, 2013,
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/business-
magazine/Gasfin_hoping_to_build_US_400m_LNG__plant_at_La_Brea-190948141.html
Golden Pass: Year and capacity from International Gas Union, World LNG Report, 36. Cost
from Financial Post, “Qatar, Exxon venture wins first U.S. LNG export permit,” October 4,
2012, http://business.financialpost.com/2012/10/04/qatar-exxon-venture-wins-first-u-s-lng-
export-permit/?__lsa=f616-9532.
Gulf Coast LNG Train 1-4: Capacity from International Gas Union, World LNG Report, 36. 
Jordan Cove – Coos Bay: Year from Econorthwest, “Effect of the Jordan Cove Energy Project’s
LNG Exports on United States Balance of Trade 2018 – 2045,” February 28, 2012, 1,
http://www.jordancoveenergy.com/pdf/Trade_Balance.pdf. Capacity from Jordan Cove Energy
Project Website, “Project Overview,” http://www.jordancoveenergy.com/project.htm. Cost from
Jordan Cove Energy Project Website, “Project Benefits,”
http://www.jordancoveenergy.com/benefits.htm.
157
Lake Charles Expansion: Year, capacity, and cost from Energy Transfer Partners LP, “Update to
the Lake Charles Liquefication Project,” News Release, August 8, 2013,
http://ir.energytransfer.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=106094&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1846291.
Magnolia LNG T1-T2: Year, capacity, and cost from Magnolia LNG Website, “Magnolia LNG
Project on Schedule,” September 12, 2013,
http://www.magnolialng.com/IRM/Company/ShowPage.aspx?CategoryId=190&CPID=1949&
EID=68984696.
Main Pass Energy Hub: Year, cost, and capacity from Ruth Liao, “US floating LNG concept files
for regulatory approval,” ICIS, September 21, 2012,
http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2012/09/21/9597730/us-floating-lng-concept-files-for-
regulatory-approval/.
Oregon LNG Terminal: Year from Oregon LNG Website, “Project Timeline,”
http://www.oregonlng.com/project-timeline/. Capacity from Oregon LNG Website, “Terminal,”
http://www.oregonlng.com/terminal/. Cost from The Daily Astorian, “Oregon LNG files new
plan with feds,” June 12, 2013, http://www.dailyastorian.com/free/oregon-lng-files-new-plan-
with-feds/article_0e5a652a-d387-11e2-97b7-001a4bcf887a.html.
South Texas LNG Train 1-2: Year and capacity from International Gas Union, World LNG Report,
36.
Texas LNG: Year and capacity from Texas LNG website, “Texas LNG Summary,”
http://www.txlng.com/about/texas-lng-summary.
XXVIII. Venezuela 
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Mariscal Sucre: Capacity and cost from Business News Americas, “Chavez: Qatar will join
US$2.5bn Mariscal Sucre LNG project,” June 10, 2002,
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/oilandgas/Chavez:_Qatar_will_join_US*2,5bn_Mariscal_Su
cre_LNG_project. Current status from Enrique Andres Pretel and Marianna Parraga, “UPDATE
3-Venezuela freezes LNG projects, eyes local demand,” Reuters, September 28, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/28/venezuela-gas-idUSS1E78R0UG20110928.
XXIX. Yemen
A. OPERATIONAL
Balhalf Train 1-2: Year and capacity from Technip, “Yemen LNG,”
http://www.technip.com/sites/default/files/technip/publications/attachments/YLNG_March%20
2011_web.pdf. Cost from Yemen LNG Company Website, “Project Overview,”
http://www.yemenlng.com/ws/en/go.aspx?c=proj_overview.
158
APPENDIX F: SOURCES FOR EXISTING AND PLANNED REGASIFICATION TERMINALS
I. Albania
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Fiere FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability,”
http://www.giignl.org/system/files/publication/130819_giignl_qflex_qmax_database.xlsx.
II. Argentina
A. OPERATIONAL
Bahia Blanca: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2012).
Escobar FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. 
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Enarsa PDV: Year from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, “Database
for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Excelerate Energy
to Develop Argentinian LNG Terminal,” http://www.hydrocarbons-
technology.com/news/news96798.html.
III. Bahamas
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Ocean Cay: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Cost from Downstream Today, “AES Ocean LNG,”
June 3, 2010, http://www.downstreamtoday.com/projects/project.aspx?project_id=59.
IV. Bangladesh
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Bangladesh FRSU: Capacity from Mohammad Azizur Rahman, “Bangladesh puts LNG terminal
project on fast-track route,” Platts, January 23 2014, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-
gas/dhaka/bangladesh-puts-lng-terminal-project-on-fast-27859956.
V. Belgium
A. OPERATIONAL
Zeebrugge: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Zeebrugge Expansion: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
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VI. Brazil
A. OPERATIONAL
Bahia Regas Terminal: Year, capacity, and cost from Gastech News, “Petrobras starts up Brazil’s
third FSRU import facility,” January 29, 2014, http://www.gastechnews.com/lng/petrobras-
starts-up-brazils-third-fsru-import-facility/.
Guanabara Bay FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Guanabara LNG FRSU: Year and cost from International Gas Union, World LNG Report, 52.
Pecem FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
VII. Canada
A. OPERATIONAL
Canaport LNG: Cost and capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Canaport LNG Plant, St John,
New Brunswick, Canada,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/canaport-lng/.
VIII. Chile
A. OPERATIONAL
Mejilones: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Mejillones Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) Terminal, Chile,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/cnlmejillones/.
Quintero: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry. Cost from SeeNews, “BG Group mulls over selling half of 40% stake in
GNL Quintero – report,” February 24, 2012, http://energy.seenews.com/news/bg-group-mulls-
over-selling-half-of-40-stake-in-gnl-quintero-report-255939.
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Colbun FSRU: Year from James Fowler, “Chile’s Colbun FSRU project hits delays as supply
talks begin,” ICIS, April 25 2013,
http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2013/04/25/9662659/chile-s-colbun-fsru-project-hits-
delays-as-supply-talks-begin/. Capacity and construction status from International Gas Union,
World LNG Report, 52.
Gas Atacama FSRU: Year and cost from Alexandra Ulmer, “Chile GasAtacama sees over $4
billion in LNG power deal with miners,” Reuters, October 18, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/18/us-chile-gasatacama-lng-
idUSBRE89H1A020121018. Capacity from Golar LNG, “Golar LNG: Golar Secures Chile’s
First FSRU Award,” July 5, 2012,
http://www.golarlng.com/index.php?name=seksjon/Stock_Exchange_Releases/Press_Releases.
html&pressrelease=1624765.html. Construction status from International Gas Union, World
LNG Report, 52.
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IX. China
A. OPERATIONAL
Dailan: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry. Cost from ICIS, “PetroChina’s Dalian terminal approved, on back of Gorgon
and Browse LNG deals,” http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2008/02/08/9302226/petrochinas-
dalian-terminal-approved,-on-back-of-gorgon-and-browse-lng-deals.html.
Dapeng, Guangdong: Year and capacity from Bloomberg News, “China’s Liquefied Natural Gas
Terminals,” August 16, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-16/china-s-liquefied-
natural-gas-terminals-table-.html. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Guangdong Liquefied
Natural Gas, China,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/guangdong-lng-
terminal/.
Fujian: Year and capacity from International Gas Union, World LNG Report, 52. Cost from
China National Offshore Oil Corp. Website, “Fujian LNG Phase II Commences Construction,”
http://en.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/news/2012-07-31/english/324567.html.
Rudong, Jiangsu: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from Jing Yang, “Jiangsu LNG Terminal Gains Chinese
Government Approval,” Resource Investor, March 23, 2007,
http://www.resourceinvestor.com/2007/03/23/jiangsu-lng-terminal-gains-chinese-government-
appr.
Shanghai, Mengtougou: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. 
Shanghai LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Shanghai LNG Project,
China,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/shanghai-lng/.
Tangshan LNG: Year and capacity from Platts, “PetroChina’s Tangshan LNG import terminal
starts commercial operations,” December 11 2013, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-
gas/singapore/petrochinas-tangshan-lng-import-terminal-starts-27723562.
Tianjin: Year and capacity from Song Yen Ling, “China’s CNOOC receives first LNG cargo at
Tianjin FSRU,” Platts, November 26, 2013, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-
gas/singapore/chinas-cnooc-receives-first-lng-cargo-at-tianjin-27666510. Cost from Joao Peixe,
“China Prepares for First Delivery to Floating LNG Terminal,” Oilprice.com, November 6,
2013, http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/China-Prepares-for-First-Delivery-
to-Floating-LNG-Terminal.html.
Zhejiang, Ningbo: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Zhejiang Ningbo LNG
Terminal, China,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/zhejiang-ningbo-lng-
terminal-china/.
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Guangxi / Beihai: Year, capacity, and cost from Chen Aizhu, “Sinopec’s $2.8 bln LNG terminal
to win approval soon – source,” Reuters, January 19, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/20/china-lng-beihai-idUSL3E8CK12X20120120.
Construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report, 52.
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Hainan LNG: Year and capacity from Sofregaz, “Hainan – China – LNG Receiving Terminal,”
2009, http://www.sofregaz.fr/en/news/2009/hainan-china-lng-receiving-terminal. Cost from
Zhao Tingting, “CNOOC gets nod from Hainan LNG project,” China Daily USA, July 20,
2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/hainan/dutyfree/2011-07/20/content_13049093.htm.
Construction status from China National Offshore Oil Corp. website, “CNOOC Starts
Construction on Hainan LNG Project,” news release August 2 2011,
http://en.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/news/2011-08-01/english/302477.html.
Shandong Qingdao: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from Fanny Zhang, “China’s Sinopec to start up Qingdao
LNG terminal in November 2013,” ICIS, September 21, 2011,
http://www.icis.com/Articles/2011/09/21/9493841/chinas-sinopec-to-start-up-qingdao-lng-
terminal-in-november.html. Construction status from ICIS website, “China’s Sinopec targets
LNG market entry by October,” January 9 2014,
http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2014/01/09/9741828/lng/glm/chinas-sinopec-targets-lng-
market-entry-by-october.html.
Shenzhen Diefu: Year, capacity, cost and construction status from China National Offshore Oil
Corp. Website, “Shenzhen Diefu LNG Receiving Terminal Starts Construction,” September 3,
2012, http://en.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/news/2012-09-02/english/326841.html.
Yuedong / Jieyang LNG: Year from Holman Fenwick Willan, “Feeding the Dragon,” July 2012,
http://www.hfw.com/Feeding-the-dragon. Capacity, cost and construction status from China
National Offshore Oil Corp. website, “CNOOC Yuedong LNG Project Lays Foundation,”
News Release, December 11, 2010, http://en.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/news/2010-12-
10/english/301873.html.
C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Dalian Expansion: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
Rudong Expansion: Year and capacity from LGC Fuel website, “Jiangsu Rudong LNG
Terminal,” http://www.lgcfuel.com/jiangsu-rudong-lng-terminal-china/.
Shanghai Expansion: Year from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Capacity from LGC Fuel website, “Shanghai LNG
Terminal,” http://www.lgcfuel.com/shanghai-lng-terminal-china/.
Tianjin Phase 2: Year from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Capacity and cost from Judy Hua and David
Stanway, “UPDATE 1-China approves first floating terminal for LNG imports,” Reuters,
August 14 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/14/china-cnooc-lng-
idUSL4N0GF24C20130814.
Wenzhou Project Terminal: Cost and capacity from SinoShip News, “Wenzhou to start major
LNG project,” April 2, 2013, http://sinoshipnews.com/news_content.php?fid=3w3c1175.
Zhejiang Ningbo Phase II: Year, capacity and cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Zhejiang
Ningbo LNG Terminal, China,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/zhejiang-
ningbo-lng-terminal-china/.
Zhoushan: Year, capacity and cost from LNG World News website, “China Approves LNG
Bunkering Project in Zhoushan,” August 19 2013, http://www.lngworldnews.com/china-
approves-lng-bunkering-project-in-zhoushan/.
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X. Colombia
A. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Puerto Bahia: Year, cost and capacity from James Fowler, “Puertoa Bahia set for 2014 start,”
BN Americas, http://www.bnamericas.com/news/oilandgas/puerto-bahia-set-for-2014-start.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Colombia LNG: Year, capacity, and cost from Chris Kraul, “Colombia to build $400 million LNG
Regasification Plant: Official,” Platts, December 13, 2013, http://russia.platts.com/latest-
news/natural-gas/bogota/colombia-to-build-400-million-lng-regasification-21919588.
XI. Croatia
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
LNG Hrvatska: Year, capacity and cost from Igor Ilic, “Croatia confirms plans for new LNG
terminal in 2016,” Reuters, July 3, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/croatia-
lng-project-idUSL6E8I36O620120703.
XII. Dominican Republic
A. OPERATIONAL
Punta Caucedo: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. 
XIII. El Salvador
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
CECAM: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Cost from Cutuco Energy, “Overview,”
http://www.cecalng.com/project0.htm.
XIV. Estonia
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Muuga LNG: Year and capacity from Kari Liuhto, “A liquefied natural gas terminal boom in the
Baltic Sea region?” Electronic Publications of the Pan-European Institute, May 2012,
http://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-ja-
tietopaketit/Documents/Liuhto%20LNG.pdf. Cost from Juhan Tere, “Elering: our LNG
terminal in Muuga port would be by 30% cheaper,” The Baltic Course, September 6, 2012,
http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/energy/?doc=62428.
Paldiski: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Cost from LNG World News, “Balti Gaas: LNG
Terminal in Paldiski to Cost 350 Million EUR (Estonia),” January 7, 2011,
http://www.lngworldnews.com/balti-gaas-lng-terminal-in-paldiski-to-cost-eur-350-million-
estonia/.
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XV. Finland
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Joddbole/Tolkinnen: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
XVI. France
A. OPERATIONAL
Fos-sur-Mer: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Fos-Cavaou: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Montoir- de-Bretagne: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Dunkerque LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Dunkirk LNG Terminal,
France,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/dunkirklngterminal. Construction
status from International Gas Union, World LNG Report, 52.
C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Le Havre: Year, cost, and capacity from Gaz de Normandie, “Gas de Normandie has lodged its
application for permission to operate the Antifer LNG Terminal,” November 5, 2009,
http://gazdenormandie.com/tl_files/documents/CP%205%20nov%202009_EN.pdf.
Fos Faster: Year, cost and capacity from Doris Leblond, “Fos Faster LNG terminal given go-
ahead,” Oil & Gas Journal, May 25, 2012, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2011/05/fos-faster-lng-
terminal.html.
XVII. Greece
A. OPERATIONAL
Revithoussa: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. 
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Revithoussa Expansion: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
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XVIII. India
A. OPERATIONAL
Dahbol: Year and capacity from Oil and Gas Journal, “GAIL Comissions Dahbol LNG
Terminal, plans expansions,” January 22, 2013, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/01/gail-
commissions-dabhol-lng-terminal--plans-expansions.html. Cost from Sudheer Pal Singh,
“India’s Third LNG Terminal at Dahbol in Oct,” Rediff Business, June 15, 2009,
http://business.rediff.com/report/2009/jun/15/dpc-indias-third-lng-terminal-at-dabhol-in-
oct.htm.
Dahej: Capacity and cost from Petronet LNG, “LNG Terminal Dahej (Gujarat), India,”
http://rsinfotech.com/work/web/allwebsite/pll/lngterminals.htm.
Dahej Expansion: Capacity from Press Trust of India, “ADB to give $150 mn loan for Petronet’s
Dahej LNG expansion,” Business Standard, December 17, 2013, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/companies/adb-to-give-150-mn-loan-for-petronet-s-dahej-lng-expansion-
113121700818_1.html.
Hazira: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Hazira LNG Terminal, India,”
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/haziralngterminalguj/.
Hazira Expansion: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2013.
Kochi LNG: Year and cost from Zdravka Lyubomirova Traykova, “Petronet LNG terminal at
Kochi port to start operations next week – report,” SeeNews, August 9, 2013,
https://energy.seenews.com/news/petronet-lng-terminal-at-kochi-port-to-start-operations-next-
week-report-370997. Capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Kochi LNG Terminal, India,”
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/kochi-lng-terminal/.
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Dahej Expansion 1: Year, capacity and construction status from the International Group of
Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The LNG Industry in 2013.
C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Dahej Expansion 2: Year, capacity and cost from Business Standard, “ADB to give $150 mn loan
for Petronet’s Dahej LNG expansion,” December 17, 2013, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/companies/adb-to-give-150-mn-loan-for-petronet-s-dahej-lng-expansion-
113121700818_1.html.
Ennore: Year, cost and capacity from The Hindu Business Line, “ONGC in talks to buy 26%
stake in IOC’s Ennore LNG terminal,” January 17 2014,
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/ongc-in-talks-to-buy-26-stake-in-iocs-ennore-
lng-terminal/article5585773.ece.
Gangavaram: Year and capacity from The Economic Times, “Petronet invites bids for
Gangavaram LNG terminal,” May 13, 2013,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-05-13/news/39228716_1_kochi-terminal-
lng-terminal-gangavaram-port.
Mundra: Year, cost and capacity from The Hindu, “RIL-BP front-runner for picking 25% stake
in Mundra Terminal,” December 3, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/rilbp-
frontrunner-for-picking-25-stake-in-mundra-terminal/article5417890.ece.
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Ratnagiri (Dabhol) Expansion 1 and 2: Year and capacity from The Indian Express, “Gail
commissions Dabhol LNG terminal in Ratnagiri,” January 11, 2013,
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/gail-commissions-dabhol-lng-terminal-in-
ratnagiri/1057766/.
XIX. Indonesia
A. OPERATIONAL
Nusantara FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from Golar LNG, “Golar LNG Energy Wins Tender for
West Java FSRU Project (Indonesia),” LNG World News, October 12, 2010,
http://www.lngworldnews.com/indonesia-golar-lng-to-build-jakarta-fsru/.
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Arun Conversion: Year, cost and capacity from Raras Cahyafitri, “Pertamina begins work on
Arun gas facilities,” The Jakarta Post, November 11, 2013,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/11/11/pertamina-begins-work-arun-gas-
facilities.html. Construction status from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry.
North Sumatra (Medan/Lampung) FSRU: Year and capacity from Priyambodo RH, “Lampung’s
floating gas terminal to be operational in 2014,” Antara News, February 28, 2013,
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/87568/lampungs-floating-gas-terminal-to-be-operational-
in-2014. Cost from Hoegh LNG, “Indonesia FRSU,”
http://www.hoeghlng.com/regas/Pages/Indonesia-FSRU.aspx. Construction status from
International Gas Union, World LNG Report, 52.
C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
East Java: Year from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The LNG
Industry. Capacity and cost from Pak Alfian, “Pertamina to build a $200m LNG terminal in
East Java,” The Jakarta Post, January 19, 2010,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/19/pertamina-build-a-200m-lng-terminal-east-
java.html.
XX. Italy
A. OPERATIONAL
Panigaglia: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Porto Levante FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from Aker Solutions, “Contract for the Isola di Porto
Levante LNG Terminal project,” News Release, http://www.akersolutions.com/en/Global-
menu/Media/Press-Releases/All/2005/Contract-for-the-Isola-di-Porto-Levante-LNG-Terminal-
project/.
166
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Gioria Tauro: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Cost from World Construction Netwrok
website, “MG/Sorgenia/Iride – Gioia Tauro LNG terminal, Calabria, Italy,” August 26, 2013,
http://www.worldconstructionnetwork.com/projects/mgsorgeniairide-gioia-tauro-lng-terminal-
calabria-italy/.
Porto Empedocle: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Cost from Stephen Jewkes, “Enel sees
Sicily LNG terminal operating in 2015,” Reuters, February 8, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/08/enel-lng-idAFLDE71724F20110208.
Panigaglia Expansion: Year from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Capacity and cost from ICIS website, “Eni’s import
empire expands as Snam confirms Panigaglia expansion,” Feburay 23, 2007,
http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2007/02/23/9294191/enis-import-empire-expands-as-snam-
confirms-panigaglia-expansion.html.
Api Nova FSRU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
Zaule: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
XXI. Japan
A. OPERATIONAL
Chita: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry in 2012.
Chita Kyodo: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Chita-Midorihama Works: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Fokuoka: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Futtsu: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry in 2012.
Hatsukaichi: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Higashi-Ohgishima: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Himeji: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry in 2012.
Himeji LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
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Ishikari LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Joetsu: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry in 2012.
Kagoshima: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Kawagoe: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Mizushima: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Nagasaki: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Negishi: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Niigata: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry.
Ohgishima: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Oita: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry in 2012.
Sakai: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry in 2012.
Sakaide: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Sedogaura: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Senboku I and II: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Shin-Minato: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Sodeshi: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Tobata: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Yanai: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry in 2012.
Yokkaichi LNG Centre: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Yokkaichi Works: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
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B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Hachinohe LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2013 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2012)..
Hibiki: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The
LNG Industry in 2012.
Hitachi: Year from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The LNG
Industry in 2013.
Kushiro LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2013.
Naoetsu: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Naoetsu
LNG Receiving Terminal, Japan,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/naoetsu-
lng-receiving-terminal/.
C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Shin-Sendai: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
Wakayama: Year and capacity from LNG Market website, “Wakayama LNG Terminal
(Wakayama),” http://www.lngmarket.com/installation/Wakayama-LNG-Terminal-242.
XXII. Kuwait
A. OPERATIONAL
Mina al Ahmadi FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
XXIII. Latvia
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Riga: Year, capacity and cost from The Baltic Times, “Riga deemed best for LNG terminal,”
July 13, 2011, http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/29052/#.UxDsu_mwLYg.
XXIV. Lithuania
A. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Hoegh FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from Hoegh LNG, “Lithuania FRSU,”
http://www.hoeghlng.com/regas/Pages/Lithuania-FSRU.aspx. Construction status from
Petroleum Economist, World LNG Factbook (London: Euromoney, 2013),
http://www.petroleum-economist.com/pdf/LNGInsight_May/LNG%20Importers.pdf.
Klaipeda FSRU: Year, capacity, cost and construction status from Joanna Hyndle-Hussein, “The
Lithuanian LNG terminal in Klaipeda is to be operational in 2014,” OSW, March 7, 2012,
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-03-07/lithuanian-lng-terminal-klaipeda-to-
be-operational-2014.
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XXV. Malaysia
A. OPERATIONAL
Melaka: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2013.
XXVI. Mexico
A. OPERATIONAL
Altamira: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Fluor, “Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd.
& ICA Fluor Consortium Awarded First LNG Terminal in Mexico,” News Release, December
18, 2003, http://investor.fluor.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=124955&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=479409&highlight=.
Energía Costa Azul: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Energía Costa Azul Website, “Sempra LNG’s
Energía Costa Azul helps meet the energy needs of Baja California,”
http://eca.sempralng.com/about-us.html.
Manzanillo: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Samsung C&T, “Samsung C&T Completes Manzanillo
LNG Terminal,” News Release, March 28, 2012,
http://www.samsungcnt.com/EN/cnt/pr/401000/articleRead.do?board_id=6&article_id=2209&p
age_index=3.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Topolobampo: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
XXVII. Netherlands
A. OPERATIONAL
Gate LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Green Car Congress, “Netherlands opens first LNG
terminal; US$1.1B GATE terminal has 12BCM annual throughput capacity,” September 25,
2011, http://www.greencarcongress.com/2011/09/gate-201109025.html.
XXVIII. Pakistan
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Marshal: Capacity from Haris Zamir, “Pakistan to invite fresh bids for 3.5 mil mt/year LNG
supply mid-Feb,” Platts, January 31, 2011, http://www.platts.com/latest-
news/oil/karachi/pakistan-to-invite-fresh-bids-for-35-mil-mtyear-8475527. Cost from Ahmad
Ahmadani, “Multi-million dollars LNG import project in doldrums,” The Nation, March 5,
2011, http://www.nation.com.pk/Business/05-Mar-2011/Multimillion-dollars-LNG-import-
project-in-doldrums.
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XXIX. Panama
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Colon LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Cost from Don Winner, “Panama to spend $430
Million on LNG Terminal, Gas-Fired Plant,” Panama Guide, January 21, 2010,
http://www.panama-guide.com/article.php/new-lng-terminal-and-power-plant.
XXX. Philippines
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Bataan-Manila: Year and capacity from LNG Market website, “Bataan-Manila LNG II (Batman
II), http://www.lngmarket.com/installation/Bataan-Manila-LNG-II-353. Cost from Alexander’s
Gas & Oil Connections website, “PNOC plans completion of LNG facility by 2012,”
December 2, 2006, http://www.gasandoil.com/news/2007/01/cns70376.
Mariveles: Year and capacity from LNG Market website, “Mariveles LNG Terminal (Bataan I),”
http://www.lngmarket.com/installation/Mariveles-LNG-(Bataan)-246.
XXXI. Poland
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Polskie LNG / Swinoujscie LNG: Year, capacity and construction status from the International
Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The LNG Industry in 2013. Cost from
Hydrocarbons Technology, “Swinoujscie LNG Gas Terminal, Poland,”
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/swinoujscie/.
XXXII. Portugal
A. OPERATIONAL
Sines: Capacity from ICIS, “Portugal’s Sines LNG terminal operator outlines expansion plans,”
March 27, 2009, http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2009/03/27/9310651/portugals-sines-lng-
terminal-operator-outlines-expansion-plans.html.
Sines Expansion: Capacity from Somague, “Sines LNG Terminal Expansion Project
inaugurated,” September 25, 2012, http://www.somague.pt/site/shownews.asp?lg=en&idn=833.
XXXIII. Puerto Rico
A. OPERATIONAL
Penuelas: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Zeus Intelligence, “LNG Import Terminal Profile:
EcoEléctrica LP – LNG terminal, Guayanilla Bay, Puerto Rico,” December 15, 2005,
http://member.zeusintel.com/ZLNGR/show_image.aspx?id=1669.
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B. PROPSED/ANNOUNCED
Aguirre FSRU: Year from Aguirre Offshore Gasport website, “Project Status and Timeline,”
http://en.aguirreoffshoregasport.com/the-aguirre-offshore-gasport-project-overview/gasport-
project-status-and-timeline/. Capacity from Aguirre Offshore Gasport website, “Project Site
Plan,” http://en.aguirreoffshoregasport.com/the-aguirre-offshore-gasport-project-overview/lng-
gasport-project-site-plans/.
XXXIV. Singapore
A. OPERATIONAL
Singapore LNG Phase 1-2: Year and capacity from Singapore LNG Corp., “Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong Officially Opens the Singapore LNG Terminal,” News Release, February 25,
2014, http://www.slng.com.sg/newsroom-press-release-20140225.html. Cost from
Hydrocarbons Technology, “Singapore LNG Terminal, Jurong Island, Singapore,”
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/singaporelngterminal/.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Singapore LNG Phase 3: Year from Cou Hui Hong and Ramsey Al-Rikabi, “Singapore Bids for
Role as LNG Hub With Second Terminal,” Bloomberg, February 25, 2014,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-25/singapore-plans-to-build-second-lng-terminal-in-
country-s-east.html. Capacity from Singapore LNG Corp., “Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
Officially Opens the Singapore LNG Terminal,” News Release, February 25, 2014,
http://www.slng.com.sg/newsroom-press-release-20140225.html.
XXXV. South Korea
A. OPERATIONAL
Gwangyang: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Gas and Oil Connections, “POSCO
Completes LNG Terminal in Gwangyang,” July 7, 2005,
http://www.gasandoil.com/news/south_east_asia/fff7fe41c85dd715f16f54514fd2d5b2?b_start=
9520.
Incheon: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Pyeong-Taek: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
Tong-Yeong: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Samcheok: Year, capacity and construction status from International Gas Union, World LNG
Report, 52. Cost from Charles Lee, “S Korea’s LNG demand to fall 1.5% to 38.29 mil mt by
2027: energy ministry,” Platts, April 30, 2013, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-
gas/seoul/s-koreas-lng-demand-to-fall-15-to-3829-mil-mt-27927622.
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C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Borycong: Year, capacity and cost from Yonhap News Agency website, “Two Korean firms to
build US$681 mln LNG terminal in S. Korea,” May 15, 2013,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2013/05/15/71/0200000000AEN20130515006700320F.H
TML.
Smacheok Expansion: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
XXXVI. Spain
A. OPERATIONAL
Barcelona: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Bilbao: Capacity and cost from David Nakamura, “BP Amoco and partners sanction major
‘wellhead to wire’ integrated energy project,” Hydrocarbon Online, June 26, 2000,
http://www.hydrocarbononline.com/doc/bp-amoco-and-partners-sanction-major-wellhead-0001.
Bilbao Expansion: Capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012. Year from A Barrel Full, “Bilbao LNG Terminal,” December 2,
2013, http://abarrelfull.wikidot.com/bilbao-lng-terminal.
Cartagena: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
El Musel: Year from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The LNG
Industry in 2012, 27. Capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2011 (Paris: GIIGNL, 2011).
Huelva: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Mugardos: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Zeus Intelligence, “LNG Import Terminal Profile:
Murgardos LNG terminal, Galicia, Spain,” February 15, 2006,
http://member.zeusintel.com/ZLNGR/show_image.aspx?id=1918.
Sagunto: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Zeus Intelligence, “LNG Import Terminal Profile:
Sagunto, Valencia, Spain,” February 15, 2006,
http://member.zeusintel.com/ZLNGR/show_image.aspx?id=1917.
B. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Bilbao Expansion 2: Year, capacity and construction status from International Gas Union, World
LNG Report 2013.
Tenerife: Year and capacity from LNG market website, “Tenerife LNG Terminal (Tenerife),”
http://www.lngmarket.com/installation/Tenerife-LNG-Terminal-83#/Tenerife-LNG-Terminal-
83. Construction status from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
“Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.”
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C. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Gran Canaria: Year and capacity from LNG market website, “Gran Canaria LNG Terminal (Gran
Canaria),” http://www.lngmarket.com/installation/Gran-Canaria-LNG-Terminal-80#/Gran-
Canaria-LNG-Terminal-80.
XXXVII. Sweden
A. UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Gothenburg LNG Terminal: Year and capacity from Kari Liuhto, “A liquefied natural gas terminal
boom in the Baltic Sea region?” Electronic Publications of the Pan-European Institute, May
2012, http://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-ja-
tietopaketit/Documents/Liuhto%20LNG.pdf. Cost from Port of Gothenburg website, “New
terminal for liquefied natural gas,” February 11, 2011,
http://www.portofgothenburg.com/News-desk/News-articles/New-terminal-for-liquefied-
natural-gas/. Construction status from Port of Gothenburg website, “LNG terminal at the Port
of Gothenburg,” September 18, 2013, http://www.portofgothenburg.com/About-the-
port/Sustainable-port/Liquefied-natural-gas--LNG/LNG-terminal-at-the-Port-of-Gothenburg-/.
XXXVIII. Taiwan
A. OPERATIONAL
Yung-An: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Taichung: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from LGC Fuel, “Taichung LNG Terminal Taiwan,”
http://www.lgcfuel.com/taichung-lng-terminal-taiwan/.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Taipei LNG: Year and capacity from Platts, “Taiwan’s CPC finalizes location of third LNG
terminal, says chairman,” September 19, 2012, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-
gas/tokyo/taiwans-cpc-finalizes-location-of-third-lng-terminal-7079593.
XXXIX. Thailand
A. OPERATIONAL
Map Ta Phut: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Map Ta Phut
LNG Regasification Terminal, Thailand,” http://www.hydrocarbons-
technology.com/projects/thailandptt/.
B. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Map Ta Phut Expansion: Year and capacity from PTT LNG website, “Company Information,”
http://www.pttlng.com/en/pj_composition.aspx. Status from PTT LNG website, “Project
Milestones,” http://www.pttlng.com/en/pj_mile.aspx.
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XL. Turkey
A. OPERATIONAL
Aliaga/Izmir: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from King and Spalding, LNG in Europe (2006),
27, http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/LNG_in_Europe.pdf. 
Marmara Ereglisi: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Zeus Intelligence, “LNG Import Terminal
Profile: Marmara Ereglisi, Turkey,” May 1, 2005,
http://member.zeusintel.com/ZLNGR/show_image.aspx?id=1149.
XLI. Ukraine
A. PROPOSED/ANNOUNCED
Black Sea LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, “Database for QFlex-QMax Acceptability.” Cost from Invest Ukraine website,
“Direct Expenses of Ukraine on LNG Terminal National Project will Equal to 3-day Payment
to Gazprom,” March 30, 2012, http://investukraine.com/5127-direct-expenses-of-ukraine-on-
lng-terminal-national-project-will-equal-to-3-day-payment-to-gazprom.
Port of Yuzhny FSRU: Year and cost from Investment Port of Kyiv Region website, “LNG-
terminal construction will start in Yuzhny in November – Kaskiv,” http://invest-
koda.gov.ua/en/lng-terminal-construction-will-start-in-yuzhny-in-november-kaskiv/. Capacity
from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
XLII. United Arab Emirates
A. OPERATIONAL
Jebel Ali FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012.
XLIII. United Kingdom
A. OPERATIONAL
Isle of Grain Train 1-3: Year from National Grid plc website, “National Grid Grain LNG: UK
leaders in LNG importation,” http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/F57A356F-603E-
4738-ABFF-26920C061A71/41131/GrainBrochure0209.pdf. Cost and capacity from Ben
Farey, “U.K. Isle of Grain LNG Terminal’s Expansion Delayed, Grid Says,” Bloomberg,
November 29, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-29/u-k-isle-of-grain-lng-
terminal-s-expansion-delayed-grid-says.html.
Dragon: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Dragon LNG Terminal,
United Kingdom,” http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/dragon-lng/.
South Hook: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from South Hook LNG, South Hook LNG Seasons,
1, 2012, 4,
http://www.southhooklng.com/uploads/newsletters/SHLNGAutumnNewsletter2012.pdf.
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Teesside FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. 
XLIV. U.S.A.
A. OPERATIONAL
Cameron LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. 
Cove Point: Capacity from Dominion Virginia Power Website, “Growth at Dominion Cove Point
LNG.” Mothball Information from Dominion Virginia Power Website, “History of Cove
Point,” https://www.dom.com/business/gas-transmission/cove-point/history-of-cove-point.jsp 
Cove Point Expansion I: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. 
Cove Point Expansion II: Year and capacity from Dominion Virginia Power Website, “Growth at
Dominion Cove Point LNG,” https://www.dom.com/dominion-virginia-power/powering-
virginia/dominion-cove-point.jsp.
Elba Island: Year and capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Elba Island LNG Terminal,
United States of America,” http://www.hydrocarbons-
technology.com/projects/elbaislandlngtermina/. Mothball Information from California Energy
Commission, “Significant Events of LNG History,”
http://www.energy.ca.gov/lng/documents/SIGNIFICANT_EVENTS_LNG_HISTORY.PDF.
Everett: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers,
The LNG Industry in 2012.
Freeport LNG: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Port Freeport, “State of the Port 2009”
Presentation, Slide 17, http://www.portfreeport.com/about_files/StateofthePort2009.pdf.
Golden Pass: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry. Cost from GCaptain, “ExxonMobil and Qatar Submit $10
Billion Request to Export LNG From the US Gulf Coast,” August 17, 2012.
http://gcaptain.com/exxonmobil-qatar-submit-billion/ 
Gulf LNG Energy: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Ellen Mitchell, “Pascagoula’s LNG importing
facility could see exports as well,” Alabama.com, June 27, 2012, http://blog.al.com/press-
register-business/2012/06/pascagoulas_lng_importing_faci.html.
Lake Charles: Year and capacity from Hydrocarbons Technology, “Trunkline LNG Lake Charles
Terminal, Louisiana, United States of America,” http://www.hydrocarbons-
technology.com/projects/trunklinelnglakechar/.
Neptune LNG FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Fitzgerald, “2 Costly LNG Terminals.”
Northeast Gateway FRSU: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural
Gas Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Jay Fitzgerald, “2 Costly LNG Terminals
Sit Idle,” The Boston Globe, January 23, 2013,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/01/23/offshore-gas-terminals-mass-bust-
far/Qu8dyZzF6yBNAsDNaTT1ZJ/story.html.
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Sabine Pass: Year and capacity from the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas
Importers, The LNG Industry in 2012. Cost from Rigzone, “Cheniere Completes Sabine Pass
LNG Terminal in 3Q 2009,” November 6, 2009,
http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/82193/Cheniere_Completes_Sabine_Pass_LNG_Termi
nal_in_3Q_2009.
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